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Introduction 
The corporate distress is a complex issue which recently is even more important for a global 
economy characterized by a material number of companies which enter a distress scenario. 
Dealing with distressed companies is even more difficult when approaching a private company 
(or SME), either because the information available to prepare the proper due diligence cannot be 
sufficient or because a material part of the SMEs is owned by families who often are not willing 
to give up the control of the company they have founded. In particular, in Italy the 76% of the 
companies are SMEs (Banca IFIS, 2018) and inside those companies the 68% of them (100.790 
in absolute terms) are owned by a family (Cerved, 2018/A). Thus, in Italy the issue is 
significantly important, not only because of the reluctancy of the family-owners, but also because 
often the SMEs entrepreneurs must be educated financially in order to not make the same 
mistakes in the future. For those reasons, who deals with the Italian distressed SME niche faces a 
very complex world; thus, it is important to analyze the issue in detail in order to increase the 
possibility to find the right way to rescue those small companies that represent the “driving force” 
of the Italian economy. 
Obviously, the main reason which recently led the Italian small companies to distress is related to 
the 2008 global financial crisis, but the reasons that lead a company to distress – and in the most 
serious cases to bankruptcy – can be multiple and different. Indeed, a company can suffer either 
because of a change of the external environment or because of internal cost or capital structure 
inefficiencies. Similarly, a company can have operative or financial troubles, impacting directly 
the income statement or the balance sheet, respectively. Again, the reasons for distress can be 
related to a mix of all the causes mentioned so far. Accordingly, to understand the path which 
have led the company to distress requires a thorough analysis of the whole context, from the 
market and industry composition to the financial statement analysis. 
Moreover, it is critical to detect the distress status sufficiently soon. For this reason, the 
researchers have provided – and still provide – a high number of studies aimed at discovering 
how to identify in advance a distress scenario inside a company, in order to be in a position to 
take the necessary countermeasures when it is still possible to revert the company performance. 
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In combination with those studies, other researchers have tried to adjust the most common 
valuation techniques including the distress component1. 
In addition to those issues, it is also important to know perfectly how to manage a procedure 
aimed at dealing with a distressed company; depending on the severity of the crisis, the procedure 
can be addressed to liquidate the company assets or to continue the company operations. 
According to Cerved (2018/B), in the first trimester of the 2018 both the types of procedures are 
decreasing, signaling a recovery from the negative performance of the post-crisis period; 
however, the number of procedures is not trivial, accounting for 2.945 liquidation procedures (- 
6% than the 2017 first trimester) and 370 non-bankruptcy procedures (- 16% than the 2017 first 
trimester). 
A particular attention shall be given to the procedures aimed at continuing the company 
operations, given the fact that the recent reforms on the Italian bankruptcy law are focused in 
encouraging the parties to give priority to continue the company operations instead of liquidating 
the assets. In practice, if the new reform will be approved, in the future the liquidation legal tools 
will be used only when there are no other possibilities which guarantee a better solution for the 
creditors. 
A significant role in a procedure aimed at continuing the company operations is often performed 
by the distress investor, i.e. a fund specialized in investing in distressed companies in order to 
obtain a positive return. In Italy the presence of those funds is not pervasive yet, so it is important 
– at this point in time – to provide an analysis of those players in order to see how they may 
operate in order to revert the Italian distressed companies’ performance. Accordingly, an analysis 
of those investors is important in order to see the way in which they can behave, given the fact 
that those entities shall have an advanced knowledge in all the issues which entail the investment 
in a distressed company, i.e. business, financial, valuation and legal expertise. 
The final aim of this dissertation is to contribute to describe and analyse which are the most 
important aspects that regard the activity of the distress investors and the way in which those 
entities contribute in recovering the performance of a distressed company. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to examine all the business and legal issues that such players should know in detail. 
Then, those bases will be used by such investors in order to select the right strategy for both the 
distressed company and the distress investor itself. 
                                                 
1 See Damodaran (2010). 
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For this purpose, the first Chapter will try to clarify and organize the main definitions of 
“distress” that the literature has provided so far. In particular, a final definition will be provided, 
and the principal distress stage models will be presented. Moreover, the reasons for distress are 
classified in various ways and a different approach will be presented. Finally, the concept of 
“turnover” will be discussed, since it represents the logical consequence of a distress period in the 
case where there is the necessity to continue the company operations. 
Then, the Italian bankruptcy law will be explained, in order to define the perimeter inside which 
the parties involved are included. In this section, the legal tools provided by the law will be 
presented; the instruments will be divided into in-court procedures and out-of-court procedures2. 
Moreover, the new Italian bankruptcy reform (not in force yet) will be described in order to 
provide an idea about the future of the Italian bankruptcy law system. 
The third Chapter will include a focus on the procedures aimed at continuing the company 
operations, performing a comparison among them and finding the main drivers which lead a 
distress investor (or an advisory company) to prefer one procedure instead of the other ones. 
Moreover, the main actors of those procedures will be described, in order to have a clear 
framework about who usually participates during the negotiation process when trying to rescue a 
distressed company and which are the main conflicts of interest among the stakeholders of the 
procedure. 
Chapter 5 will include a description of the distress investors, a classification of their main 
strategies and an analysis of the way in which they work in order to decide the target company in 
which to invest. Those funds can invest in different items of the distressed company (i.e. assets, 
debt or equity) and may have either a speculative behaviour or a strategic one. Clearly, for the 
purposes of this paper, the strategic behaviour will be analysed more in detail. 
Finally, the case study is presented. The Distressed Company3 object of the case was an Italian 
medium company specialized in the footwear design industry. After a couple of decades of 
significant growth, because of a mix of different reasons – both internal and external – it entered 
a distress scenario. As a consequence, the Distressed Company managers decided to perform 
different activities in order to try recovering the company performance. After some failed 
attempts, a distress investor entered the procedure. Thus, after the presentation of the Distressed 
                                                 
2 In reality, the out-of-court procedures may involve a minimal involvement of the court; however, the presence of 
the court in those cases is not pervasive. 
3 For disclosure reasons, the name of the distressed company and the parties that have been involved will not be 
disclosed. 
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Company and its reasons for distress, the events occurred in order to turn the company around 
will be described and analysed. Finally, the strategy implemented by the distress investor will be 
analysed in detail. 
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Chapter 1: Corporate distress 
 
1.1 Definitions 
Finding a final and exhaustive definition of corporate distress is difficult, if not impossible. The 
researchers typically use a lot of creativity to find definitions which represent the same aim, i.e. 
to describe the fact that a company is definitely in troubles and what had happened before the 
moment in which the distressed company management had to decide whether to reorganize the 
firm or liquidate it. In practice, there is one definition for each author. This may not be surprising 
if we think that usually a definition is “built” basing on the purposes of the study and the dataset 
used. 
To make the issue more complicated, the researchers tend to treat other terms such as corporate 
crisis, decline and failure as synonym, making the issue even more complex4. For example, 
Müller (1985) uses the term ‘corporate crisis’ to define “un unwanted event which always 
seriously threatens the continued existence of the firm” (Müller, 1985). Similarly, Outecheva 
(2007) employs the word “‘corporate distress’ synonymly with ‘corporate failure’ as an overall 
term for the determination of single stages of the decline period and in order to reproduce them as 
a dynamic process” (Outecheva, 2007). A different perspective is given by the Anglo-Saxon 
literature, which adds a probabilistic element into the definition of what they call ‘organizational 
crisis’ (Pearson and Clair, 1998)5; in particular, the authors seem to adopt a broader definition 
underlining that in general a crisis is a low-probability event. The latter fact illustrates clearly that 
each researcher creates a definition which is tailor made for the research he is making6. 
In general, two of the most used terms are ‘decline’ and ‘failure’. However, it is not clear in the 
literature whether those two terms are used in a static way or in a dynamic way. In this case, 
static means that a definition indicates a particular point in time, while dynamic is linked to an 
                                                 
4 For example, Pretorius (2009) states that “As the research progressed and while probing the different databases, it 
was found that failure is associated with bankruptcy, liquidation, insolvency, crisis, decline in performance, […], 
collapse, crashing, accounting practices, project failure, distress, trouble, systems failure, franchise failure, being 
non-successful, and more”. 
5 “An organizational crisis is a low probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and 
is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be 
made swiftly” (Pearson and Clair, 1998). 
6 In the specific case, the authors want to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to crisis management research, using 
psychological and social-political points of view. Accordingly, it seems reasonable such a broad definition. 
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interval of time during which the word takes significance. Watson & Everett (1999) have found 
that some studies report divergent results simply because of a different definition of ‘failure’. 
On one side, ‘decline’ is seen as a dynamic notion in most works, with some exceptions. For 
example, Chowdhury and Lang (1993) say that “Decline and crisis are the low and high extremes 
of the rate of performance deterioration”: in their work, the authors both analyze the gradual 
component of the decline (the dynamic way) and calculate a decline rate to see whether a 
company is in decline or not for one point in time (more close to the static way). However, as 
precised above, the greatest part of decline definitions include only the dynamic component. For 
example, Lorange & Nelson (1987) define ‘decline’ as “Degeneration of organizational 
performance in sales, profitability, market share and technological leadership”, indicating a 
dynamic path of decrease of a performance. Similarly, D’Aveni (1989) talks about “…decreasing 
internal resource munificence over time with respect to two critical resources: financial and 
human (managerial) resources”, focusing on the interval of time characterized by a loss of 
potentially critical resources which could lead to solvency problems. 
On the other side, ‘failure’ is adopted by the researchers in many ways. Sometimes it is used 
dynamically: for example Richardson, Nwankwo & Richardson (1994) say that “Business failing 
organisations are those that will become insolvent unless appropriate management actions are 
taken to effect a turnaround in financial performance”, suggesting that there could be a period in 
which a company can be in a failure stage, period that the management must use to recover from 
the bad performance. Alternatively, – and this is the prevalent use of the term – most of the 
authors see ‘failure’ as a static issue strictly linked to bankruptcy. Many authors match the term 
‘failure’ with strong terms such as default, zero7, closure, going out of business, dissolution, to 
shut down, insolvency, bankruptcy and in one case the term death8 has been used. Moreover, 
special versions of ‘failure’ exist: for instance, Lussier & Pfeifer (2001) give a rule to determine 
whether a firm is in failure by setting a three years period of negative profits, while Sudarsanam 
& Lai (2001) suggest that an organization is failing when there is a sufficiently large deviation 
from a “superior performance”. Cannon & Edmonson (2005) define ‘failure’ simply as a 
“deviation from expected and desired results” (Cannon & Edmonton, 2005). 
                                                 
7 “Failure occurs when the level of organisation capital reaches zero. It is no longer able to meet its financial 
obligations to debt holders, employees, or suppliers and resorts to or is forced into bankruptcy or liquidation” 
(Levinthal, 1991). 
8 “Failures refer to deaths of entire firms and industry exits by multiple business companies” (Henderson, 1999). 
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A solution about the lack of clarity of those two terms is provided by Sheppard & Chowdhury 
(2005), which give a sequential order when defining ‘decline’ and ‘failure’. In particular, they 
argue that “Organisation failure is the end result of a decline” (Sheppard & Chowdhury, 2005); 
thus, describing ‘decline’ in a dynamic way and ‘failure’ as a final consequence (a point in time) 
of the decline period, i.e. in a static way. This view is confirmed by Schmitt (2009), who 
specifies two main points: 
• Following Altman (1968) and Altman & Hotchkiss (2006), ‘failure’ could be defined in 
several ways but related to a point in time event: 
i. Economically, i.e. “[…] the realized rate of return on invested capital […] is 
significantly and continually lower than prevailing rates on similar investments” 
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006); 
ii. Legally, i.e. when a corporation is not able to respect the terms agreed with its 
creditors anymore; 
iii. In business terms, i.e. when a company ceases its operations because of a 
bankruptcy proceed; 
• ‘Decline’ is related to a specific period of time, and it describes a process which might, 
but not for sure, end in corporate failure. 
In sum, the failure event can happen only after a period of decline. This seems to be the 
interpretation given by the greatest part of the researchers. 
After having classified the most critical criteria for each of the terms, Pretorius (2009) has been 
able to summarize the two definitions in order to arrive at a middle way between all the 
definitions provided in the literature: 
• Decline: “A venture is in decline when its performance worsens (decreasing resource 
slack) over consecutive periods and it experiences distress in continuing operations. 
Decline is a natural precursor in the process to failure”; 
• Failure: “A venture fails when it involuntarily becomes unable to attract new debt or 
equity funding to reverse decline; consequently, it cannot continue to operate under the 
current ownership and management. Failure is the endpoint at discontinuance 
(bankruptcy) and when it is reached, operations cease and judicial proceedings take 
effect” (Pretorius, 2009). 
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Moving on the term ‘distress’, even though it is included inside the definition of decline provided 
by Pretorius (2009), it could be juxtaposed somewhere between the two expressions above. 
Indeed, on one side, ‘distress’ can be viewed as a term indicating the degree of severity of the 
strategic, operative and financial condition of a company, a meaning very close to the ‘failure’ 
one. For example, Sudarsanam & Lai (2001) define distress as a percentage measuring the 
bankruptcy risk of a company, linking directly the distress concept to the bankruptcy one. On the 
other side, the word ‘distress’ is used to indicate a path covering a period of time during which 
the strategic, operative and financial performance of a corporation decreases, a sense very similar 
to the ‘decline’ one. For instance, Schweizer & Nienhaus (2017) do not define directly the term 
‘distress’ but it seems clear in their work that ‘distress’ is used to describe a multi stage period 
characterized by a continuative decline of the firm performance. 
To make the things more complex, it would be enough to recall the definition of ‘corporate 
distress’ used by Outecheva (2007), who combines the latter term with ‘corporate failure’ to 
indicate the dynamic process that leads a company from a healthy situation to a problematic one. 
This circumstance demonstrates that the real meaning of ‘distress’ is between the two most 
important words present in the literature. 
Finally, coupling the definitions of ‘decline’ and ‘failure’, ‘distress’ could be defined as a 
scenario in which a company is continuously decreasing its performance – from a strategic, 
operative and/or financial perspective – until it reaches the point in time in which the 
management must decide whether to restructure the company or file for bankruptcy.  
For a temporal point of view, the distress period starts immediately after the symptoms (even 
invisible) of the decline start and ends when the managers must decide about the future of their 
corporation9. It follows that during this time interval (which length is not easy to specify since it 
is firm-specific) there could be – and it is usually the case – different degrees of decline. 
 
1.2 Corporate distress as a stage process 
A simple general definition of distress is not adequate to understand exhaustively the concept. In 
particular, there is the need of analyzing in detail the time interval considered, since the extent of 
                                                 
9 Some authors use the term “turnaround process” when defining a similar notion (Chowdhury, 2002; Grinyer et al., 
1988; Hoffman, 1989). However, sometimes they include also the turnaround strategy inside the time interval. 
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the decline is not stable during this period. The literature has provided different models which 
help to find some common characteristics of the distress periods, often assuming different 
perspectives as expected. 
To analyze the corporate distress at this level is important for at least five aspects, which cover 
the most central issues about a business environment: 
• Legally, an analysis of the intensity of the corporate distress is essential, among other 
purposes, for separating the solvency scenario and the insolvency one. For example, an 
unexpected negative event or wrong behavior of the management may let slide 
immediately a company into insolvency because the enterprise value falls straight away; 
• Strictly linked to the legal aspect there is the accounting one: the transition of a company 
from a solvency state to an insolvency one implicates a change of the accounting 
framework which directly affects the financial statements; 
• From a corporate governance perspective, it is critical to determine when a company is in 
several distress in order to define the “vicinity of insolvency” status. This status is 
important since it may imply a change of the managers’ fiduciary duties that they owe to 
their shareholders. Indeed, in case of corporate distress, it may be in the shareholders’ 
interest to take risky decisions because the downside risk has become low (i.e. in the most 
extreme cases, the value of equity is close to zero); but on the other side, the creditors’ 
interest is the opposite one (i.e. too risky strategies would diminish further the probability 
to be paid). In other words, under distress the equity holders would like that the managers 
“gamble for resurrection”, while the lenders would prefer a package of conservative 
measures that preserve the (remaining part of the) enterprise value. The debate is about 
“whether directors in the vicinity of insolvency are primarily obliged to act as trustees for 
the debt capital providers” (Bachmann et al., 2014). Irrespective of the outcome of the 
debate, if there are any changes (positive or negative) of the fiduciary duties that the 
management must guarantee to the lenders, it is important to detect the precise moment in 
which the former have the right or are obliged to behave differently (to be more 
conservative or to “gamble”, respectively);  
• From a financial point of view, it is important to detect the exact moment in which the 
degree of distress severity is high. For example, a bank may want to know when it has to 
take more precautions on its contract with a company, as for example setting tighter 
covenants or asking for more collateral for its term loan contracts. On the other side of the 
14 
 
banking contract, a company may be interested in knowing when the distress has become 
dangerous, so that it can communicate to the bank the situation in a transparent way and 
respecting the proper timing10; 
• Finally, there is the business perspective. For a manager, it is important to select the most 
appropriate moment to take the right decisions. Moreover, a CEO is interested in 
predicting the distress, since it is for sure that he will not want to enter a similar scenario. 
For this purpose, the literature has provided a very high number of studies aimed at 
forecasting the corporate distress years before when it really happens; on average, the best 
models are able to detect the start of a crisis period two years before it effectively occurs.  
 
1.2.1 Interval models 
An important theoretical model which regards the timing of the distress severity is provided by 
D’Aveni (1989). The author considers the distress time interval as a whole, without dividing it 
into stages. He differentiates three types of patterns: 
• Sudden decline: characterized by a very rapid decrease of the performance followed by an 
immediate filing for bankruptcy; 
• Gradual decline: identified with a slow, marginally incremental reduction in the 
enterprise value; as soon as the decline reaches an irreversible stage, the managers have to 
file for bankruptcy; 
• Lingering: in this case, the firm declines rapidly at the beginning of the distress period but 
remains in a sort of deadlock scenario, so that differently from the sudden decline the 
company stays alive after the quick decline. 
 
                                                 
10 Otherwise, if the company does not communicate properly with the bank there would be a reputational problem. 
The bank may think that the company is hiding a bad situation: this fact may be dangerous for the company because 
the bank may decide to not finance the company anymore. 
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Figure 1.1: Proposed patterns of declining resources preceding bankruptcy. Source: D’Aveni (1989) 
 
The author suggests that during the distress period the company is in a state of “strategic 
paralysis”, indicating that there are differences between the managers’ decisions in healthy 
periods and in case of distress. He links this dissimilarity of behaviors to the notion of resource 
scarcity: the higher the distress severity, the lower the resources11 available as the distress period 
goes on. Further, this erosion procedure is alimented by the need to maintain a positive cash 
position by selling some assets in order to finance the turnaround strategy. 
To support the theory provided, the author finds that on one side, five years before the 
bankruptcy, there were differences on the consequences of decline between lingering and gradual 
declining companies12; on the other side, two years before bankruptcy, no dissimilarities have 
been found between the two types of declining firms. This supports the fact that there exist 
different paths of corporate distress. Accordingly, the management shall thoroughly analyze the 
type of distress pattern their company is having. In particular, when making this analysis, they 
shall focus also on the characteristics of the industry in which they are operative, since the study 
shows that a fast-growing industry favors a lingering-type pattern, delaying bankruptcy. A 
sudden decline would be a signal that a decision – whether to reorganize the corporation or to 
liquidate it – must be taken soon, while a lingering or gradual decline gives more time to think 
about the best strategy to implement in order to maximize the payoff in such dangerous situation. 
                                                 
11 D’Aveni (1989) focalizes on two main types of resources: financial (i.e. decrease in liquidity and profitability) and 
human (i.e. forced layoffs and employees’ escape). 
12 “[…] the consequences of decline include managerial imbalances, actions concerned with efficiency, centralization 
effects, and strategic paralysis, all reflecting threat-rigidity responses” (D’Aveni, 1989). 
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The D’Aveni (1989) model has been integrated by Francis & Desai (2005), which analyze three 
drivers of decline that influence the way in which the managers can operate to recover the 
company: severity, suddenness and urgency. 
The severity of a distress implicates that the higher it is, the lower is the range of actions that the 
managers may adopt. Moreover, the higher the degree of severity, the more likely is the 
implementation of drastic measures (for example assets disposal, operational or financial 
restructuring and repositioning), since the situation would be more deteriorated. 
The concept of suddenness present in this model is the one introduced by D’Aveni (1989) and 
indicates how gradually a company is deteriorating. In particular, the higher the degree of 
suddenness (i.e. the more rapid a decline is), the more difficult is to recover a company. 
The third factor analyzed is urgency; the authors define urgency as a mix of severity and 
suddenness. Even in this case, the higher it is, the more difficult is to have a successful 
turnaround. 
 
1.2.2 Sub-interval models 
After having analyzed the distress period on a macro perspective, it is useful now to focus on the 
attempts made by the researchers in order to find some characteristics of the distress which can 
be clustered into a sub-time interval included in the total period of distress. The following models 
are very important in particular for a manager perspective, since they serve as a guideline to 
select the right strategy to reorganize the company successfully. Indeed, in a business life-time 
cycle perspective, a distress situation is an extraordinary and often unexpected scenario; 
accordingly, the risk that the management finds itself unprepared is very high. The direct 
consequence could be the selection of the wrong turnaround policy because of either a bad timing 
analysis (i.e. the managers believe not to have enough time to prepare an appropriate and rational 
countermeasure for reverting the negative trend, so that they believe to be in a hurry) or a lack of 
skills and capabilities to manage the dangerous condition properly (for example, the managers 
could decide to sell drastically a high amount of assets in order to stabilize the cash position, 
when in reality the secondary effect is a huge loss of the company long term enterprise value)13. 
                                                 
13 “[…] under conditions of collapse, managerial behavior becomes reactionary or experimental, since the imminent 
dissolution of the organization is a very real possibility. Because there are serious time constraints, little planning is 
done, and less than efficient decisions are accepted” (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). 
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In a chronological order, the first important work which has tried to create a temporal 
classification of the corporate distress pattern has been performed by Müller (1985). The author 
suggests a ‘narrative’ way of explaining the corporate distress pattern, by dividing it into four 
subsequent categories: strategic crisis, performance crisis, liquidity crisis and bankruptcy. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: The Müller four stages model. Own elaboration. 
 
Following the model, a healthy company begins to have its first signals of distress because of a 
strategic crisis. It means that the organization is not able anymore to maintain its unique and 
inimitable sources of competitive advantage, for example related to cost efficiency, 
differentiation, working capital, intangibles or resource exclusivity. The competitive advantage of 
the company is not sustainable to any further extent, and as a direct consequence the distress 
reaches the second stage, the performance crisis. Relatively to the distressed firm, the 
competitors are more powerful now, and the main ratios (both profitable and financial) show an 
alarming decline. In other words, the distressed company is not able anymore to meet the planned 
targets in terms of both revenues and operative margin. Consequently, the financial performance 
of the firm becomes very negative, reaching the liquidity crisis. Often the distressed company is 
obliged to decrease its sales prices in order to deal with the increased competition. Moreover, it 
may be forced to offer improving conditions to the creditors (for example decreasing the days in 
payables) in order to reduce the risk of losing them because of the lower reputation. In this stage 
the threat of insolvency increases, and if the managers do not take the necessary actions, the only 
outcome is represented by the final stage, insolvency and firm dissolution. 
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A common concern found also in the D’Aveni (1989) model is that it is important for the 
managers to well understand where they are, because the later the moment in which they 
recognize to be in several distress, the narrower the range of actions they can implement. Further, 
those remaining possibilities are very likely to be the less efficient ones. For instance, if the crisis 
has been found at the beginning of the corporate distress period, the distressed company has the 
necessary time and reputation for asking for a renegotiation of the covenant with the banks, 
obtaining a debt standstill or organizing an efficient auction which let the firm sell its non-core 
assets at a higher price; on the other side, if the management discovers the distress too late, the 
solutions are more inefficient, such as a less convenient asset disposal or a debt-equity swap. 
This model is not valid for every distressed firms. Of course, the way in which one company gets 
distressed is unique, so that a classification such that might not be suitable for all the distressed 
corporations. A company may skip the strategic crisis stage by suffering directly a performance 
problem, for example when for some organizational reasons (such as the opening of an inefficient 
new core plant which substitutes the old one) the company finds itself unable to offer its products 
at the same competitive prices, with a negative consequence on the revenues. Alternatively, 
external market forces (such as an unexpected change of the consumers’ tastes) could lead the 
company out of the market because its offer has become obsolete. 
Moreover, the distress period can be interrupted in every moment. In fact, a good CEO may 
recognize in advance the strategic problems: in this case, its company may enter the distress 
period but only for the time required to implement the set of actions which permit the firm to 
solve the deficiency. Similarly, a performance problem could be solved by the appointment of a 
new Chief Operating Officer which improves the firm efficiency or R&D department. 
A second well-known model has been proposed by Weitzel & Jonsson (1989). The authors’ goal 
is to give a more comprehensive and homogeneous definition of decline, since they recognize 
that various researchers have focused singularly on different components of the decline, namely 
the following: 
i. “A reduction in some organizational size measure (e.g., workforce, market share, assets, 
etc.); 
ii. A stage in the organization's life cycle; 
iii. Internal stagnation, or inefficiency; 
iv. A failure to recognize warning signals (internal or external) about changes needed to 
remain competitive; 
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v. A failure to adapt or change to fit external environmental demands” (Weitzel & Jonsson, 
1989). 
Accordingly, they summarize all those factors in a definition which includes all of them14. 
Even in this case, the authors have stressed the point that it is important for the management to 
detect the distress condition as soon as possible: further, their model includes a stage which is 
characterized by the inability of the managers to identify the reasons of the decline, as will be 
analyzed later. 
Going into the details of the model, the authors theorize five stages: blinded, inaction, faulty 
action, crisis and dissolution. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: The Weitzel & Jonsson model. Source: Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) 
 
                                                 
14 “Organizations enter the state of decline when they fail to anticipate, recognize, avoid, neutralize, or adapt to 
external or internal pressures that threaten the organization's long-term survival. Decline begins when an 
organization fails to anticipate or recognize and effectively respond to any deterioration of organizational 
performance that threatens long-term survival. […] Decline can also begin if the organization fails to respond to an 
opportunity to improve organizational performance” (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). 
20 
 
The blinded stage is characterized by a lack of recognition of the distress symptoms. Those 
symptoms sometimes are already existent but impossible to detect (for example, the lack of 
clarity about the communication to the employees of the corporate philosophy and mission in a 
period in which the industry is growing fast and without excess of demand), while other times the 
problems are evident but the management (or the middle and low-level employees) do not 
possess the right skills, capabilities and motivations to detect them. Accordingly, by definition 
there is a “grey area” of blindness in every company: the dimension of this area depends largely 
on the organizational structure and the corporate culture. It is reasonable to assume that when the 
company is in a healthy state for decades, the culture tends to be far away from a proactive 
behavior towards distress prevention; in specific, when things are going well for many years, the 
business environment creates automatically an inertia status which congeals the company. For 
this reason, in general “in the first stage of decline, organizations have insufficient methods of 
internal surveillance” (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). Simply, the company is not used to perform 
activities such as employees’ monitoring and quality control. Particularly important is to control 
the employees’ motivation, since a worker perfectly aligned with the company mission and 
focused on maximizing the enterprise value is the first step toward an early detection of the 
deficiencies. Moreover, it is important for a business to have the right organizational structure, in 
order to ease the probability to identify the flaws “from the top”. Finally, the firm shall train its 
employees in order to give them the right skills to find the mistakes, even for low-level workers; 
the latter are often better able to detect any early signal. 
The second phase of the model is the inaction stage: it is characterized by the absence of any 
activity by the management while the effects of the distress are evident and not hidden anymore. 
Obviously, the best thing to do immediately after the existence of a decline state has been 
discovered would be to take some remedial actions, but for some reasons the company stays in an 
impasse. In the meantime, the performance of the company is decreasing. If in the first stage the 
direct responsibilities are both of the managers and the lower-level employees (together with the 
external environment in case of impossible-to-detect symptoms), now the responsibilities of this 
misconduct are all on the managers. Sometimes it could happen that the lower-level employees 
have detected correctly the mistakes which may cause corporate distress, but the managers are 
not willing or able to take the necessary countermeasures. The reason is about the presence of 
some biases between the real severity of the condition and its managers’ perception. Weitzel and 
Jonsson (1989) find two types of biases: the first is time-related (i.e. the managers believe that the 
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threat is only temporary, so the best thing to do is to “wait and see”), while the second is cost 
saving-related (i.e. the administration is not willing to spend money for a reason it believes 
unjustified or value-destructive). A third reason is related to the inertia factor described above: 
the managers may decide not to change any operation because in the past the same set of 
activities have been successful. A final reason is associated to the psychological reaction of the 
managers as soon as they recognize that they could be responsible for the decreasing 
performance; the managers may be subjected to the so called “failure paranoia”, where 
“managers frequently refuse to admit that their organization is in trouble” (Whetten, 1980). The 
consequence of this behavior is usually a more centralized and narrow-based vision. 
The decrease of the performance goes on, reaching a sort of “point of no return” where the 
managers must take some actions. That is the faulty action stage, characterized by bad quality 
management’s choices. In this phase, the managers face a reality they have never dealt with, so it 
includes confusion and divergences about which direction to undertake to recover from the bad 
performance. Thus, most of the activities carried out in this time sub-interval are ineffective in 
correcting the problems. The internal environment becomes more nervous, the managers 
increasingly feel the pressure to make the right things quickly, while at the same time they have 
lost part of their credibility; tensions arise not only between managers and employees (the 
leadership of the formers is questioned) but also between the members of the administration 
function. As said before, the managers are forced to take quick and efficient decisions, entering a 
new field since they cannot defend anymore either the old strategy driven by the past good 
performances or the “wait and see” strategy of waiting for an automatic return to the good times. 
Due to this bad internal environment, the organizational structure goes towards a centralization of 
the decision-making process and a decrease of the communications between the different levels 
of the business structure. The problem is that usually the middle and low-level employees are the 
ones who know better how to improve the situation, so the company enters a virtuous cycle 
where the likelihood to take bad decisions is higher. Often, in this phase a change of the top 
management occurs, in order to signal the willingness to revert the negative pattern and to leave 
the company in better hands. 
Once a company has not been able to implement the right strategy which reverts the negative 
trend in performance, it enters the crisis stage. Most of the cases, this phase is characterized by 
confusion, procrastination and conflicts; as precised before, the company is not used to be in a 
scenario such that and the fact that the company is declining (despite the strong commitment of 
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the managers) leads to an environment full of irritability and frustration. However, this is the 
exact moment in which the company must take strong actions in order to recover the 
performance: hesitation is not a key word anymore. The literature calls the mentioned set of 
strong actions to be implemented in such situation turnaround15. “Now, revolutionary changes in 
structure, strategy, personnel, and ideology are necessary” (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989), and 
usually it is necessary the help of external users such as creditors, banks, distress investors and 
consulting companies. In this stage, the principal problems are about scarcity of resources, in 
particular human (since there is a higher probability that some key employees abandon the firm) 
and financial (due the material decrease in performance). 
Finally, the last stage of distress is dissolution. This phase is irreversible, since the company is in 
a too serious troubles because of the irreparable fall of market share, reputation, human capital 
and financial leverage. The only important thing here is to liquidate the company in the best way 
possible, without losing more value. 
A similar model has been provided by Slatter & Lovett (1999). The authors divide the distress 
process into four stages: 
• Crisis denial: a company enters in distress because it has ignored or underestimated the 
early signals of decline. For example, the managers may know that there are some deficits 
in the communication process between the different levels of the organizational structure, 
but they simply treat them as non-material for the business model implementation. This 
stage is quite similar to the Weitzel & Jonsson (1989)’s blinded stage; 
• Hidden crisis: the managers believe that the distress is temporary or due to external 
causes, so that it makes no sense to deviate from the strategy that has been successful so 
far. This phase is close to the inaction stage found in the model above; 
• Disintegration: now the managers have realized the severity of the distress, so they try to 
implement some corrective actions. However, as described in the Weitzel and Jonsson 
(1989) model, the likelihood of carrying out ineffective or disruptive activities is high. 
The above faulty action stage is very close to this one; 
• Organizational collapse: as in Weitzel and Jonsson (1989), the final outcome of the 
distress time interval, if not corrected, is characterized by employees escape, insolvency 
and liquidation. 
                                                 
15 A complete definition of turnaround is presented later in this chapter. 
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1.2.3 Other models 
The literature provides also models of crisis which are related to views very different from the 
economic ones. In this paragraph follows a description of a psychological model and a social-
psychological model which see the distress analysis from a different perspective. 
Other models focus on the psychological characteristics of the human being and seek to find the 
ways in which the individuals react under situations of high pressure or where unexpected events 
occur. A very important point of departure for those models is that “the crisis cannot be evaluated 
from the view of an individual who is experiencing it” (Mikušová & Horváthová, 2011), an 
assumption which suggests that a management turnover under distress periods is a preferable 
alternative. Moreover, as a basis for those models there is the assumption that a corporate crisis is 
an event which is emotional by definition, and that the likelihood to take wrong decisions is 
material. 
The most important model existent in the literature is the Caplan (1961) one16. The model focuses 
on the reaction of a single individual when a crisis occurs; however, the model can easily find 
application in the business context since we are talking about corporate decisions taken by one or 
few individuals17. The model divides the (individual) distress period into four stages: treat, 
consequence, appropriate response and disruption. In the first phase (treat), the individual is 
elaborating the fact that a trigger event has occurred so that the current situation is potentially 
critical; thus, the user starts to feel stressed, under pressure and with a new mood where he moves 
from a ‘quite’ status to a one in which he may take important decisions. Then starts the 
consequence stage where the “inability to cope with anxiety would begin to appear as well as 
stress, tears or a feeling of being guilty” (Mikušová & Horváthová, 2011); accordingly, the 
individual performance is likely to be disturbed by those mental biases. Alternatively, the user 
may feel incapable to act, of course a state which does not solve any problem. In the third phase 
(appropriate response), the person enters in an active mood, where he decides to react concretely 
in order to find a solution to the problem. To solve the crisis, the individual may use old 
techniques – not the best solution for a corporate decline, as seen in Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) – 
or he may ask to external experts for help. A third way is to resign from its task. Finally, if no 
                                                 
16 This model is a pure psychological one. Apart from this paper, the input of this model in an economic framework 
is present in Mikušová & Horváthová (2011). 
17 For this last purpose, probably a good starting point for further research could be to complicate the model applying 
it also for analyzing the way in which a group of people (i.e. the management) react when a crisis occurs. 
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solution has been found the person’s stress increases further until it reaches a state of mental 
disorder, where the individual risks of losing control of itself. This is the final stage of disruption. 
Shifting to the business application of this model, it is important to analyze the corporate distress 
time interval also from the point of view of the psychological reaction of the managers. Indeed, a 
corporate distress phase could be seen as a period where the people involved into the decision-
making process is disturbed by both evident and hidden biases. An analysis of the main cognitive 
problems the managers may have when under pressure can be decisive for developing the right 
strategy to either eliminate any risk of distress or to interrupt the distress period adopting the right 
choices. 
An alternative social-psychological model is provided by Arnold18, which focuses on the 
individual behavior in relation with the group in which he is working. In practice, he considers 
that in some cases a crisis scenario is managed by a certain amount of people, so it is useful to 
include also groups of people in this type of analyses. In its model, the author defines four stages: 
• Shock: as it seems usual, as soon as a trigger event linked to a crisis occurs the individual 
(or group of individuals) feel shocked. A shock can be manifested in different ways such 
as anxiety, panic, conflicts between members and confusion; 
• Denial: the first instinctive action is to try to return to the ordinariness, to the routine. It 
could be view either as a crisis refusal – as already reported in the Weitzel & Jonsson 
(1989)’s blinded stage and the Slatter & Lovett (1999) crisis denial stage – or as a 
psychological defensive tactic (i.e. to gain some confidence by making all the activities 
one is used to make); 
• Admitting: the individual (or group) accepts to be in a crisis scenario, and changes his 
attitude about the whole situation; 
• Adjusting/Adaptation: after the crisis has been accepted, the individual (or group) tries to 
solve the problems. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 For an analysis of the model, see Sherman (1992). 
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1.3 Financial distress 
If on one side the greatest part of the authors analyzes the corporate distress as a whole, other 
researchers’ studies deal with the ‘financial distress’. Accordingly, it seems useful to give a brief 
explanation also of this concept. 
As precised by Schmuck (2013), “financial distress is one specific distress situation” (Schmuck, 
2013), so it can be viewed either as a singular stage of decline19 or as the dynamic outcome of a 
company distress from the financial performance perspective. In particular, the concept of 
financial distress is linked directly to the firm capital structure, i.e. the debt position and its 
incidence on the total liabilities. According to Lin et al. (2008), “Financial distress refers to a 
condition when a firm incurs more debt than its firm size, profitability, and asset composition can 
sustain” (Lin et al., 2008). From this definition, it follows directly that the levers which drive the 
degree of financial distress are four: 
• Debt: a company may fall in financial distress simply because the managers have obtained 
too much finance from the lenders20. Thus, the company becomes too much leveraged 
directly; 
• Size: generally, the smaller the company, the lower the amount of debt it can sustain; in 
other words, if a firm size is trivial, it has to get a very strong expected increase in 
performance to justify huge investments financed with debt; 
• Profitability: if a firm has a low EBITDA margin (i.e. low profitability), a given amount 
of debt is more difficult to sustain. Accordingly, a corporation could enter a scenario of 
financial distress because of a material fall in profitability (due either of a strong fall in 
revenues or an increase of the unitary costs); 
• Asset composition: the way in which the management allocates the assets through the 
investment of the cash raised influences the riskiness of a company. Therefore, a bad 
investment or a bad asset composition may be a reason for financial distress. 
Since the financial distress is seen as a sort of ultimate stage of distress – where the effects of the 
crisis start to be tangible – the final consequence is a state of insolvency, where the company is 
not able anymore to generate enough cash to bear the debt service. Under financial distress, the 
banks will try to tighten the covenants and the other credit terms, while the trade creditors will 
                                                 
19 For example, Schmuck (2013) positions the financial distress “at the onset of a liquidity crisis” (Schmuck, 2013). 
20 And the lenders have allowed the company to raise so much debt, which is more problematic. 
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make some attempts to reduce their days in receivables related to the financial distressed 
company. Thus, the situation is severe, but has not reached a point of no return; a recovery is still 
possible. 
Outecheva (2007) provides a classification of the main definitions of financial distress existent in 
the literature; she separates the definitions into three categories: event-oriented, process-oriented 
and technical definitions. 
Under the event-oriented definitions class, the term financial distress is used analogously to 
‘decline’, ‘failure’, and ‘bankruptcy’. Those types of definitions want to precise that a company is 
in distress when it is unable to sustain the debt service and are related to the occurrence of an 
event such as bankruptcy filing, bond default or decision to write off a part of the total debt. 
Andrade & Kaplan (1997) find three events as indicators that a company is in financial distress: 
“[1] the first year that a firm has EBITDA less than interest expense, [2] attempts to restructure 
its debt and [3] default” (Andrade & Kaplan, 1997).  
Process-oriented definitions treat the financial distress as a stage of a bigger process which 
includes failure and restructuring21. Other researchers see the financial distress as a stage between 
solvency and insolvency, assuming that a company could be distressed financially without being 
bankrupt. Other authors see the financial distress as a sequential dynamic composed by stages 
divided each other from trigger points such as negative cash flow, dividend reduction, technical 
default and bankruptcy filing22. 
Finally, the technical definitions deal with the use of financial indicators, ratios or other measures 
to define the financial distress. Those definitions are at the same time the most criticized – since 
the use of financial ratio are seen as a backward-looking way to define the financial distress – and 
the most used ones. Further, for this type of definitions the heterogeneity is very high, since the 
authors use different measures for determining the financial distress. For example, Andrade & 
Kaplan (1997) use the interest coverage ratio (i.e. EBITDA / Interest), while others compare the 
debt service with the operative cash flow (if the latter is lower than the debt service, the company 
is in financial distress), look at covenant breaches, observe the EBITDA (for example, if the 
EBITDA is negative for at least three consecutive years, the firm is in financial distress) or 
analyze the trend of the company market value. 
                                                 
21 “Failure and reorganization are preceded by financial distress” (Gordon, 1971). 
22 See (Turetsky & MacEwen, 2001). 
27 
 
Similarly to the corporate distress case, there exist some stage models which try to fragment the 
financial distress period into several phases, divided each other through a trigger point as in the 
Turetsky & MacEwen (2001) model mentioned before or through an analysis of the different 
characteristics that distinguish each stage. 
One of the second type models has been provided by Outecheva (2007). The model is based on 
the fact that there are different degrees of financial crisis severity – not an innovative 
precondition since it is present in the corporate distress stage models as well. Accordingly, under 
each stage (except bankruptcy, of course) the company has the possibility to recover adopting the 
correct strategy. The entire financial distress period starts at the “first sign of slight deterioration 
in performance [and ends at] the deepest point and subsequent recovery” (Outecheva, 2007). By 
the way, the difficulty in identifying the first early signals of financial distress implies the use of 
a prediction model23. The model divides the financial distress into three stages: early impairment, 
financial distress and “death struggle”. 
 
Figure 1.4: the Outecheva model. Source: Outecheva (2007) 
                                                 
23 A detailed analysis of the distress prediction models is outside the purposes of this work. Generally, those models 
are aimed at finding some common behavior or performances analyzing a sample of companies – either bankrupt (or 
under reorganization plan) or health – using different statistical approaches. For a summary of the most famous 
models, see Pozzoli & Paolone (2017). 
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The early impairment stage provides very weak signals about the worsening of the financial 
performance of a firm. In particular, those warnings are not captured at all by the external third 
parties since they are very immaterial, but they could be detectable by a good manager. Indeed, 
the cash flow is still positive, and it would be necessary a thorough internal analysis to find those 
signals. Thus, usually in this phase no correcting actions are undertaken. 
The second phase, financial distress, is in turn divided into four sub-stages: 
• Deterioration of performance: the operative and financial ratios of the company decrease 
continuously, usually at an exponential pace. A decrease in performance could be due 
either to a material drop in the revenues or to an increase of the per-unit costs. Usually, 
for listed companies this phase is accompanied by a decrease of the stock price. 
Moreover, some qualitative issues arise, such as customers complaints, management 
anxiety and lower firm reputation; 
• Failure24: this sub-stage confirms the performance deterioration, suggesting that now the 
company is permanently decreasing its value. In this phase, the cash flow becomes 
negative, and the company passes definitively from a solvency status to a distress one. 
The troubles present in the previous sub-stage develop in negative: the employees 
abandon the firm, the shareholders do not trust the managers anymore and the liquidity 
situation worsen. The management is obliged to take some remedial actions, such as 
dividend cuts and assets restructuring; 
• Insolvency: at this point, the value of equity is very small if not negative (it means that the 
value of debt is higher than it); moreover, the cash flow generated by the company is not 
enough to pay the debt service. The net income worsens, and the managers are forced to 
take some remedial action to collect enough cash to stay operative; 
• Default: it means that the company is definitely unable to cover the debt service at 
maturity; it violates the agreement with the creditors and may be forced to file for 
bankruptcy (liquidation or reorganization) in order to avoid being sued by the creditors. 
Basically, the main difference between ‘default’ and ‘insolvency’ is that the default 
occurs at the maturity date (Outecheva, 2007). 
                                                 
24 In this model the Altman & Hotchkiss (2006) definition of failure has been used, i.e. “[…] the realized rate of 
return on invested capital […] is significantly and continually lower than prevailing rates on similar investments” 
(Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). 
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Finally, the author finds a deeper negative point than the default one, which is called “death 
struggle”. In this phase, the only aim of the managers is to take actions that let the company 
survive. At this point, financial distress not only represents a very low enterprise value, but also a 
several weakening of the organizational structure (i.e. almost no one would like to remain as 
employee in the company) and a irremediable relationship with the most important stakeholder 
(i.e. trade creditors, lenders, shareholders, etc.). 
 
1.4 Reasons for distress 
Once an idea of what are the principal definitions of distress (both corporate and financial) have 
been provided, it is important to shift the attention on the reasons which may lead to this scenario. 
To find a common framework is almost impossible and also not useful. On one side, each 
research focuses on the key points related to the study itself; on the other side, the reasons for a 
distress are so wide that an exhaustive work is practically impossible. Moreover, the causes for 
distress are firm-specific, so that each company follows its original pattern that will be for sure 
different from every other firm crisis path. Therefore, this section provides the main 
classifications existent in the literature and creates some basic frameworks to give an idea about 
how different the reasons for distress can be. 
Almost all the researchers agree to the fact that the main reason which leads a company to 
corporate distress is bad management. Saying it with Balgobin & Pandit (2001), “the primary or 
root cause of severe income declines must be poor management”; similarly, Schendel et al. 
(1976) suggest as a main cause of distress the “…interaction of poor managerial decisions 
coupled with or in response to unfavorable environmental events” (Schendel et al., 1976). 
At the same time, Andrade & Kaplan (1997) analyzing highly leveraged transactions arrive at the 
conclusion that the main reason of distress is the leverage. Probably, they arrive at that 
conclusion because their main focus was on high leveraged transactions; thus, it seems too forced 
to conclude that they don’t agree with the general view that poor managerial decisions leads to 
distress primarily25. 
 
                                                 
25 Moreover, the Andrade & Kaplan (1997) findings seem difficult to generalize, since for example Denis & Denis 
(1995) find that the main cause for financial distress under high leveraged recapitalizations is related to industry-
wide issues. 
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1.4.1 Internal vs External reasons 
The most used classification of the reasons for corporate and financial distress involves two 
classes: external reasons and internal ones26. Indeed, “downturns in performance were a result of 
unfavorable environmental shifts combined with organizational inefficiency or inappropriate 
competitive strategies” (Francis & Desai, 2005). 
Internal causes are not only a matter of ability to be efficient internally, but also deal with a 
population ecology perspective, where the survival of the corporations depends on their capacity 
to align their resources with the external environment. If not, those company will exit the market. 
For this purpose, an inertial behavior by the management may be one first factor which may lead 
a company to distress27. More generally, bad management28 – either related to an incapacity of 
adaptation to the external environment or a failure to produce a product (or provide a service) in 
an effective and efficient way – is the primary source of distress. For example, some of the 
principal errors that a CEO may make – so that he increases the risk of distress – are related to: 
(i) a too autocratic behavior, (ii) the absence of clarity on the segregation of duties between the 
CEO and the chairman, (iii) the presence of unskilled managers and (iv) greed or egoistic 
behaviors. If it appears easy to think about examples of bad management, it may be useful to 
describe some extreme cases which are not immediate to think about. Interesting is the point of 
view of Miller (1992) which has found four behaviors that paradoxically (he called them “Icarus 
Paradox”) may lead to distress, since they are related to something that the company is very good 
at doing: 
• Focusing: the company has a success product and concentrates all the attention in getting 
that product perfect. However, this perfection is not fully perceived by the customers, that 
may be satisfied even with a less perfect product. Thus, a company may enter a distress 
period because of a bad capital allocation; 
                                                 
26 Some researchers, such as Chowdhury (2002), use the term “K-extinction” to indicate the external reasons and “R-
extinction” when defining the fact that “decline is a property of the organization” (Chowdhury, 2002). 
27 For this purpose, a good example has been provided by Maheswari (2000), with the case of Indian Telephone 
Industries Ltd. “Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. (ITI) remained prosperous in the protected environment as the 
Department of Telecommunication (DoT) ensured the purchase of its products. The organization developed inertia 
due to this protected environment and failed to develop in-house technological capability. In the post-liberalization 
scenario, the arrival of foreign giants like AT&T and Ericsson into the country brought new products. […]. ITI found 
it hard to respond to these changes in the environment and started declining” (Maheswari, 2000). 
28 Bad management is not related to any type of lack of action or inertia only, but also to the undertaking of too much 
initiatives. For example, a frequent change and revision of the medium-term business plan could be a source of 
distress because of the increase of the confusion inside the company. 
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• Venturing: the managers tend to continuously look for new profitable opportunities 
without having the necessary capabilities to enter new industries. Accordingly, those 
firms may become distressed because of bad investments and failures to compete 
successfully with the new competitors; 
• Inventing: those organizations operate in innovation-related industries, and risk to fall in 
distress since a bad management of the intrinsic complexities may lead to organizational 
chaos and wrong missions. For example, those companies could decide – erroneously – to 
invest in a too futuristic technology, without performing a market analysis to see whether 
the investment is justifiable also in the short-middle term; 
• Decoupling: in this case, a business focuses too much on its marketing department. The 
consequence is that the company concentrates the efforts only in finding new ways of 
selling the old products without looking at the efficiency issue. This behavior may lead to 
distress. 
Another important internal cause of distress is related to bad acquisitions. This is one of the most 
frequent reasons why a company enters into distress29. One of the most critical phases of a 
company which wants to grow externally, indeed, is the valuation and the form of payment of a 
subsidiary; sometimes, deciding to pay the whole transaction by cash could lead to a very 
negative cash position, as well as raising too much debt for financing a transaction. Thus, it is 
very important for a company – in particular a Small Medium Enterprise (SME) – to be assisted 
by the right people when deciding to purchase another firm. 
Balgobin, Pandit 
(2001) 
Gopal 
(1991) 
Schmitt 
(2009) 
Grinyer 
(1990) 
- Poor management 
 
- Inadequate financial 
control/policy 
 
- High cost structure 
 
 
 
 
- Poor quality of top 
management 
- A weak board 
- Conservatism in 
management 
- Excessive complacency 
- Premature corporate 
expansions 
- Weak financial 
management policies 
- Unacceptable market 
prices and costs 
- Poor management 
- Mismanagement of big 
projects 
- Bad acquisitions 
- Cost disadvantages 
- Poor financial control 
- Inadequate marketing 
- A weak financial policy 
- Autocratic leadership 
- An excessive success 
culture 
- Poor management 
- Lack of marketing 
efforts 
- Inadequate financial 
control 
- High cost structure 
- Poor quality 
- Bad acquisitions 
- Big projects that fail 
Table 1.1: Selection of the main internal reasons for distress present in the literature. Own elaboration. 
                                                 
29 For example, recently one of the most important Italian case has been the Favini Group srl one, that at the end of 
the last decade went into distress (among other factors) because of having overpaid some M&A transactions. 
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External reasons are related to the external environment; some of them are controllable by a good 
manager able to adapt the company to the dynamic external environment (this means that the line 
which separates internal reasons and external ones sometimes is very blurred), while others are 
difficult to eliminate even if predicted, such as a global economic crisis, or a controversial 
decision of a policymaker. The external causes are usually segmented into five sub-sections: 
market, industry, customers, legal and nature. 
The external reasons are related to the market when they deal with events such as market price 
volatility, changes in the offer for raw material and macroeconomic changes. For a financial 
institution, for example, an increase of the speculative activity may lead to a revaluation (in 
negative) of all the assets measured at fair value; similarly, a financial crisis usually leads to a 
several distress scenario the banks and as a consequence also all the local companies. For those 
manufacturing companies with a high need of commodities as raw material (for example oil), a 
change of the suppliers’ decision, such as a restriction of the quantity produced, may affect the 
company in a very negative way; in that case, the firm may fix the purchasing price using future 
or forward contracts, but that solution is not always feasible or available. Macroeconomic 
changes, such as an interest rate cut or rise, may be positive for some companies but negative for 
others, since it affects the financial performance of both manufacturing companies and financial 
institutions. 
An industry is a dynamic group of companies, which might compete each other in order to get 
more market share or might collude to become bigger and be able to fix higher prices. However, 
the behavior of one or more companies inside an industry can damage the performance of the 
other ones. For example, if the two most important companies collude each other in order to 
monopolize the market, the other firms will enter a several distress scenario if they are not able to 
find a profitable niche. Alternatively, a company can use a too conservative strategy by avoiding 
huge investments in R&D but doing so it risks suffering from the technological developments of 
its competitors. In this sense, it is important also to know the field in which a company is playing: 
if a sector is characterized by a very short product life cycle, it is likely that the technological 
environment changes rapidly, and the company shall invest in R&D in order to avoid remaining 
left behind. Finally, the herding effect is also important, in particular in the financial sector; a 
company crisis may decrease the reputation also of the distressed company’s competitors. 
As for customers variations, if not detected through a thorough market analysis, a company risks 
losing customers, falling into distress. Thus, it is important to analyze precisely the customers’ 
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needs and their future developments both in terms of general trend and in terms of changes in 
behaviors, needs, tastes and psychographic characteristics. For example, if a demand for a certain 
product is in decline, to avoid distress a company shall reinvent itself by looking for a new 
market niche where its resources and capabilities may be valuable at least as before. A different 
type of strategic change is necessary if a material variation in the consumers’ tastes occurs; 
indeed, the company shall reinvent its product in order to follow the demand properly. 
The legal factor is usually industry-specific, since some industries are more regulated than others. 
For example, in the US the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 facilitated the entry of new airline 
companies: the corporations that were operating before the reform have been damaged from the 
new legislation for sure, and the ones which have not been able to take the necessary 
countermeasures have increased their risk to become distressed. A similar reasoning could be 
made for the broadcasting industry, as well as the petroleum one. By contrast, other industries are 
freer to act; for those companies the legal factor is less important. 
Finally, a factor which must be taken into consideration is nature. Generally, it includes natural 
catastrophes and other unpredictable events such as tough weather conditions and accidents. In 
this case, the only thing a company can do is to sign an insurance contract. 
 
Balgobin, Pandit 
(2001) 
Gopal 
(1991) 
Schmitt 
(2009) 
Grinyer 
(1990) 
- Decrease in demand 
 
- Increase in competition 
 
- Increase of input costs 
 
 
 
 
- Postponement or 
cancellation of major 
projects 
- Decrease in market 
demand 
- Changes in government 
rules and regulations 
- Increased competition 
- Increased input costs 
- Non-availability or 
shortage of raw materials 
- Inadequate insurance 
cover 
- Economic changes 
- Catastrophes 
- Competitive changes 
- Social changes 
- Technological changes 
- Governmental 
constraints responsible for 
organizational decline 
 
- Adverse changes in total 
market demand 
 
- Failing revenues due to 
more intense competition 
Table 1.2: Selection of the main external reasons for distress present in the literature. Own elaboration. 
 
It is discussed whether the internal reasons or the external ones are more decisive for causing a 
corporate or financial distress. The debate is still open, but difficult to solve because of three 
main aspects. Firstly, since all the authors agree on the fact that the primary cause for distress is 
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poor managerial performance, the works may be prejudiced in favor of this solution. This may be 
true, in particular if we think that a material number of studies are based on surveys which are 
biased by definition30. Secondly, as the years pass the older studies are becoming less reliable, 
since the economic conditions change. Think about all the regulatory change that occurred in the 
last decades, or about the financial engineering that started some decades ago. For example, 
Outecheva (2007) suggests that “the evolutionary development of corporate enterprises as well as 
a change to more service-oriented economies and an increasing role of governmental regulation 
provoke a shift from endogenous to exogenous causes of corporate failure” (Outecheva, 2007). 
Thirdly, every distressed company is such because of a mix of internal and external reasons. 
Moreover, sometimes it is not possible to divide a cause as internal or external, since some 
reasons are themselves a mix of the two. 
 
1.4.2 Operational vs Strategic and other reasons provided by the literature 
Another classification that has been used frequently in the literature relates to the distinction 
between operational and strategic reasons. This taxonomy usually is parallel with the internal vs 
external classification31, but it may offer a different view in analyzing the sources of distress. 
Basically, the operational reasons are related to a negative managerial performance, so very close 
to the internal causes present in the last paragraph. In reality, there is not a real definition of 
operative causes. The difference may be that operational reasons are more connected with 
efficiency problems, so not related with the external environment at all. By contrast, the internal 
causes include, for example, the inability of the management to adapt to receipt correctly the 
external signals. Thus, an example of operative reason – which in turn is also internal – may be 
the inability of the management to hire a medium-level director able to optimize the operations. 
On the other side, following Furrer et al. (2007), the strategic reasons may be compared to the 
external causes. However, a strategic cause of distress may be an inability of the managers to 
reposition the company as soon as the demand changes – a reason closer to the internal reason in 
the previous classification. 
                                                 
30 In reality, in those surveys there is a tendency by the sample company managers to blame the external environment 
rather than analyzing critically their themselves behavior, as evident in Grinyer (1990). Therefore, the factor “poor 
managerial performance” may be underestimated. 
31 As precised by Furrer et al. (2007). 
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A material insight provided by this new classification is its relationship with time. Operative 
reasons may deal with the short-term, such as the lack of production process optimization; on the 
other side, strategic reasons could be more medium or long-term related, such as the incapacity to 
increase the marketing effort to rebrand the company when necessary. 
Other authors do not provide a classification, but simply list some reasons of distress. 
Lorange & Nelson (1987), for example, provide some qualitative and managerial oriented 
reasons for distress, based on bad management conducts. They find the following reasons: (i) 
decline, entrapment and self-deception (i.e. the belief that the most important thing to do is to 
base the strategy on the outdated view of the business which has worked in the past); (ii) 
hierarchy orientation; (iii) cultural rigidity; (iv) desire for acceptance, conformity (i.e. no 
suggestions from the bottom will be heard because of the management aversion to change or 
criticism); (v) too much consensus and compromise (i.e. when the organizational structure 
becomes too complex, the company may lose too much time in planning the activities). 
Other authors provide different classifications: the following table provides the lists of Schendel 
et al. (1976) and Pearson & Clair (1998). 
 
Schendel et al. 
(1976) 
Pearson & Clair 
(1998)
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- Higher costs: 
- Wages and other costs 
- Extraordinary costs 
- Inefficient production 
- Unanticipated start-up costs 
- Anti-trust defense 
- Demand decline 
- Lower revenues 
- Lower prices 
- Excess industry capacity 
- Product obsolescence 
- Strikes 
- Increased competitive pressure 
- Management problems 
- Marketing problems 
- Extortion 
- Hostile takeover 
- Product tampering 
- Vehicular fatality 
- Copyright infringement 
- Environmental spill 
- Computer tampering 
- Security breach 
- Executive kidnapping 
- Work-related homicide 
- Natural disasters 
- Malicious rumor 
 
- Bribery 
- Information sabotage 
- Workplace bombing 
- Terrorist attack 
- Plant explosion 
- Sexual harassment 
- Escape of hazardous material 
- Personnel assault 
- Product recall 
- Counterfeiting 
- Product/service boycott 
 
Table 1.3: Selection of other distress reasons present in the literature. Own elaboration. 
 
                                                 
32 As it is possible to observe, they focus more on external events than variables such as poor managerial 
performance, indicating that a company management shall be ware also on this type of (sometimes illegal) third 
parties’ behavior. 
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1.4.3 A SWOT – financial statement approach 
In order to have a clear framework to use when analyzing the company troubles, the most 
comfortable way is to connect as much as possible the reasons for distress with the most used 
models and with the financial statements – i.e. the frameworks that a normal manager uses very 
often. For this purpose, this paragraph tries to connect the well-known SWOT analysis with the 
causes for distress. Subsequently, the reasons are connected with the financial statements, in 
order to see whether the reasons are a balance sheet problem or an income statement problem33. 
As all the business experts know, a SWOT analysis involves the classification of the main 
characteristics of a company into four classes: Strengths (i.e. which are the factors that explain 
the firm competitive advantage), Weaknesses (i.e. the aspects where the company is less effective 
or inefficient than the competitors), Opportunities (i.e. the external factors that the company may 
use to take advantage to increase its performance and market share) and Threats (i.e. the external 
factors which may erode the firm competitive advantage). The aim of the model is to serve as a 
basis when deciding which strategy to implement. 
The aim here is to build the “negative” of a classic SWOT, where all the problems that 
potentially can lead a company into distress are linked with the company Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats. Obviously, the most used sections will be the Weaknesses and Threats 
ones (which roughly can be considered similar to the internal and external reasons for distress, 
respectively), but as seen before there exist some paradoxes where a company may enter into 
distress because of an overconfidence on the abilities. Table 1.4 presents the “negative” SWOT, 
the negative aspects are presented between brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 As already precised, it is impossible to create an exhaustive model which includes all the possible reasons for 
distress. However, this approach may be useful as a framework from which one can start its firm-specific analysis. 
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Strengths 
 
- Good past performance (inertia) 
- Good past acquisitions (confidence) 
- Successive culture (inertia) 
- Focusing, Venturing, Inventing and 
Decoupling (too high specialization) 
Weaknesses34 
 
- Poor management performance 
- Inadequate financial control 
- High cost structure 
- Bad acquisitions 
- Autocratic leadership 
Opportunities 
 
- Changes in government rules (worse 
reaction than the competitors) 
- Economic changes (worse reaction than 
the competitors) 
- Social changes (worse reaction than the 
competitors) 
Threats 
 
- Decrease in demand (no adaptation) 
- Increase in competition (no retaliation) 
- Increase of input costs or shortage of input 
(no hedging policy) 
- Change in government rules (no 
adaptation) 
- Economic changes (no adaptation) 
- Catastrophes (no insurance) 
- Social changes (no adaptation) 
    Table 1.4: The “negative” SWOT. Own elaboration.  
 
The table must be seen in the following way: every element in the list represents a reason which 
potentially can lead to distress, while the words in italic represent the behavior which can lead to 
distress. For example, ‘good past performance’ is a positive aspect in the normal SWOT, but if 
the managers react to this Strength adopting an inertial behavior (i.e. by continuing with the same 
strategy simply because it has been successful in the past), the company may enter a distress 
situation. Similarly, since a ‘decrease in demand’ is a Threat in a classic SWOT, the “best 
solution” to enter a distress scenario is to avoid any adaptation to the changing environment. 
Once an easier framework has been created, the reasons listed in the modified SWOT can be 
analyzed singularly and linked to the main financial statement line items, in order to make a more 
precise analysis aimed at defining concretely the real sources of potential distress. Some of them 
are out-of-financial statements items (such as the inertia behavior of the management), while 
others have an impact on the financial statements. Doing in this way, it is possible to see whether 
a company has a balance sheet problem, an income statement problem or a managerial problem. 
One example is about a well performing company which is growing externally (i.e. through 
M&As). The primary risks in this case are two: the management inertial behavior and the too 
                                                 
34 The Weaknesses are reasons for distress by definition, so the only negative reaction related to them is to not 
correct them. In order to not complicate the table, the reactions have not been written there. 
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high confidence when performing acquisitions. The first risk is a managerial problem, so it 
doesn’t have any direct impact on the financial statements; the second risk is a balance sheet 
problem, since the monetary risk is to pay too much for a subsidiary, deteriorating the capital 
structure. 
A second example regards a company with cost inefficiencies operating in a highly regulated 
industry. Even in this case, the main risks are two: to continue with the bad cost management and 
to avoid any adaptation to the change in regulations. The first risk is an income statement 
problem, since the EBITDA would be better with an improved cost management; the second risk 
may be either balance sheet related or income statement related. 
 
1.5 Turnaround 
1.5.1 Turnaround definitions 
Once having defined in detail the concept of distress, it is useful to analyze what should a 
manager do after the distress has been detected. As described in the previous sections of this 
chapter, in all the stage models presented the distress period starts with the appearance of the first 
signals of distress (hidden or not) and ends with dissolution, collapse or bankruptcy. However, 
before entering the last stage, the managers have the possibility to implement some strategies 
aimed at rescuing the company. The set of activities selected by the managers in order to recover 
from a distress situation is usually called turnaround35. 
Before describing the main definitions and characteristics of a turnaround process, two 
clarifications are necessary. First, it is important that, before implementing a turnaround strategy, 
the managers analyze whether it makes sense its execution; it could be that the liquidation value 
of a firm is higher than the company going-concern one, so that it would be better to file for 
bankruptcy. Secondly, if the managers decide to implement a turnaround strategy, they must 
consider that the time to apply is usually very short; as precised by Hofer (1980), “In most 
turnaround strategies, regardless of the performance area affected, the time criticality of the firm 
situation is quite severe. There is some imminent danger to survival” (Hofer, 1980). 
                                                 
35 Inside the distress literature, after the distress prediction segment the turnaround segment is the biggest one. 
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Similarly to the distress case, the literature offers different definitions of turnaround36. In general, 
the turnaround concept is seen as the reversal of the distress one; a turnaround is considered 
successful if the business performance returns to or becomes higher than the pre-distress level. A 
basic definition is present in Pandit (2000), who describes turnaround as the “recovery of a firm’s 
economic performance following an existence-threatening decline” (Pandit, 2000). Similarly, 
Chowdhury (2002) describes the “process of turnaround [as] how firms move away from 
crippling deterioration in performance to enduring success or eventual death”, adding to the 
former definition the idea that a turnaround strategy may fail; a successful turnaround occurs 
when a company “ends the threat with a combination of strategies, systems, skills, and 
capabilities [,] and achieves sustainable performance recovery” (Chowdhury, 2002). 
A turnaround strategy usually involves four types of restructuring strategies, depending on the 
type of distress reason (i.e. balance sheet problem, income statement problem or managerial 
problem): operational, asset, managerial and financial. To provide critical examples of 
turnaround strategies is outside the purpose of this work; however, there is a flourishing literature 
which analyzes case studies (the so called “anecdotal studies) in order to provide practical ways 
of implementing a turnaround strategy37. A general truth is that “a precondition for almost all the 
successful turnarounds is the replacement of the current top management of the business in 
question” (Hofer, 1980). Indeed, the ability of implementing a strategy for growing a company is 
materially different from a restructuring strategy; thus, it would be necessary to hire a new 
person, more expert in corporate restructuring, who substitutes (totally or partially) the old 
managers. 
However, the most accepted classification present in the literature is about operating turnarounds 
and strategic turnarounds38. As summarized by Hoffman (1989), “Operating turnarounds focus on 
improving the way the firm currently conducts business. Strategic turnarounds focus on changing 
or adjusting the type of business conducted by the firm” (Hoffman, 1989). In other words, 
operating turnaround strategies deal with the implementation of activities aimed at increasing 
revenues, decreasing the unitary cost or refining the asset composition; the focus is on 
maximizing the resources that the company already has, i.e. to increase the performance. 
                                                 
36 Some authors use the term turnaround to describe a process composed by two stages: a downturn one (coincident 
with the distress phase) and an upturn one. For the sake of simplicity, this particular has been avoided in this work. 
37 See Pandit (2000). 
38 See Hofer (1980) and Chowdhury (2002). 
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Differently, strategic turnaround strategies consist in changing the firm positioning in the market 
they are already operative or entering a new market niche; the main aim here is to increase the 
market share by working in the product/market matrix. The greatest part of the literature agrees 
that on average both strategies are important to turnaround successfully a company. 
Other researchers limit their work in listing the turnaround strategies they retain are most used. 
Probably the first author who has classified the turnaround strategies has been Hofer (1980). If on 
one side he has classified the turnaround strategies into operative or strategic, on the other side 
the author has listed four types of turnaround strategies: revenue-increasing (for example, the 
selection of the product lines to maintain and the ones to dismiss), cost-cutting, asset reduction 
(i.e. the disposal of the less useful assets) and a combination of them. According to him, the 
decision about which strategy to choose depends on how far the company is from its break-even 
point: an asset reduction strategy is the most effective if a firm is very far from the break-even, 
while if the company is very close to the break-even, a cost cutting strategy is preferable. 
Alternatively, Hoffman (1989) differentiates the possible strategies into three main stages: 
preparatory stage, short-term fix stage and growth stage. The preparatory stage includes the 
strategy of “restructuring leadership and organisation/culture”: in this phase a change in 
leadership occurs in order to either motivate the employees and the external stakeholders to not 
abandon the company or simply to leave the company in better hands. The short-term fix stage 
comprises the strategies of cost reduction (both variable and fixed), asset redeployment (i.e. the 
disposal of plants and equipment in order to increase the productivity) and selective 
product/market strategy (for example, marketing policies adopted in order to increase revenues). 
Finally, the growth stage includes repositioning strategies (i.e. to choose the market segment in 
which to operate, also through acquisitions or strategic alliances). 
Another useful classification has been provided by Balgobin & Pandit (2001), who list four 
events which characterize successful turnaround plans: situation analysis, gaining control, 
managing stakeholders and improving motivation. Situation analysis means that who performs 
the turnaround strategy (usually the new management) has to collect information about the 
current situation, in particular the distress reasons. Gaining control is divided into financial (i.e. 
to obtain the control of the financial situation by improving the capital structure equilibrium) and 
managerial (i.e. to be able to influence the employees’ attitude). Managing stakeholders means 
that the new managers must start and maintain good relationships in particular with banks, trade 
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creditors, employees and customers. Finally, improving motivation is related to the fact that the 
leadership must be such that incentivizes the entire internal environment. 
 
1.5.2 Turnaround as a stage process 
As in the distress case, also the turnaround can be divided into several stages, in order to 
determine in a more detailed way which is the best strategy for every case. As a precondition, it is 
important to recall that the “turnaround golden rule” is that the higher the time available, the 
wider the range of strategies from which a manager can select the best one. 
As described in one of the last paragraphs, Müller (1985) has provided a model which divides the 
distress period into four phases (i.e. strategic crisis, performance crisis, liquidity crisis and 
bankruptcy). Furthermore, he has linked each stage with another one that includes the main ways 
to manage the crisis. In particular, each solution shall be connected with the characteristics of the 
distress: for example, a strategic crisis shall be solved adopting a turnaround strategy aimed at 
solving a strategic crisis. Thus, the model presents four stages of turnaround, that are specular to 
the distress stages: strategic crisis management (i.e. to operate on the product/market matrix in 
order to eliminate the business segments with low potential), operating crisis management (i.e. to 
increase efficiency), financial crisis management (i.e. activities such as securing new credit lines 
and improving the working capital) and crisis management during insolvency (for example, to 
create a restructuring plan). 
Finally, the most accepted turnaround stage classification consists in dividing the turnaround into 
retrenchment and return to growth, (Balgobin Pandit, 2001). 
The retrenchment (or stabilization) phase is characterized by a focus on the firm survival; 
therefore, the activities performed under this stage are aimed at generating cash flow. To do this, 
usually the firm has to sell some assets and reduce costs. “The basic idea is to take one step 
backwards so that two steps forward may be taken in the future” (Balgobin & Pandit, 2001). The 
final outcome of a successful retrenchment stage is to stabilize the cash flow and to prepare the 
field for the subsequent stage. 
The second stage is return to growth. During this stage, the objective is to recover the pre-distress 
performance and to implement strategies that will increase the long-term profitability of the 
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company. Those strategies are usually revenues-related and may also include mergers and 
acquisitions. 
This model is not a rule. Sometimes, a retrenchment strategy may affect positively the enterprise 
value, in a certain sense including the return to growth stage; alternatively, in order to stabilize 
the cash flow, it is necessary to take some aggressive measures that in the model are included into 
the return to growth stage, incorporating the retrenchment phase into the other one. Furthermore, 
other times it is not possible to take a single strategy alone but is essential to adopt both the 
stages-strategies at the same time. For example, during the 1999-2002 Nissan turnaround it has 
been important to implement both the stages-strategies at the same time: “Turning around a 
company in Nissan’s state is a bit like Formula One racing. To take the highest-speed trajectory, 
you have to brake and accelerate, brake and accelerate all the time. […] We couldn’t say, ‘There 
will be a time for cost reduction and then a time for growth’ – we had to do both at once.” 
(Ghosn, 2002). 
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Chapter 2: the Italian bankruptcy law 
 
After having analyzed in detail the concept of distress – and the moment in which a company can 
be defined as distressed, at different levels –, it is important to describe the tools which are 
available when dealing with a company in troubles. In every country, some of those tools are 
regulated by the bankruptcy law, while others are completely private, as for example a 
consultancy service provided by a specialized firm39. 
The first main classification – which is valid for all the countries’ bankruptcy law systems – is 
related to the severity of the corporate distress: some tools are more appropriate for a seriously 
damaged company, while other ones are suitable for recovering a distressed company at its early 
stage of distress (i.e. when the crisis is still manageable). Accordingly, a first separation is 
between liquidation tools and recovering tools, where the former is appropriate for a bankrupt 
firm (where the principal aim is to preserve the remaining enterprise value and to liquidate the 
assets in favor of the creditors) while the latter are useful for turning around an early-distress-
stage company. 
Another classification could be made considering the reasons for distress. As seen in the previous 
chapter, the reasons for distress are so various that it is possible to conclude that each firm has 
made its own specific set of mistakes before entering a distress scenario. Therefore, under this 
approach a clear classification of the tools mentioned before is difficult to create. However, in 
some cases it may be useful to consider the type of distress, when selecting the right way to 
recover from a crisis: for example, recently the Italian bankruptcy law has provided the two 
institutions of accordi di ristrutturazione con intermediari finanziari and convenzione di 
moratoria, which could be used when a distressed company has a predominant indebtedness 
towards the financial institutions40, suggesting an unbalance of capital structure as main reason 
for distress. By contrast, if the principal causes for distress are far from a too high dependence on 
the financial institutions, those two instruments are not applicable at all; thus, depending on the 
severity of the crisis, other tools are available to deal with the negative situation created. 
                                                 
39 Currently, there are different types of tools provided by the countries. However, a comparative analysis of the 
different countries’ approaches about the balance between regulated agreements and private ones is out of the scope 
of this paper. 
40 In particular, the art. 182 septies of the Italian bankruptcy law (Royal Decree of 16 March 1942, no.267) states that 
those two institutions are applicable when at least one half of the total debt has been made with the financial 
institutions.  
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For the purposes of this paper, only the Italian bankruptcy law will be considered. Accordingly, 
the following sections of this chapter will present the Italian legal framework and will include an 
analysis of all the available tools which can be used to conclude a distress scenario – either in a 
positive way through a turnaround strategy or negatively using liquidation tools. 
 
2.1 The Italian bankruptcy law framework 
The main legal source about the Italian bankruptcy law is the Royal Decree of 16 March 1942, 
no.267 (hereinafter Legge Fallimentare – l.f.). This law has been modified several times, 
especially from the 2005; an improvement of the original law has been considered necessary 
because of the obsolescence of the latter as the years were passing. In particular, the “vision” of 
the legislator at that time was too punitive, in the sense that the main purpose was to detect the 
bankrupt companies and to liquidate them, and at the same time to label the entrepreneur (or the 
management body) as “failed”41. Recently, on the contrary, a new way of thinking has been 
established, where the bankruptcy is not seen as an extraordinary event but as an ordinary phase 
of the company life cycle. In other words: to fail is possible, and not necessarily it must be a 
shameful event and not necessarily the fault is on the entrepreneur (or the corporate 
management)42. Moreover, under this new approach the focus has been shifted towards 
procedures aimed at supporting the continuation of the company operations rather than 
liquidating them. To do that, the legislator should take measures directed to let the economic 
agents prefer private out-of-court agreements rather than in-court liquidation procedures, and to 
limit the application of the liquidation tools only when necessary. In short, the objective of this 
new attitude is to increase both the probability of continuing the operations of the distressed 
company and the likelihood that the creditors will receive the full amount of their claims. 
A first initiative towards this new approach has been taken with the Prodi law of 3 April 1979, 
no.9543, that introduced the legal tool of the extraordinary liquidation for big companies 
(amministrazione straordinaria delle grandi imprese in crisi), a special procedure created to deal 
                                                 
41 Under the first version of the Royal Decree, the bankrupt individuals could not maintain the right to vote for five 
years after the negative event. Moreover, their name was published in the “Public Register of Bankrupts”, labeling 
them as a negative individual forever. 
42 Of course, the problem of this approach is the risk of giving second opportunities to who does not deserve it, but 
apparently the importance of giving a further chance to who, notwithstanding the crisis, is behaving well is higher. 
43 Reformed and substituted by the Legislative Decree of 8 July 1999, no.270. 
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with big corporations of national or systemic importance. This legal tool is characterized by a 
completely new purpose, i.e. the continuation of the distressed company operations44. Indeed, the 
law has been created in a period where a material number of Italian big corporations were in a 
very critical scenario; using the old legislation, the only result would have been a long chain of 
liquidations which could have negatively affected the Italian economic environment. 
More important changes occurred in the first decade of the new century, firstly with the Law 
Decree of 14 March 2005, no.3545, known as Competitive Decree (Decreto Competitività). This 
law on one side provided some changes for the composition with creditors (concordato 
preventivo) and the clawback action (revocatoria fallimentare), while on the other side 
introduced the procedure of the agreements for debt restructuring (accordi di ristrutturazione dei 
debiti). The last aspect is very important, since this law has opened the field towards a more 
complete reform in favor of private out-of-court agreements. Furthermore, the Law of 14 May 
2005, no.80 – the result of the conversion of the Law Decree mentioned before – included a 
mandate to the Government to reform organically the in-court procedures discipline. The result 
was the Legislative Decree of 9 January 2006, no.5, which rewrote part of the Legge Fallimentare 
following the directives of the precedent Law Decree. In the same period, the Law Decree of 30 
December 2005, no.373 modified slightly the regulation of the composition with creditors by 
adding the insolvency state, together with the crisis state, as a prerequisite for the admission to 
the procedure. 
At this point, even though the legislator has tried to change some rules in order to convince the 
economic agents to prefer the private tools, the latter continued to use them very rarely. The main 
problem was that the private procedures have not been regulated completely, so that the 
uncertainty about their use were still high. The Corrective Decree of 15 June 2007, no.169 tried 
to include new measures in favor of the private procedures – for example establishing that the 
restructuring agreement can be done even in case of corporate crisis and increasing the protection 
on the assets of the entrepreneur who files for a restructuring agreement46 –, but the reluctance of 
the economic agents continued. In order to further increase the incentives, with the Law Decree 
of 31 May 2010, no.78, the legislator extended the protection of the entrepreneur’s assets even 
                                                 
44 By the way, the name of the procedure – extraordinary liquidation for big companies – shall not create confusion, 
since the aim is not to liquidate the company. That was a very innovative approach at that time. 
45 Converted in Law of 14 May 2005, no.80. 
46 In particular, the creditors’ direct actions towards the entrepreneur’s assets are suspended for the 60 days that 
follow the start of the private agreement procedure. 
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during the negotiations with the creditors; moreover, the Law Decree of 22 June 2012, no.8347 
was aimed at facilitating the access on the private procedures and disciplining the assessment of 
feasibility performed by the expert, under some prerequisites precised by the law. 
At this point, the situation of the Italian bankruptcy law is characterized by a lot of confusion and 
a certain degree of obsolescence. On one side, there is the need of new rules that incentivize the 
economic agents to select private out-of-court agreements rather than liquidating the company 
without considering softer alternatives; on the other side, the high number of updates of the 
Legge Fallimentare text has led the operators to a scenario of confusion and difficulty on 
selecting the right legal tool when dealing with distressed firms. In particular, currently inside the 
same Legge Fallimentare text there is a combination of old-written articles and reformed ones, 
and for this fact sometimes there is a lack of clarity due to the different purposes of two articles. 
Moreover, as member state of the European Union, when legislating the Italian policymaker has 
to comply (or at least align) with the EU guidelines; in particular, the Recommendation no. 
2014/135/EU specifies the principle of helping the companies in troubles – but still healthy – to 
restructure themselves at an early stage, avoiding an insolvency procedure that could happen 
some years later. 
All those necessities have pushed the Italian legislator to think about making a complete reform 
of the Legge Fallimentare, in order to: 
• increase the incentives for the economic agents (entrepreneurs, creditors and other parties) 
to select private out-of-court agreements when dealing with a distressed scenario: this will 
imply the definition of a condition which occurs before the insolvency, as will be better 
described later in this chapter; 
• create a new and more homogeneous Legge Fallimentare text, where all the articles are 
written under the same “vision”, avoiding as much as possible the uncertainties when 
adopting and interpreting the law; 
• adopt the most recent guidelines provided by the European Union, in particular the 
Recommendation no. 2014/135/EU mentioned before. 
For all those purposes, following the work performed by the Rordorf Commission, in the 2017 
the Italian Parliament approved the Law of 19 October 2017, no.155 which empowers the 
                                                 
47 Converted in Law of 7 August 2012, no.134. 
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Government to reform the Italian bankruptcy law, following the directives that will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Finally, it is important to specify that some rules about the bankruptcy issue are present also in 
the Italian Civil Code and other codes (for example, legge cambiaria, legge sull’assegno 
bancario and codice della navigazione). 
Apart from its dynamics, currently the Italian bankruptcy law includes different procedures, 
which can be roughly divided into two ways, as presented in Table 2.1: 
• in-court procedures and out-of-court ones; 
• liquidation tools or going concern ones. 
 
 
     Table 2.1: Legal tools provided by the Italian bankruptcy law. 
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2.2 In-court procedures 
As it is possible to see in Table 2.1, the greatest part of the procedures regulated by the Legge 
Fallimentare establishes the presence of the court, at different extents depending on the type of 
procedure. This section will describe the most important aspects of every in-court procedure. 
 
2.2.1 Bankruptcy (fallimento) 
The bankruptcy is the most regulated institution in the Legge Fallimentare, and not surprisingly is 
also the legal option the most used by the economic users. The aim of the bankruptcy is to 
liquidate the company assets in order to satisfy in the best way possible the creditors which 
claims have not been settled yet or have a property right on a debtor asset. Thus, the procedure 
does not encourage the continuation of the debtor activities, but simply “takes note” of the 
insolvency status of the debtor and establishes a procedure aimed at liquidating the firm48, in the 
best interest of the creditors. 
This legal tool is addressed to all “the entrepreneurs49 who practice a commercial activity, except 
the public corporations” (art. 1, l.f.). As for the company size, there is a limitation: indeed, the 
firms considered small by the law cannot apply the bankruptcy procedure50. Moreover, the 
procedure is not allowed also for the entrepreneur-farmers and the start-ups51; however, on the 
other side those two agents can apply for other tools (such as the settlement of over-indebtedness 
crisis) which permit them to take advantage of the protections assured by the law as happens for 
the entities which can file for bankruptcy. 
                                                 
48 The (temporary) continuation of the activities is applied only when the alternative (i.e. the immediate liquidation 
of the assets) is less convenient for the creditors. For example, it is in the interest of the creditors to continue the 
company operations in case of a major project which is going to conclude by the end of the year. Thus, it has nothing 
to do with the aim of supporting the continuation of the company activities as a priority. 
49 Currently, the law defines the debtor as an individual, and applies using the analogia legis technique the same 
rules for the companies managed by an administrative body or with more than one partner, with some variations in 
certain cases (for example, the extension of the bankruptcy to the general partners of a firm ex art. 147 l.f. and the 
fact that after a bankruptcy declaration the company bodies are not eliminated). 
50 On the basis of the second paragraph of the art. 1 l.f., a firm is considered small if has: a) in the three years before 
the start of the bankruptcy procedure, “active assets” (attivo patrimoniale) lower than €300.000; b) in the three years 
before the start of the bankruptcy procedure, gross revenues lower than €200.000; c) total debts lower than €500.000. 
However, those entities can use the tool of the settlement of over-indebtedness crisis for dealing with an insolvency 
scenario. 
51 For the start-ups, the aim is to protect them from a too early bankruptcy procedure. Indeed, the first years of those 
companies are characterized by important investments in R&D and low (if not negative) profits, and consequently 
negative cash flows. 
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As precised before, the bankruptcy procedure starts with the identification of an insolvency 
status. The art. 5 l.f. precises that “the entrepreneur that finds himself in an insolvency status is 
declared failed. The insolvency status shows itself with non-fulfillments or other exterior acts 
which demonstrate that the debtor is not able to regularly fulfill its own obligations anymore”. 
From this article, two definitions are clearly separated. On one side, the ‘non-fulfillment’ is 
related to a single obligation, while on the other side the ‘insolvency’ is linked to the whole 
indebtedness of the company52. Accordingly, not necessarily a non-fulfilled obligation means that 
a company is insolvent. Moreover, is insolvent not only who is not able to pay its debt at all, but 
also who pays only a portion of its debt when it falls due; similarly, is insolvent who, in order to 
collect cash to pay the creditors, is forced to sell part of its assets at a material discount, signaling 
a strong difficulty of finding enough cash to pay them. Finally, another insolvent company 
characteristic is the persistence53 of the inability of paying the creditors; as precised before, the 
non-fulfillment of a single obligation does not imply an insolvency status. In short, a company 
could be defined as insolvent when it is not able to generate enough cash (either through its 
operations or through the financing channel54) to pay the creditors (including the debt service). 
The bankruptcy procedure starts with the bankruptcy declaration. Ex art. 6 l.f., “The bankruptcy 
is declared on complaint by the debtor, one or more creditors or the prosecutor”55. The complaint 
must be done to a court, and the procedure is almost the same in all the three cases. The law 
provides that immediately after the bankruptcy declaration has been made, the court must call the 
debtor in order to give to it the right of defense. Subsequently, the court must verify the existence 
of all the preconditions for a bankruptcy declaration (i.e. the corporate size of the debtor and an 
analysis of the insolvency status); if there are all the requirements, the court will declare the 
bankruptcy through sentence. Alternatively, it can reject the declaration, precising the reasons. 
If the court declares the bankruptcy, the sentence must: 
• elect the main bankruptcy bodies (the official receiver and the bankruptcy judge); 
                                                 
52 However, the Legge Fallimentare does not provide a clear definition of ‘insolvency’. 
53 Fiale (2018), when describing the moment in which the insolvency status exteriorizes itself, talks about ‘repeated 
non-fulfillments’ (reiterati inadempimenti) to state the importance of the persistence when defining an insolvency 
status. 
54 For example, a company with a persistent negative operating margin but with a strong reputation so that it is able 
to be financed regularly from the financial institutions may be considered as solvent, since it is effectively continuing 
its activities without any cash flow problems. Furthermore, in order not to be considered as insolvent, a company can 
obtain from the creditors the so called pactum de non petendo, i.e. an agreement where the creditors commit to not 
ask for the debt service for a certain period of time. 
55 Before the recent reforms, it was possible also for the court to declare the bankruptcy. Now it is not possible 
anymore. 
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• ask to the debtor to deposit, in three days, the book entries, the financial statements and 
the list of creditors; 
• fix the place and date of the first hearing for verifying the credits. Before the fixed date, 
the creditors must ask for taking part of the procedure. 
At this point, the bankruptcy bodies are elected or appointed. The system is made in a way that 
gives the right powers to each body, without favoring only one them, under a sort of ‘checks and 
balances’ system. The bodies established by the Legge Fallimentare are: 
• bankruptcy court (tribunale fallimentare): as seen before, it is the jurisdictional body 
which is in charge of declaring the bankruptcy (art. 9 l.f.). Moreover, the bankruptcy court 
has a general assignment of control of the whole bankruptcy procedure. The bankruptcy 
court most important tasks are: 
▪ to appoint (and revoke and substitute if necessary) the others bankruptcy bodies; 
▪ to hear in the council chamber the official receiver, the debtor and the creditors 
committee; 
▪ to decide about all the disputes that are not under the authority of the bankruptcy 
judge and to decide about the disputes that involve the bankruptcy judge; 
▪ to ask for clarifications and explanations to the others bodies; 
• bankruptcy judge (giudice delegato): it exercises a role of “control, surveillance on the 
regularity of the procedure” (art. 25 l.f.). Its main tasks are: 
▪ to communicate to the court about every issue which competence is on the court 
itself; 
▪ to take the necessary compelling measures in order to protect the debtor assets; 
▪ to appoint the creditors committee; 
▪ to call the official receiver and the creditors committee when necessary and when 
established by the law; 
▪ to decide about the complaints on the official receiver and creditors committee 
activities; 
▪ to authorize the provisional budget or the rent of the company; 
▪ to organize the final allotment; 
• official receiver (curatore fallimentare): it is the body aimed at managing the debtor 
assets. In particular, it has to identify, preserve and liquidate the debtor assets, once it is 
sure to have included in the inventory all the debtor assets. Its goal is to liquidate the 
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assets satisfying in the best way possible the creditors’ claims. The official receiver is 
appointed by the court during the same sentence that declares the bankruptcy. To be 
elected, an official receiver must be a lawyer, an accountant or a person considered expert 
because has conducted successfully a public company; also a firm can be an official 
receiver (for example a professional firm). On the other side, it is important that the 
official receiver has not been declared bankrupt in the past and has not any limitation to 
its capacity to act; moreover, it has not to be connected with the debtor (for example, it is 
not possible to appoint as official receiver the spouse of the debtor, or a debtor’s creditor). 
The other most important tasks of the official receiver are: 
▪ to prepare the debtor assets inventory; 
▪ to prepare a first report on the reasons for distress and every six months to prepare, 
and to send it to the bankruptcy judge, a report on the activities performed during 
the period; 
▪ if necessary, to prepare or integrate the debtor financial statements; 
▪ to examine the declarations of claim (domande di insinuazione al passivo) and to 
participate at the hearing where all the claims are discussed; 
▪ to require to the court to not perform any verification of the claims because of a 
too low value of liquidated assets, so that there will not be enough cash to perform 
the final allotment; 
▪ to prepare a final report on the activities performed and to promote the bankruptcy 
closure. 
As precised before, the main task of the official receiver is to manage the debtor assets. 
Thus, it may perform all the actions it retains necessary to preserve their value; if this is 
true for all the ordinary operations, for the extraordinary ones it must obtain the consent 
of the creditors committee. Moreover, it can propose to the bankruptcy judge the rent of 
the company or the start of a provisional budget (esercizio provvisorio) period. 
Every dispute related to the official receiver activity is managed by the bankruptcy judge. 
Moreover, the bankruptcy court can revoke the official receiver in every moment if there 
is a right justification, on its own initiative or after a proposal made by the bankruptcy 
judge or the creditors committee; 
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• creditors committee (comitato dei creditori): it is formed by three or five members chosen 
among the creditors and has the power to address and control the whole procedure. The 
body is appointed by the bankruptcy judge. Its main functions are: 
• to authorize all the extraordinary acts that the official receiver wants to perform; 
• to authorize the official receiver to enter the pending contracts on behalf of the 
debtor; 
• to approve the liquidation plan produced by the official receiver; 
• to formulate a legal opinion where required by the law56. Those opinions could be 
compulsory or discretionary; moreover, some of them are binding, some of them 
are not; 
• to inspect the financial statements and ask for information about the debtor and the 
procedure. 
The bankruptcy, as all the legal procedures, takes effect on all the participants of the procedure 
but also on third parties. 
As for the debtor, he is subjected to some personal effects. First of all, it has to cooperate with the 
bankruptcy bodies during the whole procedure, by making itself available for every explanation 
or clarification the other bodies need57. Secondly, the bankruptcy declaration sentence reduces 
some civil rights of the debtor58 protected by the Italian Constitution, such as the right of freedom 
and confidentiality of its own correspondence and the right of reside and travel freely. But the 
most important effect of the bankruptcy declaration sentence on the debtor is the dispossession of 
its assets in favor of the official receiver that will manage the assets on its behalf in order to 
                                                 
56 For example, the legal opinion of the creditors committee is required in case of temporary continuation of the 
debtor company operations (art. 104 l.f.), company rent (art. 104bis l.f.), official receiver revoke (art. 37 l.f.) and for 
asking for a bankruptcy discharge (esdebitazione) for the debtor (art. 143 l.f.). 
57 If the debtor does not cooperate in such a way, it risks to eliminate every probability to take part to the institution 
of the bankruptcy discharge, where it would not be liable anymore for the debts not completely paid during the 
bankruptcy. 
58 Either as a person or as a company; in the latter case, there are some slight differences, but the essence does not 
change. 
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liquidate them59. A final effect sustained by the debtor is the ineffectiveness of all the acts 
completed by it60. 
Obviously, also the creditors get some effects after a bankruptcy declaration sentence. Firstly, 
they have the right to participate to the distribution of the sum collected after the official receiver 
has liquidated all the debtor assets, following the ranking structured by the law. The ranking 
gives the highest priority to some types of claims defined by the law and to the claims arose 
during the bankruptcy procedure (crediti prededucibili). Once those claims have been satisfied, 
the following level is composed by the secured claims (creditori privilegiati). Finally, only after 
the secured claims have been paid, the remaining part of the money collected are divided on a pro 
quota basis (the so-called par condicio creditorum) to the unsecured claims (creditori 
chirografari). The second effect of the procedure on the creditors is the ban of initiating or 
continuing individual executive or protective actions towards the debtor assets; in the American 
bankruptcy law this injunction is known as automatic stay and is one of the most important 
pillars of the US insolvency law which has been used as inspiration by many of the civil law 
countries. Therefore, the creditors can only participate in the bankruptcy by applying for the 
declaration of claim. 
The bankruptcy declaration sentence takes effects also for some third parties which take not 
directly part of the procedure. This happens in particular because of the use of the so called 
clawback action (azione di revocatoria fallimentare)61. The aim of the action is to reconstruct the 
assets of the debtor, returning to the moment in which the insolvency status began; in practice, 
the action is oriented to respect the principle of the par condicio creditorum, which permits to 
treat all the creditors (except the ‘prededucibili’ and privileged ones) in the same way. Indeed, 
with the clawback action the official receiver scrutinizes all the transactions occurred in the so 
called ‘suspect period’, and/or with a third party that was aware of the bad conditions of the 
debtor. For the bankruptcy purposes, a period is considered suspect when it is close to the 
bankruptcy procedure start: the law sets a period equal to one year or six months before the 
                                                 
59 It is important to precise that also the profits derived from the use or possession of the assets are included into the 
total assets of the debtor. Moreover, also the assets arrived to the debtor during the bankruptcy procedure take part of 
the procedure itself. By contrast, some assets cannot be part of the total assets subjected to the bankruptcy (for 
example, personal items, salaries, maintenance payments, pensions and other assets not subjected to foreclosure as 
precised by the law). 
60 However, the debtor can intervene legally in the disputes regarding a declaration of bankruptcy pending on it, or 
when it is allowed by the law. 
61 The action is regulated by the art. 67 l.f.. 
54 
 
opening of the procedure. As for the second prerequisite, for the ‘normal transactions’62 the 
official receiver has to prove that the third party was aware of the debtor insolvency; if the 
transaction is abnormal, the official receiver does not have to prove anything but just to execute 
the clawback action63. If the prerequisites are present, the assets related to that transaction return 
to take part of the total debtor assets which can be used by the official receiver64. 
The bankruptcy takes effects also on the pending contracts. Since it is out of the purposes of this 
paper a focus on what happens for all the different types of contracts, it is sufficient here to 
mention the general rule. In general, the art. 72 l.f. establishes that the execution of the contract 
remains suspended until the moment in which the official receiver decides whether to replace the 
debtor in the contract or to exit from it. 
Finally, the bankruptcy may have also penal implications. The most frequent criminal violations 
are called ‘simple bankruptcy’ and ‘fraudulent bankruptcy’. The debtor could be accused of 
fraudulent bankruptcy when has: 
• hidden, concealed or destroyed its assets (fraudulent bankruptcy strictly speaking); 
• stolen, destroyed or counterfeited the journal entries (documentary fraudulent 
bankruptcy), before or during the bankruptcy; 
• executed payments in favor of certain creditors (preferential fraudulent bankruptcy). 
The debtor could be accused of simple bankruptcy when has: 
• made too high personal expenses, in relation to its financial situation; 
• invested too much in high risky operations; 
• delayed the procedures on purpose; 
• not maintained the journal entries in the last three years (documentary simple 
bankruptcy). 
Apart from those two cases, other criminal violations are the abusive loan financing (i.e. a debtor 
continues to ask for a financing when it knows to be already insolvent), the omission of 
declaration of some assets when the official receiver is preparing the inventory and other illegal 
acts performed by the other bodies of the procedure. 
                                                 
62 A transaction is abnormal when the price paid is completely out of the market or the payment method is abnormal 
(as for example a payment in kind not described in the contract). Moreover, the anticipated payments and the free-of-
charge acts (atti a titolo gratuito) are abnormal by definition. All the other acts are considered normal, and the 
official receiver must prove that the third party was aware of the debtor’s bad conditions. 
63 However, the third party can demonstrate that it was not aware that the debtor was in troubles. 
64 The clawback action cannot be asked for certain assets, such as the payments performed in order to favor the 
continuation of the debtor activities, the transactions planned by a certificate plan or a composition with creditors and 
the payments made in favor of the debtor employees. 
55 
 
The bankruptcy procedure is composed by four phases: 
• preservation and management of the debtor assets: in this phase, after having placed 
temporarily the seals on the assets, the official receiver creates the inventory. With this 
activity, the official receiver takes the control and all the responsibilities on each item 
listed in the inventory. Together with the inventory, the official receiver must prepare also 
a detailed list including all the creditors and everyone that has a real right on a debtor 
asset. Once this operation is concluded, the official receiver must manage the assets, 
taking both ordinary operations and extraordinary ones (obtaining the consent of the other 
bodies as described before)65; 
• liabilities scrutiny: the purpose of this phase is to determine the creditors admitted to the 
procedure (i.e. both the ones which have a credit with the debtor and the ones which have 
a real right on a debtor asset). It is important to precise that this is the only moment in 
which the creditors can enter the procedure; if they do not apply to the declaration of 
claims or do not defend themselves in case of rejection from the official receiver66, they 
cannot participate to the final allotment; 
• assets scrutiny and liquidation: as explained before, the total assets to liquidate are 
composed by all the debtor assets at the bankruptcy declaration time plus the assets 
returned to the debtor because of the clawback action. Those assets are liquidated, i.e. 
transformed in cash. In this phase, the official receiver prepares a liquidation plan which 
must be approved by the creditors committee and authorized by the bankruptcy judge. 
The plan must include all the details about the creditors and the way in which the 
liquidation of each asset occurs67, together with other information about the necessity of 
having a provisional budget and the existence (if any) of some proposals of composition 
with creditors. The law gives also the possibility of selling the company as a whole, but 
                                                 
65 Among the possibilities, it is possible to continue the debtor activities under the consent of the creditors committee 
and to rent the company. 
66 Indeed, the official receiver must prepare a project in order to give to the creditors not admitted the possibility to 
contest the decision. 
67 The recent reforms have given more freedom to act about the way in which an asset can be sold during a 
bankruptcy procedure. Thus, currently it is possible to sell an asset also using a purchase agreement (contratto di 
compravendita). The only prerequisite that the Legge Fallimentare provides is that the sale must be done adopting 
competitive procedures. However, the bankruptcy judge has the power of suspending the assets sale (if there are 
justified reasons and on request of the debtor, the creditors committee and everybody which is interested in the issue, 
ex art. 108 l.f.) and to block a transaction if the offered price is materially below the right one inferred by the market 
trend. 
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only if the sale of each asset singularly would have produces a smaller amount of cash to 
distribute to the creditors (art. 105 l.f.); 
• final allotment: during this phase, the cash obtained from the assets liquidation is 
distributed to the creditors accepted during the liabilities scrutiny stage, following the 
ranking described before (prededucibili, secured and unsecured creditors). It is important 
to precise that this phase is not mandatory; indeed, it may happen that the bankruptcy 
procedure can finish because of a too low amount of cash obtained through the liquidation 
process. Before the final allotment occurs, the official receiver must present to the 
bankruptcy judge a report which includes all the transactions performed during the 
procedure, including also the related journal entries. Once the bankruptcy judge has 
approved the report and liquidated the official receiver compensation, he orders the final 
allotment. 
As a consequence, the bankruptcy procedure can end in several ways, ex art. 118 l.f.: 
• when the creditors do not apply to the declaration of claims process (i.e. when no one 
applies for entering the bankruptcy procedure); 
• when all the liabilities have been liquidated68; 
• when all the cash generated from the liquidation of the debtor assets has been distributed 
to the creditors. Differently than the previous case, under this circumstance the creditors 
are not fully satisfied; 
• when during the procedure the official receiver verifies that there are no possibilities for 
satisfying, even partially, the creditors. 
If one of those cases occur, the bankruptcy court declares the closing of the procedure, on request 
of the official receiver, the debtor or by its own initiative (art. 119 l.f.). Immediately after the 
bankruptcy is definitely closed, all the related bodies cease to exist, while the debtor returns in 
bonis, i.e. it can restart to manage its (remaining) assets as it could do before the procedure 
inception. As for the creditors, they can execute individual legal actions on the remaining assets 
of the debtor, except the case of debtor bankruptcy discharge69. 
                                                 
68 This case may mean that not all the cash raised from the liquidation of the debtor assets have been distributed. In 
this case, all the creditors have been satisfied. 
69 The debtor bankruptcy discharge (esdebitazione del fallito) is an institution aimed at favoring the reintegration of 
the debtor in the economy, by eliminating his post-bankruptcy remaining debt. The goal is to give to it the possibility 
to restart a new commercial activity without supporting the burden of the liabilities related to its past bankruptcy. In 
order to get this advantage, the debtor must satisfy some prerequisites: 
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2.2.2 Bankruptcy buy-out (concordato fallimentare) 
The Legge Fallimentare provides for a further way to conclude a bankruptcy procedure: the 
bankruptcy buy-out (concordato fallimentare). It consists of the creation of an agreement 
between the debtor and the creditors aimed at satisfying the claims of the latter. Generally, the 
principal advantage of this legal tool is that it is a quicker way to exit an insolvency status; thus, 
rather than waiting for the closure of the bankruptcy procedure, on one side the creditors are 
satisfied earlier, while on the other side the debtor has the possibility to restart the (or a new) 
commercial activity sooner. Moreover, the second advantage of this tool is that the debtor is 
released completely from the liabilities that it has not paid to the creditors under the bankruptcy 
buy-out. Thus, with the bankruptcy buy-out the creditors may agree to be satisfied only partially 
and commit to not execute any individual action towards the debtor assets after the agreement has 
been approved by the court. The bankruptcy buy-out can be proposed either by the debtor (but 
only after one year from the bankruptcy declaration) or by one or more creditors or a third party 
(art. 124 l.f.). The proposal may include the subdivision of the creditors in different classes, a 
different treatment for each class and must contain the detailed description of the liquidation plan. 
The bankruptcy buy-out plan must be presented to the bankruptcy judge; after the consent of the 
creditors committee, the bankruptcy judge orders that the plan is communicated to all the 
creditors. The creditors must vote adopting the majority rule70; if the majority of the creditors 
gives the consent to the plan, the court homologates it71. The bankruptcy buy-out on one side 
binds the debtor to execute what described into the plan; on the other side is valid for all the 
creditors, also the ones which have not voted positively. Moreover, as precised before, the debtor 
is free from every liability connected with the bankruptcy procedure; thus, the creditors cannot 
take individual actions on the debtor assets related to the remaining part of the debt. 
                                                                                                                                                              
i. during the bankruptcy procedure, the debtor must have satisfied partially the creditors; 
ii. the debtor has cooperated with the bankruptcy bodies during the procedure, without delaying voluntarily the 
procedure; 
iii. the debtor has not obtained another bankruptcy discharge in the last ten years; 
iv. the debtor has not made fraudulent activities (such as having hidden, concealed or destroyed its assets and 
obtained illegal financing). 
70 Recently (Decision no. 17186 of 28 June 2018), the United Chambers (Sezioni Unite) of the Italian Supreme Court 
established that the plan cannot be voted by the subject which has filed for the plan, since there would be a clear 
conflict of interest. Indeed, on one side the objective of the party which files for the plan is to minimize payments to 
the other creditors, while on the other side the goal of the creditors is to receive the highest amount of cash possible. 
71 There is the possibility that more proposals are presented during the procedure. If this is the case, the creditors 
must vote on each procedure, and wins the procedure which has obtained the highest amount of votes (in case of 
equality of votes between two plans, wins the one which have been presented first or the one presented by the 
debtor). 
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One of the most critical aspects of this legal tool is that the procedure could start also when the 
list of creditors created by the official receiver is still temporary (artt. 124-127 l.f.). Indeed, the 
proposal can be made by every creditor or third party also before the production of the decree that 
gives execution of the list of creditors, if the official receiver has been able to create a temporary 
list of creditors. If we combine this aspect with the fact that every change of the creditors 
admitted to the procedure occurred after the inception of the buy-out are irrelevant for the 
computation of the majority (art. 128 l.f.), the risk to obtain a solution which disadvantages some 
creditors could be very material. 
 
2.2.3 Administrative compulsory winding up (liquidazione coatta amministrativa) 
The Legge Fallimentare includes a special procedure addressed to those companies which 
insolvency has important implications for the whole country, for different reasons. For example, 
a corporation may be owned by the public authority, or it may be important for public reasons 
because if it goes bankrupt the financial credibility of the country will fall dangerously72. The 
administrative compulsory winding up is a special procedure through which, in order to protect 
the public interest, the authority decides to cancel that particular company. As a consequence, not 
necessarily a company subjected to this procedure is insolvent; a corporation may enter this 
procedure also in case of legal violations and other public interest reasons. However, the law has 
explicitly considered the possibility of verifying the insolvency of the company, when insolvency 
is not the reason why the procedure has been applied. In such a way, it is possible to satisfy the 
creditors as happens under the bankruptcy procedure73.  
The procedure determines the substitution of the entrepreneur (or the board of directors) with an 
administrative body which acts on behalf of him (or them). The initiative for starting the 
procedure is taken by the Public Administration (i.e. the company industry’s competent ministry). 
The bodies which take part of the procedure are: 
• liquidator (commissario liquidatore): its prerequisites and tasks are very similar to the 
official receiver ones; 
                                                 
72 For example, are among those companies: the insurance companies, the financial institutions, the cooperatives, the 
investment funds and the auditing firms. 
73 However, the verification is not possible for the public authorities (enti pubblici) and for the companies which can 
be subjected to both the bankruptcy and the administrative compulsory winding up procedures. 
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• supervisory authority (autorità di vigilanza): its activities are comparable to the one 
performed by the bankruptcy judge under a bankruptcy procedure; 
• supervisory committee (comitato di sorveglianza): it is composed by three or five 
members. In practice, they advise the other bodies when required. 
As a result of the procedure, the activity of the company bodies are suspended. Moreover, as in 
the bankruptcy case, the individual legal actions are banned. As for the creditors, the effects of 
the administrative compulsory winding up are similar to the bankruptcy ones, except the fact that 
there is not any declaration of claims; in this procedure, the list of creditors is prepared by the 
liquidator, which has to communicate to each creditor the amount of its claim as specified in the 
journal entries. Each creditor can complain if it retains that the amount identified by the 
liquidator is wrong or it has not been included in the list of creditors. Once all the complaints 
have been solved, the liquidation starts. Finally, after the supervisory authority has approved the 
liquidation plan provided by the liquidator, the final allotment can be performed.  
The procedure can close in two ways: with the final allotment and with an agreement which is 
very similar to the bankruptcy buy-out. 
 
2.2.4 Extraordinary liquidation for big companies (amministrazione straordinaria delle grandi 
imprese in crisi) and Extraordinary special liquidation (amministrazione straordinaria speciale) 
As already precised before, the first push towards the new approach to the whole Italian 
bankruptcy law content has been provided by the Prodi law of 3 April 1979, no.95; this act 
introduced the institute of the extraordinary liquidation for big companies, aimed at recovering 
an insolvent big company instead of liquidating it. The mentioned law has been abrogated by the 
Legislative Decree of 8 July 1999, no.270, which has confirmed the institution adding up new 
rules in order to regulate better the issue. 
The procedure is similar to the one for the administrative compulsory winding up, but its main 
aim is to preserve the know-how and the commercial, technical and occupational values of those 
big companies. Indeed, a simple dissolution of those corporations could implicate severe 
problems for a material number of users, from the employees to the society. 
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To participate in this procedure, a company must be considered big; the art. 2 of the Legislative 
Decree of 8 July 1999, no.270 sets the quantitative threshold. A company is admitted to this 
procedure, when: 
• for at least one year, it has more than 200 employees; 
• it has an amount of debt at least equal to the ⅔ of both the total assets and the total 
revenues; 
• it shows a concrete possibility to recover the economic equilibrium. 
The procedure inception occurs in two phases: (i) the verification of the quantitative prerequisites 
and the insolvency declaration; (ii) the analysis of the company recovering. Thus, when a 
company is considered ‘big’, it cannot be declared bankrupt immediately, but must be subjected 
to the analysis of its recovering. Only when the court have declared that it is not possible to 
recover the company, the latter could be declared bankrupt74. 
Accordingly, the court can declare the bankruptcy or reject the complaint if it concludes that the 
company is not insolvent75. With the sentence which declares the insolvency status, the court 
appoints the bankruptcy judge, elects the judicial commissioners (commissario giudiziale)76, asks 
to the debtor the journal entries and the financial statements, sets a term for the declaration of 
claims and decides up to whether the company is run by the existing managers or by the judicial 
commissioner(s) under this period. 
Once the court has concluded that the company is sufficiently big and insolvent, the second phase 
starts, i.e. the analysis of the company recovering. The aforementioned recovery can be obtained 
in different ways, namely by selling the company assets or restructuring the company operations 
and capital structure. For this purpose, the judicial commissioner must prepare a report including 
the reasons for distress and the possibility of recovering the company. Consequently, the court 
decides whether to start the procedure of extraordinary liquidation or to declare the bankruptcy. 
Once the procedure is opened, the Minister of Economic Development appoints one or three 
extraordinary commissioners (commissari straordinari), depending on the complexity of the 
                                                 
74 However, before declaring the bankruptcy of a big company, the court must hear the interested parties (i.e. the 
debtor, the claimant and the Minister of Economic Development). 
75 There is a third way, i.e. when the court rejects the complaint only because the quantitative prerequisites are not 
reached. In this case, since the company is insolvent but not big, the court will declare the bankruptcy. 
76 One or three, depending on the complexity of the case. 
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case. The extraordinary commissioner manages the company77, and every six months has to 
prepare a report about the activities performed to deliver to the Minister. 
Furthermore, the Minister has to elect the surveillance committee (comitato di sorveglianza) 
composed by three or five members78; the committee’s aim it to give opinions about the decisions 
taken by the extraordinary commissioner. Moreover, it has control powers, since it can control 
the journal entries and ask clarifications to the extraordinary commissioner. 
As for the effects of the procedure, as happens in the bankruptcy procedure, the debtor cannot 
manage the company anymore; furthermore, it cannot start any dispute related to its company and 
the corporate bodies are suspended. Moreover, after the procedure has started, it is not possible to 
start or continue individual legal actions on the company assets. However, only if the turnaround 
plan is about the liquidation of some assets, it is possible to perform clawback actions. 
By sixty days from the inception of the procedure, the extraordinary commissioner must prepare 
and present to the Minister a plan, which must include all the details about the procedure to 
perform and the specification up to whether the plan regards the liquidation of the assets or the 
restructuring of the company operations and capital structure. The plan must be approved by the 
Minister of Economic Development, after having heard the surveillance committee. 
After the plan has been approved, the extraordinary commissioner can execute it; if the plan 
includes a liquidation procedure, after the assets have been liquidated it is possible to distribute 
the cash obtained to the creditors, as stated into the plan. 
Ex art. 74 Legislative Decree of 8 July 1999, no.270, the procedure closes: 
• if there are no creditors that has applied for the declaration of claims; 
• if the insolvent debtor has recovered from its indebtedness; 
• when the sentence which approves the agreement between debtor and creditors 
(concordato) is definitive. 
Moreover, if the plan consists of the liquidation of some debtor assets, the procedure closes when 
the final allotment has been performed or when the creditors have been satisfied fully. 
                                                 
77 When managing the company, the extraordinary commissioner has more power than the official receiver of the 
bankruptcy procedure. Indeed, the Minister of Economic Development has the power of authorization of only two 
acts, namely the rent of the company and the rent of the buildings (and similar rights) of material value. However, 
the Minister has the power of revoking the extraordinary commissioner if there is a fair reason, on the request of the 
surveillance committee or on its own initiative. 
78 One or two of them (respectively, in case of committee composed by three or five members) are chosen among the 
unsecured creditors, while the other members are selected among the individuals considered expert in the field. 
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A legal tool very similar to the extraordinary liquidation for big companies is the extraordinary 
special liquidation. The procedure has been introduced with the Law of the 18 February 2004, 
no. 3979, and is addressed to bigger companies than the one subjected to the extraordinary 
liquidation for big companies. To apply for this procedure, the prerequisites are: 
• the company must have no less than 500 employees; 
• the corporation must have an amount of debt of at least €300 million. 
The aim of this procedure it to accelerate the procedure presented above in this paragraph; in 
particular, in order to limit the time necessary to perform the procedure, the powers of the 
Minister and the extraordinary commissioner have been reinforced. It is up to the insolvent debtor 
to decide which procedure to follow. If the debtor follows the special procedure, the Minister (if 
agrees with the decision) immediately starts the procedure by appointing the extraordinary 
commissioner and dispossessing the debtor in its own favor. As for the remaining part of the 
procedure, it is similar to the one described for the extraordinary liquidation for big companies, 
with the difference that every task shall be performed quicker. As stated for the ordinary tool, 
also the special one may conclude through a declaration of bankruptcy or an agreement between 
the debtor and the creditors. 
Finally, the Law of 27 October 2008, no. 166 has updated the Marzano Decree by extending the 
power to open the procedure also for the Prime Minister, but only for the companies which 
operate in the “essential public services” industry. 
 
2.2.5 Composition with creditors (concordato preventivo) 
Generally, the composition with creditors is an agreement between the debtor and the majority of 
the creditors aimed at solving the distress situation through the satisfaction, even partially, of the 
creditors. 
To be admitted to the procedure, the debtor must be a commercial entrepreneur and in a distress 
status. Moreover, the debtor must produce a recovery plan (piano di risanamento) which includes 
the restructuring of the debt, the satisfaction of the creditors, the transfer of the activities to a 
                                                 
79 Which has converted in law the Marzano decree (Law Decree of 23 December 2003, no. 347). 
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contractor (assuntore)80, the subdivision of the creditors in different classes and a different 
treatment given to each class of creditors. 
The procedure bodies are: 
• bankruptcy court (tribunale fallimentare): differently than the bankruptcy case, its 
functions are not general but predetermined. In particular, the bankruptcy court has to 
admit the debtor to the procedure, to declare the bankruptcy if the composition with 
creditors is not feasible, to homologate (or cancel) the plan and to decide on the disputes 
related to the bankruptcy judge and the judicial commissioner; 
• bankruptcy judge (giudice delegato): its duties are slightly different from the bankruptcy 
case. Indeed, it has to solve the disputes arisen during the procedure, to authorize the 
extraordinary operations performed by the judicial commissioner and to promote the 
eventual bankruptcy declaration; 
• judicial commissioner (commissario giudiziale): this body must verify the list of creditors 
presented by the debtor, monitor the debtor activities (since the debtor can manage the 
company also after the inception of the procedure), prepare the necessary reports about 
the distress reasons and monitor the way in which the plan is going to be performed; 
• public prosecutor (pubblico ministero): its main task is to receive the information from 
the judicial commissioner about potential criminal investigations to perform, in case the 
judicial commissioner finds some material facts when performing the report about the 
reasons for distress. 
Moreover, in case of composition with creditors regarding the liquidation of the debtor assets, the 
court has to appoint one or more liquidators (with the same tasks and power of the official 
receiver under the bankruptcy procedure) and the creditors committee, as in the bankruptcy case 
(art. 182 l.f.). 
The composition with creditors procedure starts with the application for the admission to the 
procedure itself. To do that, the debtor has to complain to the court, present several documents 
(i.e. the updated financial statements, the list of creditors and all the entities which have real 
rights on a debtor asset) and present a plan containing the detailed proposal81. The debtor can also 
present the complaint without proposing a plan at the same moment, in order to take advantage of 
                                                 
80 Also a creditor can be a contractor. 
81 The law establishes that, to protect the creditors, the plan must be accompanied by a report where an expert 
confirms the veracity of the data and the feasibility of the plan itself. 
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the protections guaranteed by the law from the very beginning; however, the debtor has no more 
than 120 days to present the complete plan (this institute is called concordato in bianco)82. Apart 
from this particular case, once there is a plan, the bankruptcy court can approve or reject it; if the 
court rejects it, the court may give to the debtor a period of time during which it could complete 
the plan. If the court approves the plan, it admits the debtor to the procedure of the composition 
with creditors, nominating the bankruptcy judge, electing the judicial commissioner and ordering 
the convocation of the creditors for the approval of the plan83. In this phase, the judicial 
commissioner has to verify the list of creditors provided by the debtor; indeed, differently than 
the bankruptcy case, under the composition with creditors rules there is not any verification of the 
claims. Subsequently, the judicial commissioner prepares the inventory and a report about the 
reasons for distress, as mentioned above. 
After this stage, the creditors have to approve the plan. The proposal is approved if it obtains the 
vote of the majority of the creditors admitted to the vote84. If the proposal has not been approved 
by the creditors, the bankruptcy court must revoke the composition with creditors and – if the 
company is insolvent – declare the bankruptcy, but only on request by the creditors or the public 
prosecutor. 
Once the plan has been approved, to be effective it must be homologated by the bankruptcy court, 
after the judicial commissioner has presented a justified opinion where it confirms the feasibility 
of the plan. The court can homologate the plan also when a percentage of creditors up to the 20% 
of the total creditors admitted to the vote is against it, but only if the court believes that the 
composition with creditors plan is more convenient for the creditors than the other alternatives. 
After the homologation of the plan, the composition with creditors procedure is closed. 
                                                 
82 This possibility is strictly regulated, in order to avoid fraudulent purposes by the debtor. In particular, when 
presenting the complaint, the debtor must provide information about the creditors and the last three years financial 
statements; moreover, the bankruptcy court can appoint the judicial commissioner at this moment, in order to control 
the debtor operations and behavior also from this pre-composition with creditor phase. 
83 From the 2015, it is possible for the creditors to provide a competitive proposal, in order to prevent the 
presentation of illogical plans by the debtor. Thus, the law states that it is possible to present a competitive proposal 
if the plan presented by the debtor does not include a satisfaction of the claims greater than the 40% of the total 
claims (30% in case of composition with creditors with continuation of the company operations). 
84 If there are different classes of creditors, the plan is approved when: 
i. the proposal obtains the majority of the creditors admitted to the vote; 
ii. the majority of the creditors classes has voted positively. 
If there are multiple plans, wins the plan which has obtained the highest majority. In case of equality of votes among 
two or more competitive proposals, wins the proposal presented earlier. If among the proposals with the same vote 
composition there is the plan presented by the debtor, the latter proposal wins. 
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As regards the effects of the composition with creditors, differently than the bankruptcy case, the 
debtor management bodies (or the entrepreneur) continues to manage the company; in other 
words, the dispossession of its assets in favor of a third party does not occur85. As for the effects 
of the procedure on the creditors, they are similar to the bankruptcy case; in particular, the 
creditors cannot take any individual legal action on the debtor assets after the procedure has 
begun. However, only for this procedure the Law Decree of 31 May 2010, no. 78 sets a list of 
claims considered as prededucibili, namely the financing provided by the financial institutions 
aimed at starting the procedure and executing the plan and the financing provided by the 
shareholders when executing the plan. Moreover, from the 201286 there is a new discipline on the 
pending contracts87; in particular, the debtor can ask to the court to dissolve some ‘oppressive’ 
contracts in exchange of a fair compensation in favor of the third party88. 
After the procedure has been closed with the homologation by the bankruptcy court, the debtor 
regains the full availability of its assets, and the creditors can continue to adopt legal actions on 
the debtor assets (respecting the guidelines of the agreement). 
A particular type of this procedure is the composition with creditors with continuation of the 
company operations (concordato preventivo con continuità aziendale), introduced by the Law 
Decree of 22 June 2012, no. 8389 and regulated by the art. 186bis l.f.. The article defines 
‘continuation of the company operations’ as the continuation of the activities by the debtor, the 
conferment of the company in another one or the sale of the company. The aim of this recent 
legal tool is to create an agreement aimed at continuing the company activities, without incurring 
in illogical liquidations. In practice, the continuation of the operations is guaranteed by the future 
expected cash flow of the company; thus, it is necessary that the debtor proposes a business plan 
which proves that the firm will restart to be profitable in the near future. The procedure is the 
same described before for the ordinary composition with creditors. 
The composition with creditors, of every type, can be dissoluted when the debtor does not 
perform the activities defined into the plan. Moreover, it can be cancelled, on request by the 
                                                 
85 However, the activities of the debtor are monitored by the judicial commissioner (art. 167 l.f.). Moreover, for the 
extraordinary operations it is necessary the authorization of the bankruptcy judge. 
86 Law of 7 August 2012, no. 134. 
87 In fact, one of the most common reasons for the crisis is the presence of some oppressive contracts. Thus, the 
Legge Fallimentare wants to give a chance for the debtor to exit from those contracts, simplifying the recovering 
from the distress scenario. 
88 This compensation enters the procedure as a prededucibili claim, together with the other ones listed above. 
89 Converted in Law of 7 August 2012, no. 134. 
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judicial commissioner or every creditor, when the debtor has voluntarily exaggerated the assets 
value or concealed part of the liabilities. Thus, the main difference between dissolution and 
cancellation is that the latter must have a malicious component.  
 
2.3 Out-of-court procedures 
The Legge Fallimentare includes also some out-of-court procedures, i.e. legal tools that are 
regulated but do not require (or minimize) the intervention of any jurisdictional body. In practice, 
the aim of those legal instruments is to favor the creation of private agreements between the 
debtor and the creditors, without incurring the legal costs and being bound to the time of the 
bureaucracy (often too long for having an efficient result). Moreover, the increase of the out-of-
court agreements helps to decrease the work for the courts, allowing them to be more focused on 
the most critical cases. 
 
2.3.1 Agreements for debt restructuring (accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti) 
The Law Decree of 14 March 2005, no. 3590 introduced the possibility to create an arrangement 
between the debtor and the creditors aimed at reaching an agreement with the majority of the 
creditors about the restructuring of the capital structure (art. 182bis l.f.). Thus, the final purpose 
is to support the continuation of the company activities, without looking for useless liquidations. 
Once an agreement has been reached, the court has to homologate it: this is the only phase in 
which a judicial body enters the procedure. The main procedure is accompanied by two similar 
ones – the accordi di ristrutturazione con intermediari finanziari and the convenzione di 
moratoria – that work as the main procedure but have different purposes. 
The agreement must be approved by at least the 60% of the creditors which represent the total 
liabilities of the debtor and must provide for the full payment of the claims of the creditors that 
have not approved the plan. The main disadvantage of this rule is that the procedure is 
continuously subjected to the so-called free ride problem, i.e. that situation where, since the 
creditors that do not agree with the plan will obtain for sure a full payment, all the creditors have 
the incentive of rejecting the plan. In other words, those creditors will take advantage of the fact 
                                                 
90 Converted in Law of 14 May 2005, no. 80. 
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that there are some creditors that are willing to be paid less than the full amount of their claims 
because they are directly interested in the continuation of the debtor operations. Similarly, the 
procedure could be subjected to the holdout problem as well, i.e. that scenario where some 
creditors are encouraged to reject a plan because there are more convenient (only for them) 
alternatives91. 
The company that applies for this procedure must be in a distress condition; thus, it may not be 
insolvent, but at an earlier stage of distress. If a company is in distress, it can ask for the 
homologation of the agreement after having provided the documentation ex art. 161 l.f. (the 
updated financial statements, the list of the creditors and the specification of the plan) and a 
report prepared by an expert about the feasibility of the plan itself and the veracity of the data 
included on it. Then, the court can decide up to whether to approve or reject the agreement, 
explaining the reasons. 
Recently, one of the most critical points of this legal tool was the precautions that the law 
guarantees to the companies that apply for the procedure. In order to support the creation of out-
of-court agreements, the Legislative Decree of 12 September 2007, no. 169 established a period 
of 60 days – subsequent the publication of the agreement in the Registry of Businesses – where 
for the creditors it is not possible anymore to take individual legal actions on the company assets. 
In the 201092, the ban has been extended also during the negotiations related to the conclusion of 
the agreements.  Finally, to further increase the incentive to use this tool, the Law of 7 August 
2012, no. 134 established that the ban is valid also for the achievement of the guarantees (such as 
pledge, lien or other special privileges).  
Another important aspect of the procedure is the possibility to obtain a financing during the 
procedure93. Indeed, the Law of 30 July 2010, no. 122 introduced in the Legge Fallimentare text 
the art. 182 quater which gives the possibility, for the parties interested in doing this, to finance a 
company without being afraid of getting involved in a bankruptcy procedure in the near future. 
Indeed, the claims related to the financing obtained under this framework are classified as 
                                                 
91 However, it is important to note that the Italian law encourages procedures such as the agreements for debt 
restructuring only when there are not any more convenient alternatives. 
92 Law of 30 July 2010, no. 122. 
93 In the American insolvency law, this type of help provided to the debtor in state of crisis (or insolvency) is 
summarized with the Debtor-In-Possession (DIP) financing institution, where it is possible to provide financing to 
the debtor also during those tough moments. 
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prededucibili claims in case of bankruptcy94. The aim is to guarantee the continuation of the 
company operations: indeed, in order to continue the activities, it is important for a company to 
be able to pay the creditors (such as the trade creditors) during the procedure. To do that, the law 
provides for this type of ‘preferential financing’. 
Moreover, from the 201595 it is possible for the court to authorize the debtor to obtain preferential 
financing during the phase in which the debtor asks for the agreement without presenting the plan 
yet (i.e. the concordato in bianco). In other words, the law provides for the possibility to collect 
some cash in terms of risk capital before the very beginning of the procedure. However, this is 
possible only when the debtor demonstrates that it is not able to collect money in other ways; 
further, it has to specify how those money will be used and prove that without that financing the 
company would enter a more several distress scenario. 
As illustrated before, the main procedure is accompanied by two other procedures – introduced 
by the Law of 6 August 2015, no. 132 –, that work in a similar way but have been created for 
different purposes: 
• accordo di ristrutturazione con intermediari finanziari: it is possible to adopt this legal 
tool only when the distress is accompanied with a strong dependence on the financial 
institutions. In particular, it is necessary that a distressed company has at least the 50% of 
the total debt related to the financial institutions. The agreement is valid if the 75% of the 
financial creditors subscribe the plan; moreover, all the non-financial creditors must be 
paid in full. If those conditions are respected, the court will homologate the agreement; 
• convenzione di moratoria: this agreement permits a debtor to delay the payment terms of 
the debt service with the financial institutions. Also for this institution are required the 
preconditions for the previous tool. 
 
2.3.2 Certificate plan (piano attestato di risanamento) 
The certificate plan is a tool aimed at turning around a company performance, characterized by 
the completely absence of any jurisdictional body and any publication. The first advantage of the 
absence of a jurisdictional body is that the debtor saves all the legal costs; however, differently 
                                                 
94 Together with the other types of financing identified for the composition with creditors discipline and the fee for 
the expert which prepares the report aforementioned. 
95 Law of 6 August 2015, no. 132. 
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than the other out-of-court procedures, there are no protections guaranteed by the law during the 
execution of the plan. Thus, this instrument is completely in the hands of the distressed company, 
that can use it to recover the profitability without any legal limitation. The institute has been 
introduced in the 2005 (Law Decree of 14 March 2005, no. 35) and has been reinforced with the 
Law Decree of 22 June 2012, no. 83, implementing the art. 67 l.f. regarding the clawback action. 
The article, at the letter d), establishes that all the acts related to the debtor assets in execution of 
a plan suitable for recovering the company indebtedness and improving the equilibrium of the 
performance – where the plan is certified by an independent expert –, are exempt from any 
clawback action. Thus, one of the most important aspects of this tool is that the activities 
performed in execution of such plan are safe, in the sense that if the plan does not succeed, the 
third parties that have given confidence in the plan are not damaged by a potential clawback 
action during the bankruptcy procedure. 
To get the protection guaranteed by the law, the plan must have two conditions: 
• to permit the turnaround of the company: it can be obtained by reducing the amount of 
debt, renegotiating the deadlines of the payments or renegotiating the conditions of the 
loan (for example, decreasing the interest rate or with a debt write out)96; 
• to be certificated by an independent expert appointed by the debtor. 
Moreover, it is sufficient that a company is in distress and not insolvent, as happens for the 
agreements for debt restructuring. 
The plan can be prepared by all the entities that can file for bankruptcy and every private 
entrepreneur considered “not small” by the art. 1 l.f.. 
Since this tool is not explicitly regulated by the law, it is object of some critics. In particular, the 
certificate plan is a unilateral act, in the sense that the consent of the majority of the creditors is 
not mandatory. Indeed, it seems possible to affirm that the real aim of the certificate plan is not to 
satisfy the creditors’ claims (or at least not indirectly), but to reorder the company capital 
structure (Burigo, 2016). Following this perspective, it would not be necessary to include into the 
plan agreements with the creditors97. 
                                                 
96 It is important to precise that the plan is not suitable to solve an operational crisis (for example, a loss of market 
share, or the obsolescence of the machineries), while it is more appropriate for restructuring the company capital 
structure. 
97 Obviously, the plan may include agreements with creditors, and it usually happens. 
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Another critical point about the certificate plan is the absence of any type of publication of the 
plan. Currently, the law gives to the debtor the possibility (but not the obligation) to publish the 
plan. Thus, in some cases the third parties could be damaged from a non-published plan. 
Moreover, a problem could arise when, during the bankruptcy procedure which follows a failed 
certificate plan, the official receiver wants to control the certificate plan in order to verify its 
feasibility; in particular, if the plan has not been written on paper, it could be difficult to prove 
the non-feasibility of the plan. 
 
2.3.3 Settlement of over-indebtedness crisis (composizione delle crisi da sovraindebitamento) 
From the 201298, the Italian law provides also for other legal tools addressed to all the entities 
which cannot apply for all the other procedures aforementioned, i.e. small firms and consumers. 
If under the other procedures the main ‘protagonist’ is the debtor, under this framework the entity 
which is subjected to those procedures can be called over-indebted. An over-indebted is an entity 
(or an individual) that has taken obligations for other purposes than the execution of an 
entrepreneurial or professional activity; this entity must not have the requisites to be declared as 
bankrupt or to take part of a composition with creditors99. Logically, an over-indebted must be in 
an over-indebtedness status, i.e. a situation of persistent disequilibrium between the level of debt 
and the assets; the consequence of this condition is a serious difficulty of fulfilling the 
obligations. 
The law provides for three procedures: 
• debtor agreement (accordo del debitore): it regards a plan aimed at the reorganization of 
the debt and the satisfaction of the creditors, which have to approve the plan. The 
proposal is prepared by the over-indebted (with the help of a specific agency100); the plan 
must include all the details about the execution of the plan itself (for example, the way in 
which the creditors will be paid, the technique of liquidation of the assets and the new 
fiscal position of the over-indebted). The plan must be presented in the court, together 
                                                 
98 Law of 37 January 2012, no. 3. 
99 A recent Court of Cassation sentence (1/2/2016, no. 1869) affirmed that can apply for the procedure also the 
professional or entrepreneur – which does not have the prerequisites for the bankruptcy or composition with creditors 
procedure – which assumed debts for purposes not related to the professional or entrepreneurial activity. 
100 The specific agency (organismo di composizione della crisi) is an agency registered in a specific register provided 
by the Minister of Justice which participates in all the settlement of over-indebtedness crisis procedures. Their aim is 
to help the over-indebted to prepare the plan and executing the most complex parts of the procedure. 
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with the list of creditors, the journal entries if the over-indebted is an entrepreneur and the 
report produced by an expert where it certificates the feasibility of the plan. The plan is 
homologated by the court after at least the 60% of the creditors have approved the 
proposal; 
• consumer plan (piano del consumatore): if the over-indebted is also a consumer101, he can 
choose whether to prepare a plan aimed at balancing the over-indebtedness status, without 
looking for the consent of the creditors. The characteristics of the plan are the same of the 
debtor agreement’s one; the only (but important) difference is that the decision on 
whether to approve the plan is on the court, without the necessity of the creditors 
approval; 
• assets liquidation (liquidazione dei beni): the Law Decree of 18 October 2012, no. 179102 
introduced the possibility for the over-indebted to liquidate the assets in alternative of the 
other two procedures aforementioned. The liquidation may include all the assets with 
some exception (for example the assets that cannot be subjected to foreclosure, pensions 
and salaries). Moreover, the specific agency must prepare a report where it includes 
elements such as the reasons for distress, the analysis of the indebtedness of the over-
indebted and the certification of the feasibility of the plan. 
Moreover, also the over-indebted can be discharged (esdebitato), as in the bankruptcy case. 
 
2.4 The 2017 reform 
As precised earlier in this chapter, recently the purpose of the Italian bankruptcy law is changing, 
going towards a preference for the legal tools which support the continuation of the company 
activities and the presence of quicker and less expensive (in particular for the debtor) procedures. 
As a consequence, in the 2017 the Italian Parliament approved the Law of 19 October 2017, 
no.155 (hereinafter, Reform) which authorizes the Government to perform a deep reform of the 
Legge Fallimentare by the 14 November 2018. By the date aforementioned, the government 
prepared a document which confirms what described by the Rordorf commission. 
                                                 
101 The consumer is defined in the Italian Consumer Code (art. 3) as “the person who acts for different purposes than 
his entrepreneurial, commercial, handcrafted or professional activity eventually performed”. 
102 Converted in Law of 17 December 2012, no. 221. 
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Generally, the Reform aims at completing the passage from the bankruptcy law to the ‘corporate 
crisis law’, aligning the Italian legislation with the other countries’ one103. Moreover, the Reform 
must consider the European legislation, in particular the Regulation 2015/848/EU – which 
provides for a criterion for determining the competent jurisdiction in case of international 
insolvency procedures – and the Recommendation no. 2014/135/EU aimed at promoting the 
identification of the crisis before the insolvency and the continuation of the activities of a 
distressed company. 
The first step towards this new approach is to substitute the term ‘bankruptcy’ (fallimento) with 
‘judicial liquidation’ (liquidazione giudiziale), in order to erase the negative aspect behind the 
whole legal framework. As already described, a company liquidation shall be seen as an ordinary 
phase of a company life-cycle, rather than a way to punish the ones which were managing the 
corporation in that period. 
Together with the new terminology, the Reform substitutes the old bankruptcy procedure with a 
new one, which is almost equal to the original one; the new procedure must be quicker and must 
provide more power to the official receiver. Indeed, if in the recent reforms the legislator decided 
to increase the power of the creditors committee (to the detriment of the bankruptcy judge), the 
Reform is oriented to increase the importance of the official receiver; in particular, the official 
receiver will have more power when taking decisions about the company capital structure and 
will be legitimated to start legal actions towards the company bodies. Moreover, the Reform 
regulates in detail issues such as the incompatibility of the official receiver between different 
procedures and establishes a minimum content of the liquidation plan. 
To increase the quickness of the procedure, the Reform indicates the possibility of substituting 
the functions of the creditors committee with telematic consultations in case of less complex 
procedures; also, the verification of the liabilities phase shall be adjusted in order to be faster. 
Moreover, to make the procedure more powerful, the clawback action is limited further and the 
rules on the real estate rights are clarified. 
The Reform changes also the composition with creditors; in particular, this procedure is seen by 
the legislator as the most important one, replacing the bankruptcy institution that has been used 
the most so far. The legislator, indeed, wants to align perfectly the procedure to the new approach 
eliminating the possibility of performing a composition with creditors characterized by the 
                                                 
103 In particular, the Reform is inspired to the American (in particular the Chapter 11 of the American insolvency 
law), British and German (particularly the rules about the unification of the insolvency procedures) law. 
73 
 
liquidation of the assets. Thus, the only way to use this procedure is the composition with 
creditors with continuation of the company operations (concordato preventivo con continuità 
aziendale)104. 
As for the procedure, the Reform adds that during the alert procedure (see below in this 
paragraph) the initiative is only on the debtor; by contrast, after the alert procedure, the Reform 
provides for the possibility of proposing a plan related to the composition with creditors with 
continuation of the company operations also to a third party. Finally, the Reform provides for 
various small general changes in order to decrease the uncertainty related to issues such as the 
debtor protection, the analysis of the feasibility and reliability of the plan, the pending contracts 
and the financing occurred during the procedure. 
The Reform provides also for new incentives for the out-of-court procedures. Also in this case, 
the aim is to support the procedures focused on continuing the company activities through two 
classes of ways: internal strategic plans and external agreements with creditors. In particular, it is 
important to offer the highest freedom possible when preparing the plan, that on one side must be 
made in favor of the creditors but on the other side must offer protection to the debtor105. 
In order to incentivize those procedures, the Reform provides for an extension of the accordo di 
ristrutturazione con intermediari finanziari and the convenzione di moratoria also to the other 
types of creditors (and not only the financial creditors); moreover, for the agreements for the debt 
restructuring the Reform wants to reduce or eliminate the threshold of 60% of the total credits for 
approving the plan106. 
Finally, for the certificate plan procedure the Reform wants to set the written form as mandatory, 
in order to solve partially the problems described earlier in this chapter. 
Another innovation provided by the Reform is the higher specialization of the judges. The 
Rordorf Commission analyzed clearly the lack of quality and competence of the judges in certain 
Italian courts; accordingly, the Reform establishes that the biggest procedures are transferred to 
                                                 
104 However, it is still possible to have compositions with creditors with the liquidation of the assets only if there is 
one or more third parties which confers cash or assets such that the creditors will be satisfied better than in the 
bankruptcy case. 
105 In particular, it is important that: 
• the debtor is protected from the clawback action during the bankruptcy procedure started after the out-of-
court agreement has failed; 
• the debtor is protected from the legal activities on the assets performed by third parties during the out-of-
court procedure. 
106 Only if the debtor does not ask for a delay for the payment of the out-of-the-agreement creditors and does not ask 
for the protection of its assets. 
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the Business Courts (Tribunali delle Imprese), the over-indebtedness procedures to the local 
courts as before and the remaining procedures to a reduced number of well-organized courts. 
Furthermore, the Reform introduces a clear separation of the definitions of ‘crisis’ and 
‘insolvency’, following a very similar approach than the one presented in the previous chapter of 
this paper107. Furthermore, the Reform provides for an unique procedure for verifying the crisis 
or insolvency status, valid for all the corporations except the public entities; once the status has 
been clarified, it is possible to select the most appropriate legal tool (i.e. liquidation or 
continuation of the company operations). However, it is important to specify that the Reform 
institutes that the priority must be done to the procedure which supports the continuation of the 
company operations108. 
Linked with the separation of the definitions of crisis and insolvency is an important innovation 
provided by the Reform, i.e. the alert procedure. The procedure is aimed at anticipating the crisis 
appearance through a rapid analysis of the reasons for distress; once this analysis has been 
performed, the procedure to exit from the crisis follows. The alert procedure could start on the 
initiative of different parties and under different reasons: 
• internal alert: an internal company body (or the company auditor) finds that the company 
is in distress and opens the procedure. For this purpose, the legislator suggests that it is 
important for a company to have a qualitative level of corporate governance such that the 
organization is able to detect every early sign of distress109. Thus, in this case the ground 
for the opening of the procedure is the discovery of a distress scenario and the 
communication of it to the specific agency110; 
• external alert: the so called ‘qualified creditors’ – i.e. the Agenzia delle Entrate, social 
security Offices (Enti previdenziali) and collection agents – are obliged to signal the 
continuous non-payments related to the company to the specific agency111. Differently 
                                                 
107 The crisis should be defined as a “probability of being insolvent in the future” (Cherubini, 2017), introducing a 
basic separation of the distress period, as seen in the various models presented in the previous chapter. 
108 In practice, the first step is to verify whether there is the possibility of recovering the debtor performance; if – and 
only if – the conclusion is negative, it is possible to focus on the liquidation. 
109 In this sense, the legislator establishes an obligation for the mentioned bodies to communicate as soon as possible 
to the managers the distress scenario discovered. 
110 An alternative is the internal solution of the crisis – i.e. without the help of the specific agency –, through the 
communication to the manager of the distress and the implementation by the latter of the proper strategy to eliminate 
the insolvency threat. 
111 The choice to involve in the procedure the specific agency instead of a judicial body is aimed at eliminating the 
fear that the procedure will end directly in a bankruptcy procedure in case things go wrong. 
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than the first case, the ground for the inception of the procedure is the signal of 
continuous non-fulfillments. 
The Reform provides also for the protection of the company, stating that the debtor can ask to the 
judge for protective measures on its assets until the out-of-court agreement is executed; 
moreover, the Reform institutes rewards in favor of the debtor if it uses the alert procedure. 
Finally, the Reform provides for other material changes: 
• new rules about the prededucibili claims: the aim is to reduce the huge increase of the 
claims classified as prededucibili occurred during the past reforms; 
• a specific regulation related to the companies, since the current Legge Fallimentare text 
treats the debtor as an individual and uses the analogia legis technique to use those rules 
for the companies owned and managed by more individuals; 
• the possibility of an automatic bankruptcy discharge (esdebitazione) in case of small 
insolvencies; in this case, the discharge would be given without passing from the court; 
• the introduction of new types of guarantees, in particular a guarantee which does not 
require the possession of the asset as a requisite. In this way, it would be possible for the 
debtor to offer as collateral its assets and at the same time to use them in order to continue 
the operations. Moreover, the new guarantees may include also future assets, such as the 
result of a research or the future inventory; 
• to include new rules about the groups of companies, together with a definition: indeed, 
currently the Legge Fallimentare does not include any definition nor procedures for the 
companies which are part of a group, or for a holding company112. In particular, the 
Reform provides for the possibility to create a unique filing (or the creation of one plan 
for each company but linked each other) for both the composition with creditors and the 
agreement for debt restructuring in case of a group of companies. However, at the same 
time it is important to keep separated the different assets, since usually the creditors are 
related only to one company of the group. As for the procedure, the Reforms specifies that 
for a procedure regarding a group of companies only one court and one official receiver 
                                                 
112 The Gruppo Baglietto case is emblematic to show the huge effects that the lack of a regulation for groups 
insolvency procedures can get. In that recent case, the Cassation court contested the legality of the plan simply 
because of this legal lack. For more details, see Menchinelli (2016). 
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must be appointed113, while there is the possibility to perform intercompany transactions 
if aimed at continuing the operations of one of the companies of the group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113 Differently, of course, there is one creditors committee for each company of the group. When voting for the 
bankruptcy buy-out proposal, the vote is separated accordingly, and the companies which are also creditors of 
another company of the same group cannot vote. 
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Chapter 3: The continuation of the distressed company operations 
 
Once the “legal field” has been described properly, in this chapter the focus will be shifted 
towards the procedures which permit to recover the company performance, avoiding every idea 
of liquidating the company assets. It is important to precise the fact that the tools which support 
the continuation of the company operations can be either in-court procedures or out-of-court 
ones. In particular, the attention will be addressed to three procedures already described in the 
last chapter: 
• the agreements for debt restructuring; 
• the certificate plan; 
• the composition with creditors with continuation of the company operations. 
The aim of the chapter is to describe in detail the way in which a debtor shall select the proper 
legal tool, the best practices and the main players for each procedure and the different interests of 
the main stakeholders about the plan. 
 
3.1 The plan 
The main aspect which associates all the legal tools aforementioned is the fact that a plan must be 
presented. The plan must be provided by the debtor, which usually is supported by the advisors, 
i.e. an advisory company expert in the preparation of plans aimed at recovering the debtor 
performance. However, regardless of whether the advisors have been appointed, the 
responsibility on the content of the plan is solely on the debtor. 
The law does not provide a determined content of the plan, since the willingness of the legislator 
is to give freedom to the debtor when deciding which items the plan should include. However, 
the activities included in the plan shall be enough precise to be determinable, in order to take 
advantage of the benefits guaranteed by the law114 (such as the classification of the financing 
                                                 
114 On the other side, it would not be optimal to include all the details about all the operations related to the plan. In 
other words, when preparing the plan, the debtor should find the right balance between the necessity to disclose the 
activities in order to take advantage from the benefits provided by the law and the need to prepare a concise plan that 
communicates to the stakeholders the main elements delivering the right message. 
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performed in execution of the plan as prededucibili claim and the ban of the clawback action for 
the acts performed in execution of the plan in case of a subsequent bankruptcy procedure). 
Thus, when deciding what the plan should include, there is a sort of best practice that the advisors 
or the entrepreneur follow. If on one side – as it seems obvious also for a competitive advantage 
point of view –, each advisory company has its own way to prepare a plan, on the other side some 
Italian think-tanks or associations has tried to create some guidelines in order to help those 
entrepreneurs who have not idea about how to create such a plan to create it in a credible way. As 
the years go by, thanks to those guidelines the strengthening of this procedure will create an 
increasingly higher level of standardization of the plans, providing more clarity of their content. 
A first attempt has been provided from the Italian Ordine dei Dottori Commercialisti e degli 
Esperti Contabili (2010), relative to the certificate plan procedure only. First of all, the committee 
specifies that the plan shall include the economic, operative and financial outlook of the 
company, in order to deal with the crisis properly and to find the right strategy to recover the 
performance. Secondly, from a structural point of view, they suggest a scheme which lists all the 
main sections that the plan shall have: 
• analysis of the reasons for distress: before making the plan, it is crucial to understand the 
reasons why the company is in distress. Thus, for the reader of the plan it is important to 
have a clear starting point when observing the strategy planned by the company; 
• description of the strategy selected in order to recover the performance and related 
timeline: it is important to include into the plan the main strongholds of the turnaround 
strategy and the main operations to implement in order to improve the company 
performance. Usually this part of the plan is called ‘industrial plan’, since it comprehends 
the operative actions to perform, without projecting the operations mentioned with the 
financial data. Usually the industrial plan is divided into: 
▪ a component aimed at stabilizing the current critical situation: for example, in this 
phase there could be some cost cutting just in order to ‘put pressure on the wound’ 
and preserve the company before the new strategy starts to take its effects; 
▪ a part addressed at realizing the strategy planned to recover the company 
performance: this is the key element of the industrial plan, where it is clearer to 
understand whether the company could really return to a healthy status; 
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▪ a third section which includes all the provisions related to the going concern trend 
of the company when the effects of the plan will be completed; 
• extraordinary operations necessary for achieving the goals included in the plan: it is 
important to recall that the company which is preparing the plan is in troubles, thus it 
could be necessary to undertake some extraordinary measures. Those actions can be very 
different, and may include assets disposals, standstill agreements, debt-equity swaps, debt 
write offs, equity injections and new financings; 
• forecasted income statement: this section shall include the projection in terms of 
economic data of what planned in the industrial plan and in the extraordinary operations 
section; 
• forecasted balance sheet: similarly to the previous point, all the financial effects of what 
has been included in the industrial plan and in the extraordinary operations section shall 
be comprised. In particular, it is important to forecast the effects of the strategy on the 
cash position as soon as the main operations will be performed; 
• scenario analysis: it is important that the plan shows flexibility and resiliency in case 
something goes against what planned at the beginning. For this purpose, the plan should 
include a ‘what-if’ analysis which examines what could be the results in case of better or 
worse scenarios, such as a material increase of the raw materials cost or an aggressive 
competition from new entrants; 
• governance changes: as precised in the first chapter, in most cases the main reason which 
have led a company to a distress scenario is bad management. Thus, it may be helpful a 
change of the management, at least partially. Moreover, in case of an equity injection 
from an external agent as extraordinary operation, the latter may ask for a seat on the 
management board. Finally, especially for big companies it is important to include into 
the plan the way in which it deals with the minorities. 
Similarly, Rutigliano (2010)115 tries to standardize the plans related to both the certificate plan 
procedure and the agreements for debt restructuring one. Following his approach, first of all the 
plan must be created adopting the most used guidelines about the creation of the business plan116.  
                                                 
115 In particular, inside the document the referred article is titled “I piani industriali e finanziari nelle crisi di 
impresa: casi ed esperienze”, written by Penna L. 
116 In Italy, the most common guidelines are provided by Borsa Italiana (2003). In short, a strategic plan shall be 
composed by five components: 
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Accordingly, the plan shall include: 
• the company profile, i.e. a general description of the corporation value proposition, 
competitive advantage and main operations; 
• the definition of the company market and competitive positioning; 
• the analysis of the past economic data and an examination of the reasons for distress: in 
particular, it is important to analyse the distress stage, in order to select the right strategy; 
• the industrial plan, which includes the strategy planned to recover the company 
operations, the operative plan and the change in the management; 
• the financial plan. 
At this point, it is important to note that this list is similar to the one provided by the Ordine dei 
Dottori Commercialisti e degli Esperti Contabili (2010), under certain aspects; furthermore, the 
two lists are complementary in the elements which diverge. 
Moreover, the same document provides some recommendations, which – again – are perfectly in 
line and complementary with the former list. In particular, the starting data must be examined by 
an independent expert, the assumptions shall be explained clearly and shall be realistic and the 
activities in execution of the plan shall be detailed; moreover, the plan shall include scenario and 
sensitivity analyses, automatic adjustments and some milestones which will act as a monitoring 
instrument. 
A very similar point of view has been provided by AIDEA et al. (2014)117 and CNDCEC et al. 
(2015)118, confirming the fact that currently a standardization process about the production of a 
restructuring plan is ongoing119. 
                                                                                                                                                              
• strategy pursued: the analysis of the starting point and the acknowledgement of the need for a strategic 
renewal; 
• strategic aims: the strategic choices decided by the management about the value proposition and the 
positioning; 
• action plan: the actions undertaken in order to reduce the gap between the strategy pursued and the strategic 
aims; 
• assumptions: the quantitative measures that give the possibility to formulate the forecasts, related to the key 
value drivers of the company; 
• forecast financial data: the projected financial statements based on the new strategy. 
117 The paper lists the following sections: i) company presentation; ii) analysis of the past economic and financial 
data; iii) description of the crisis situation and the reasons for distress; iv) presentation of the assumptions and the 
strategy for recovering the company performance; v) action plan; vi) industry analysis; vii) competitors analysis and 
expected evolution of the performance and the market; viii) presentation of the economic and financial assumptions 
and the projected financial statements. 
118 As in the case of Rutigliano (2010), firstly the document refers on the most used procedures to prepare a business 
plan, underlining the fact that it is important to identify the reasons for distress and the liquidity position. Then, it 
includes some recommendations which regards the introduction inside the plan of: i) the assumptions, the data 
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In order to provide a further element toward the standardization of the plans, Trentini (2016) 
provides, from a legal perspective, a general classification which can serve to give a first idea 
about the plan to prepare. 
Under his viewpoint, the plan can be divided in: 
• plans which include an agreement between the parties; 
• unilateral plans, where there are not any negotiations among the parties. These ones can 
be divided further in: 
▪ disposal plans; 
▪ managerial or corporate reorganization plans; 
▪ plans which include a unilateral modification of the capital structure (for example, 
an equity injection or equity cure on the existing shareholders’ initiative). 
However, in qualitative terms the content of the plan changes also considering the type of legal 
tool selected by the debtor. Indeed, the purposes of each instrument are slightly different each 
other. Under certain aspects, this is valid also for a quantitative aspect: for example, one of the 
most important differences between certificate plan and agreements for debt restructuring is that 
the creditors which do not have agreed to the terms of the plan must be satisfied fully under the 
agreements for debt restructuring procedure; thus, to be considered as sustainable, the plan must 
not only consider the cash position looking at the sustainability of the debt service and the 
limitations existent because of the covenants, but also must consider the fact that there will be 
another “fix cash outflows” to consider, i.e. the payment of the creditors which have not accepted 
the plan. Accordingly, it is important that the debtor finds the right legal instrument among the 
ones provided by the law. 
Finally, the content of a plan depends also on the objective of the debtor; a first distinction is 
between plans which have a liquidation element (also partially) and the ones aimed at continuing 
the company operations. In this case, not only the actions included in the plan are different, but 
also the data and forecasts are different, ceteris paribus: for example, the accounting for an asset 
for which a disposal is going to be planned is completely different than the value of the same 
asset in case of the application of the going concern assumption. 
                                                                                                                                                              
sources and the methodologies used to formulate such assumptions; ii) the length of the timeline, which usually 
cannot be longer than 5 years; iii) sensitivity analyses; iv) milestones. 
119 Another more recent evidence can be found in CNDCEC (2017). 
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3.2 Which legal tool to select? 
When trying to recover a distressed company performance, before preparing the plan it is 
important that the management (or the advisors) selects the right legal tool among the three 
aforementioned – i.e. the agreements for debt restructuring, the certificate plan and the 
composition with creditors with continuation of the company operations. Indeed, the three 
instruments are different under various aspects, even though it may seem, at a first glance, that an 
entrepreneur can be indifferent among them. 
In reality, not only each instrument has its own degree of in-court involvement, but also the 
purposes are slightly different. As for the in-court involvement, as already described in the last 
chapter, the certificate plan does not require the intervention of a judicial player, while the 
composition with creditors is an instrument which needs the creation of some judicial actors in 
order to perform the procedure required by the law; in the middle there is the agreements for debt 
restructuring procedure, where the intervention of a court is minimum (i.e. required only for the 
homologation of the agreements). Regarding the different purposes, Rutigliano (2010) assumes 
that the certificate plan and the agreements for debt restructuring have the same purpose (i.e. the 
return to a positive and stable performance) but are used in different stages of the crisis120; 
moreover, according to the most relevant doctrine, the certificate plan and the agreements for 
debt restructuring are aimed at solving the crisis (i.e. without being bound to the necessity to 
assure the going concern of the company), while the composition with creditors with continuation 
of the company operations seems more linked to reach an agreement about the complete recovery 
of the performance. 
Moreover, each legal tool has its own rules. For example, it is possible to obtain a financing 
before the completion of the plan only for the composition with creditors and the agreements for 
debt restructuring. Generally, the dispositions related to each legal instrument cannot be used for 
the other ones applying the analogia legis technique, since they have an exceptional nature. 
Accordingly, it is useful to compare the main differences between the three instruments, in 
particular between the certificate plan and the agreements for debt restructuring and between the 
agreements and the composition with creditors. 
                                                 
120 In particular, the certificate plan shall be used when the distress is at an early stage (i.e. less serious), while the 
agreements for debt restructuring shall be adopted when the distress is more advanced. However, the doctrine does 
not completely agree with this view; in reality, even a single non-complex operation such as the disposal of non-core 
assets can represent a way for rebalancing the financial situation (Trentini, 2016), so that even a certificate plan may 
be appropriate for a company in a serious crisis scenario. 
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Before making the comparisons aforementioned, it is important to mention a further way when 
listing all the tools available when looking for the continuation of the distressed company 
operations, i.e. the bankruptcy buy-out. Indeed, it is possible to create a buyout which can 
provide for the continuation of the activities after a bankruptcy declaration has been accepted by 
the court. Under certain cases, it could be convenient (also for some players only) the selection of 
this tool, due the special characteristics of it as seen in the previous chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Certificate plan versus Agreements for debt restructuring 
As precised before, it is very difficult to find differences about the purpose of the two procedures; 
it is not surprising that the orientation of the doctrine is not very clear. The fact that the content of 
the plan is (not) regulated in the same way proves that in terms of purpose if there is a difference, 
it is not material121. Trentini (2016) says that while the agreements for debt restructuring are 
aimed at restructuring the company, the certificate plan is oriented at solving the crisis; however, 
it is not clear which is the real difference among the two, in particular because the going concern 
condition is not required by the law in both the cases. Therefore, the main reason why a manager 
should prefer a tool instead of the another one is related to the different rules which regard them. 
Among the numerous differences provided by the law, the main ones about the two tools are: 
• the agreements for debt restructuring have a negotiation element, while the certificate plan 
is a unilateral document. In particular, to go on with the agreements for debt restructuring 
procedure it is necessary to have the consent of creditors which represent at least the 60% 
of the total liabilities; on the contrary, for the certificate plan it is necessary the 
certification of the attestor; 
• the certificate plan procedure does not have a judicial intervention, while for the 
agreements for debt restructuring one it is necessary the homologation provided by the 
court122; 
                                                 
121 Moreover, as analyzed above in this chapter, the main guidelines published during the last decade tend to describe 
the content of a plan without making any reference to a single legal procedure. 
122 To be more precise, the certificate plan enters a court only in case of a bankruptcy procedure following a failed 
attempt to solve the distress situation through a certificate plan. In that case, the plan is examined by the court in 
order to detect the activities performed in execution of the plan, which will have the exemption from the clawback 
action. 
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• under the agreements for debt restructuring procedure, the exemption from the clawback 
action takes its effects automatically from the homologation date; in the certificate plan 
case, it is necessary the consent of the court under a bankruptcy procedure; 
• it is not mandatory to publish the certificate plan. It is on discretion of the debtor, which 
usually keeps it secret in order to not disclose clearly the distressed condition123; 
• under the agreements for debt restructuring procedure it is possible to get financing either 
before or after the homologation of the plan. Those financings will be labeled as 
“prededucibili claims” in case of bankruptcy procedure. For the certificate plan, it is not 
possible to do so; 
• the agreements for debt restructuring procedure provides for the full payment for the 
dissenting creditors; this rule cannot be applied for the certificate plan; 
• under the certificate plan procedure, it is not possible to protect the debtor assets from the 
actions undertaken by the creditors, while the agreements for debt restructuring tool 
provides for it also during the negotiations about the plan. 
 
3.2.2 Agreements for debt restructuring versus Composition with creditors with continuation of 
the company operations 
If the main differences between certificate plan and composition with creditors can be roughly 
assimilated to the one listed in the last paragraph, the issue is dissimilar when differentiating the 
agreements for debt restructuring and the composition with creditors. The main differences are 
the following: 
• the composition with creditors is an in-court procedure, where the presence of the judicial 
bodies is pervasive; 
• under the agreements for debt restructuring procedure it is possible to not respect the par 
condicio creditorum rule, since there is the possibility to treat the unsecured creditors 
better than the secured ones; under the composition with creditors, the par condicio must 
be satisfied; 
                                                 
123 The only advantage from the publication of the certificate plan is that it is possible to avoid paying taxes on the 
windfull profits (sopravvenienze attive) ex art. 88 TUIR. 
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• with the agreements for debt restructuring procedure the consent of the creditors must be 
obtained before the deposit of the plan subject to the homologation, while the composition 
with creditors permits to negotiate with the creditors after the presentation of the demand; 
• if the court does not homologate the agreements for debt restructuring, it is not possible to 
declare bankruptcy immediately after, while it is possible for the composition with 
creditors; 
• the agreements for debt restructuring procedure is cheaper, quicker and less complex than 
the composition with creditors one; 
• differently than the composition with creditors case, with the agreements for debt 
restructuring procedure the entrepreneur preserves the administration of its assets. 
Under this issue, it is important to precise two common behaviors observed from the recent 
experience. Firstly, the fact that usually the composition with creditors is used after a certificate 
plan or agreement for debt restructuring has failed. Secondly, sometimes it may happen that a 
debtor decides to pass from an ongoing composition with creditors procedure to the agreements 
for debt restructuring on, or vice versa. 
 
3.2.3 Selecting the proper tool: the main drivers 
From this analysis, it seems very clear that the selection of the correct legal tool is a critical part 
of the whole restructuring process. In this sense, it is important to know which are the main 
drivers that the manager should control when performing this selection. 
Following CNDCEC (2015), the main drivers are the following124: 
• the need of short-term liquidity: in this circumstance, the distressed company has a serious 
cash scenario, for example because the deadline of a huge term loan is incoming or the 
relationships with the suppliers is in a deterioration status. If this is the case, the company 
will need a new financing during the negotiation of the plan or directly in execution of the 
completed plan. It seems obvious that the best solution in such a situation would be to 
                                                 
124 Obviously, to make an exhaustive list is an impossible work, since the dispositions about the three legal 
instruments are very detailed, and sometimes the technicalities are so complex that the only way to arrive at a 
solution is by being inside the practical case. 
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select the agreement for debt restructuring or the composition with creditors procedure, 
since they give the possibility to obtain a financing under the protection of the law; 
• the number and the characteristics of the creditors: if, when negotiating a plan, a 
distressed corporation has to deal with a high number of different creditors, to reach the 
60% threshold required by the agreements for debt restructuring procedure seems very 
difficult; potentially the management (or the advisors) should employ a lot of time for 
contacting each creditor looking for obtaining a positive reply for the plan. On the other 
side, a composition with creditors is a more structured procedure which increases the 
probability of success. Moreover, it depends on the characteristics of the creditors: as 
described in the previous chapter, there exist a procedure – inside the family of the 
agreements for debt restructuring – called accordo di ristrutturazione con intermediari 
finanziari which is tailor-made for the companies whose debt is mainly composed by 
financial debt (i.e. a debt contracted with financial institutions). In this case, the distress 
company has the possibility (but not the obligation) to select that procedure; 
• the risk to not succeed in the medium-long term: if the going concern assumption is not 
feasible, to use a legal tool addressed at continuing the company operations would not be 
the best solution. Thus, for example, to select the composition with creditors with 
continuation of the company operations instrument would be a mistake. However, it is 
possible to use the other two tools, since they are not aimed directly at continuing the 
company operations; in alternative, there is the possibility to use the other in-court 
procedures (i.e. composition with creditors125 and bankruptcy); 
• the risk to be subject to actions addressed at diminishing the debtor assets: if there is a 
high probability that the creditors will behave in an aggressive way, it would be preferable 
to use a legal procedure which protects the debtor assets from the beginning of the 
process. Thus, to select the certificate plan tool would be a mistake, since it does not 
provide any judicial protection of the assets. Differently, the other two procedures offer 
this benefit also before the homologation or presentation of the plan; 
• the risk of alteration of the par condicio creditorum rule: if, for some reasons, there is the 
need to overcome the par condicio rule, the debtor should avoid the composition with 
creditors procedure, for the reasons explained in the last paragraph. For example, a 
                                                 
125 It is important to recall that one of the new Reform’s aims is to eliminate (or minimize) the composition with 
creditors aimed at liquidating the company. 
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company may prefer to preserve one particular creditor by promising to it the full 
payment. However, in case of agreements for debt restructuring the plan must reach the 
60% threshold while the certificate plan must be certified, so the proposal shall be 
convenient also for the damaged creditors; 
• the severity of the crisis: part of the doctrine believes that some tools are more addressed 
for situations where the crisis is not serious (in particular the certificate plan), while on 
the other side other procedures such as the composition with creditors have been created 
for dealing with the recovering of the performance of a company in an advanced stage of 
distress. In reality, a serious scenario could be solved simply by taking a few simple 
measures, so this theory seems not valid (Trentini, 2016); 
• the willingness to pay in full the creditors that do not approve the plan: if a distressed 
company prefers to negotiate with all the creditors – instead of giving to the ones which 
disagree with the plan the benefit to get paid in full –, it should avoid the agreements for 
debt restructuring instrument. In particular, it may prefer the composition with creditors in 
order to have the possibility to enjoy the institute of the discharge (esdebitazione); 
• the existence of huge losses which could undermine the legal equity level: if the risk to 
have material losses – such that the level of the capital will be lower than the minimum 
level required by the Italian civil code – is high, the manager should select the agreements 
for debt restructuring tool since it suspends the effects of the Italian civil code rules126 on 
the obligation for the management to restore immediately the level required (art. 
182sexies l.f.). 
 
3.3 The actors of the procedures 
In the procedure participate various actors, which have different roles and interests. This section 
will provide an analysis of all the actors which can participate a process aimed at continuing the 
company operation. Some of those actors are mandatory (automatically or because the law 
provides for it) while others are optional. For the purposes of this section, the actors are divided 
in two parts: 
                                                 
126 The art. 2447 of the Italian civil code establishes that if the legal capital decreases at a level below the minimum 
level required by the law, the management must call immediately a meeting in order to approve the legal capital 
reduction and, at the same time, to increase the legal capital itself in order to restore the minimum level required. 
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• players, which enter the procedure only after the distress period has started; 
• stakeholders, which are already in a relationship with the company when it becomes 
distressed. 
 
3.3.1 The main players of the procedures 
Apart from the judicial bodies already discussed in the last chapter (in particular the composition 
with creditors ones since the other two tools do not have judicial bodies appointed by the court), 
in the three procedures other players participate: some of them are mandatory since they are part 
of the procedure described by the law, while others are discretionary. In general, all those players 
are experts in the restructuring field that help the debtor (or the other parties interested in the 
turnaround process) in managing the procedure and certificating that it has been made properly. 
The role of those players is similar for all the three procedures; thus, they will be treated 
generally since it is out of the purposes of this paper to focus on their differences among the 
procedures. 
 
3.3.1.1 The advisors 
As already precised, when preparing a plan with the characteristics abovementioned, the debtor 
(i.e. the single entrepreneur or the board of administration) can be assisted by the advisors. The 
advisors are not mentioned by the law, proving the fact that it is not a mandatory player for the 
procedure. In most cases, the advisors are one or more advisory companies or an individual 
expert in the restructuring field which is external from the distressed company and has advanced 
competences and an important experience in dealing with distressed companies, so that its 
activity is considered unbiased and reliable. Officially, the advisors are appointed by the debtor, 
but in practice it is necessary the consent of the creditors since it is important that also the latter 
are willing to deal with the advisory companies that they consider appropriate127; thus, the 
selection of the advisors is an activity performed in concert by both the debtor and the 
                                                 
127 This ‘negotiation’ for the right advisor could be seen as a sort of protection against the preparation of bad plans, 
which will never be approved by the court or certified by the attestor. Thus, it is a kind of mechanism of quality 
control of the procedure. 
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creditors128. The main risk in this case is to appoint some advisors which have, also 
unintentionally, a point of view oriented towards one of the stakeholders of the procedure; for 
example, the advisors may support the financial creditors viewpoint. In that case, the outcome of 
the negotiation can be unbalanced, threatening the quality of the whole operation. 
As for the activity performed, the advisors collaborate and accompanies the debtor throughout the 
whole procedure in the creation of the plan and the fulfillment of all the operations for complying 
with the procedure. 
One of the first activities that the advisors shall perform is to analyze the suitability of the current 
management in dealing with the crisis scenario (Pellerone, 2014). Indeed – as already analyzed in 
the first chapter –, the management ability under a normal scenario has nothing to do with its 
ability in case of a distress situation; in the last case, the managers act under pressure since there 
is the need to undertake drastic and extraordinary decisions. In other words, the management of a 
distressed company under a complex environment – where there are different stakeholders with 
different purposes – is a completely different task than handling a firm under a normal scenario. 
A manager should be able to take the right decision in a restricted period of time, without any 
margin of error. Accordingly, it is important that the advisors observe whether the current 
management has the right competencies and self-control to deal with the crisis properly. 
Secondly, the advisors shall – together with the debtor – prepare the plan, with the content 
explained earlier in this chapter. In particular, the advisors shall focus on the determination of the 
reasons for distress and the strategy to be performed to recover the debtor performance. 
Regarding the first aspect, the advisors shall not only understand the drivers of the distress, but 
also to be sure that the current management has understood them properly; if this is not the case, 
there would be the risk that the managers are not the right ones to participate in the turnaround 
process. 
Generally, it is possible to identify two main functions that the advisors give to the procedure. On 
one side, they provide a high-quality technical contribute, by managing the emergence daily until 
the completion of the procedure; on the other side, they help to coordinate the objectives of all 
                                                 
128 However, also the other parties interested in the turnaround process can appoint, on its own initiative, an advisor 
which controls for them the plan and the procedure. Thus, it could happen that other advisors are involved in the 
procedure beyond the main one. The issue is important if we think that, in some cases, all the advisors appointed by 
the stakeholders of the plan are paid by the debtor. 
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the stakeholders of the procedure towards the achievement of an agreement that does not hurt 
anyone (or minimizes the losses for all of them). 
Finally, it is possible to distinguish between four types of advisors (Pellerone, 2014): 
• industrial advisors: its main scope it to prepare the industrial plan. Thus, it is expert on all 
the issues related with the creation of a business plan, such as market analysis, industry 
analysis, study of the reasons for distress and creation of the assumptions related to the 
strategy to implement; 
• financial advisors: it is specialized in controlling the performance of the cash position 
both during the plan execution and after the plan under a going concern analysis. Its main 
goal is to adjust the capital structure in order to ease the successful implementation of the 
turnaround strategy. The financial advisors are crucial in case of a company whose 
distress is linked with a serious difficulty in collecting enough cash in order to support the 
operations; 
• legal advisors: this type of advisors is expert in preparing the documentation required for 
the legal tool selected and in dealing with the procedure itself from a legal point of view; 
• fiscal advisors: its main aim is to deal with the fiscal law, for example by signaling to the 
debtor – in case of certificate plan – the possibility to save money in terms of less taxes in 
case of publication of the plan. 
 
3.3.1.2 The distress investor (brief introduction) 
The distress investor is a company (usually a fund) which invests in distresses companies. The 
aim of the distress investor is to maximize its return by investing – using its broad knowledge in 
the business, financial and legal field – in distressed companies: the aim of its strategy can be 
either speculative or strategic, depending on the purposes of the fund and the opportunity it is 
going to face. 
When entering a procedure aimed at continuing the distressed company operations, the distress 
investor may purchase the distressed company debt, its assets or directly the equity. The way in 
which it enters affects also its possibility to obtain the control of the distressed company. 
Accordingly, the distress fund must combine its purposes with the strategy to implement. 
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Moreover, the strategy to implement depends also on the practical case and the opportunities 
which are available. 
This player, its main strategies and the procedure it performs in order to implement its strategy 
will be described in detail in the next Chapter. 
 
3.3.1.3 The attestor 
The attestor is a qualified expert129, in possession of the requisites demanded by the law, whose 
aim is to guarantee to the stakeholders of the turnaround process (in particular the ones which do 
not take part of the agreement) that the plan and the procedure is valid on its content and feasible. 
The role of the attestor is so important that his presence is included for all the three procedures 
part of this chapter130, with slightly different roles but very similar. As happens for the advisors, 
the appointment of the attestor is a responsibility of the debtor. 
The requisites to be an attestor are described in detail by the law. Indeed, the art. 67, third clause, 
letter d) precises that to be attestor it is important to be: 
• registered in the register of auditors; 
• to have the requisites to be official receiver, namely: 
▪ to be a lawyer or an accountant; 
▪ to be a professional association, only if the partners are lawyers or accountants; 
▪ every person who has been a manager and has demonstrated high managerial 
competencies in the past. 
Moreover, the attestor must be independent. In particular, it must declare to not be connected 
with the debtor or the other stakeholders from both professional and personal connections and not 
to have worked for the debtor company in the last five years. However, the attestor can 
participate in the meetings with the debtor and the advisors where they prepare the plan, in order 
to serve as an ‘advisor’ and explain the methodologies they have to adopt in order to achieve a 
positive opinion; obviously, the attestor cannot participate in the preparation of the plan. The 
                                                 
129 It can be either an individual or a professional association. 
130 Apart from those three procedures, an attestor can also make some ‘special’ attestations, namely: i) the attestation 
related to the financings during the negotiation and before the homologation in case of agreements for debt 
restructuring tool; ii) the attestation for the payments of some creditors before the homologation of the agreements 
for debt restructuring; iii) the attestation required for the continuation of the public contracts and the participation to 
the public tenders. 
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participation of the attestor during the meetings aforementioned is important because it creates a 
positive contrast with the optimistic point of view of the advisors. 
From a practical perspective, the aim of the attestor is to analyze the plan subject to attestation; 
obviously, the attestor objective cannot be linked with the attestation itself, since not necessarily 
the activity of the attestor finishes with the attestation of the plan (AIDEA et al., 2014). Indeed, 
the attestor could also give a negative opinion about the plan. 
However, the main document which entails the attestor activity is the report which explains the 
way in which the attestor have formed an opinion about the plan and the opinion itself. The report 
does not have to repeat the content of the plan but has to certify, explaining the reasons, that the 
plan is able to restore the company performance, achieving the objectives of the legal tool 
selected.  
 
The content of the report must follow two main drivers: 
• reliability: the attestor must perform an analysis of the data provided by the debtor to 
see whether they represent a fair portrayal of the reality. Such verification is important 
because the data provided by the debtor are the starting point of the plan; if those data 
are wrong (or voluntarily modified with fraudulent purposes), the whole plan cannot 
have any sense131. Indeed, it would not have any sense to guarantee the ban of the 
clawback action in case of bankruptcy procedure if the data which originates the 
benefit are not fair. To perform this analysis, the attestor shall use the common tools 
adopted by an auditor and suggested by the most common guidelines132 (i.e. test of 
controls, test of details and substantive analytical procedures, dividing the total risk of 
material misstatements into inherent risk, control risk and detection risk); however, an 
attestor is not an auditor, in the sense that it does not have to perform its work as an 
auditor. Moreover, the high risky scenario makes impossible for the attestor to achieve 
a reasonable assurance about the data included in the plan; 
• feasibility: this judgement consists in a predictive analysis about the viability of the 
expected results presented in the plan at the moment of the release of the attestor’s 
report. In order to get such analysis, the attestor shall have gained a global vision of 
                                                 
131 In particular, if the attestor concludes affirming that the data are not reliable, also the feasibility analysis will have 
a negative opinion. 
132 The most used European guidelines are the ISAE (International Standards on Assurance Engagements), prepared 
by the IAASB (International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board). 
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the whole company, including the assumptions, the turnaround strategy, the action 
plan and the what-if analyses. Moreover, the attestor shall be extremely convinced 
that the probability to realize what included in the plan is materially high. The analysis 
should not be based only on the content of the plan, but also on the coherence of all 
the assumptions and on the conclusions reached by the management. As for the 
verification of the assumptions, the attestor shall use the IAASB (2017)133 perspective, 
which distinguishes forecasts134 and projections135; thus, the attestor shall examine the 
feasibility of the assumptions explaining the reasons which support the positive thesis. 
 
Finally, the final report is composed by three components: 
i. introduction and description of the review performed to verify the data provided by 
the debtor; 
ii. analysis of the plan; 
iii. feasibility opinion. 
If the feasibility of the plan depends on future events within a defined period of time, the 
certification is valid from the beginning – i.e. the date in which the attestor has completed it – if 
the attestor gives a high probability to the verification of the events aforementioned. By contrast, 
if there is more uncertainty on the probability of the verification of the event, the validity of the 
report is conditioned on the effective realization of the event. 
The attestor is not supposed to check the correct execution of the plan, but there is the possibility 
that it is appointed by the debtor (or other stakeholders) in order to inspect the way in which the 
provision of the plan is performed. 
 
3.3.1.4 Other players 
In a restructuring process can participate other types of experts, such as: 
                                                 
133 In particular the ISAE 3400. 
134 A “forecast” is related to an event which the management expects will take place at the time of the preparation of 
the plan. They are referred to the so called “best-estimate assumptions”. 
135 A ‘projection’ is an assumption prepared on the basis of either hypothetical future events which are not 
necessarily expected to take place or a mix of best-estimate assumptions and hypothetical assumptions. 
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• temporary manager: it could be defined as an external manager expert in the restructuring 
field. Its task is to manage temporarily the company either under negative conditions (as 
distress scenarios) or in positive ones (such as the introduction of a new product). The 
presence of a temporary manager during a distress situation can be crucial for 
reinvigorating the credibility of the company strategy, both internally and externally; the 
appointment of an expert person as the temporary manager can give the necessary 
management discontinuity crucial to keep involved the core stakeholders of the company. 
Since it is directly involved in the management of the company, the temporary manager is 
different than the advisors; however, the two players can cooperate in order to arrive to 
the best turnaround strategy with a higher probability. Finally, the temporary manager 
provides also for a negotiation advantage, since it can manage the talks between the main 
stakeholders of the distressed company; 
• loan agent: it is an independent agent which acts with both the financial creditors and the 
debtor; it guarantees a simplification of the procedure by monitoring the way in which the 
plan is produced, the fulfillments are performed and the periodical reports on the 
performance of the distressed company during the creation of the plan are produced. 
Usually this player is appointed by the creditors – in particular from the financial ones – 
since its activities are aimed at protecting them. However, not only the creditors are 
advantaged by the presence of the loan agent, but also the debtor is advantaged since it 
would receive more certainty about the willingness of the financial creditors to maintain 
the credit lines during this troubled period of time; 
• Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO): it is a manager characterized by strong competencies 
on the restructuring field which takes the responsibility of the implementation of the plan, 
as happens for a CEO in normal times. Its main activities are related to the creation of the 
plan, the negotiation of the debt with the creditors, the research for external financing and 
the management of the turnaround procedure. Its role is very similar to the temporary 
manager one, with the difference that the CRO may remain inside the company board of 
management for a longer period; 
• judicial bodies: in particular for the composition with creditors, the judicial bodies can be 
relevant for the quality of the procedure136. 
                                                 
136 For the details about the composition with creditors bodies, see the second chapter of this work. 
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3.3.2 The stakeholders of the restructuring procedure 
The preparation of the aforementioned plan is a very complex procedure, since every decision, 
every action and every other element must be weighted properly in order to balance the interests 
of all the stakeholders, i.e. every person or entity which is interested, for different reasons, in the 
content and the execution of the plan. Indeed, one of the main aims of the plan – in the sense that 
there cannot exist a plan without such precondition – is to obtain the proper consent in order to 
pursue the strategy selected by the debtor. In other words, since the scenario is critical – and 
assuming that every alternative (i.e. in-court liquidation procedures) are less convenient –, the 
debtor on one side must minimize the dissatisfaction of all the stakeholders, while on the other 
side must equalize their degree of dissatisfaction. 
The problem is that the goals of the different stakeholders of the plan are not aligned; in 
particular, only some objectives are aligned, but the main interests are in conflict. As Lai & 
Sudarsanam (1997) precise, “While there is agreement among stakeholders on certain strategies 
there is also evidence of conflict of interests between lenders and managers and between 
managers and some block shareholders. […] While both lenders and shareholders have a 
common interest in restoring firm viability and its ability to generate adequate returns to their 
investment in the firm, in the turnaround process either group may gain at the expense of the 
other” (Lai & Sudarsanam, 1997). 
A further complexity is represented by the fact that it is not possible simply to determine, in 
absolute terms, the monetary payoffs of each stakeholder in order to balance them and guarantee 
equality; if a manager acts in this way, it assumes that all the stakeholders are rational and risk 
neutral. In reality, each stakeholder has its own utility function: some of them are risk-averse 
while other ones are risk-seeking. For example, let’s think about the employees: if the company 
fails, they risk losing their job; accordingly, they will give a higher weight to their payoff in case 
of failure of the plan, and mathematically it means that, ceteris paribus, their expected utility is 
far lower than the one of a less risk-averse player, such as a supplier. 
Moreover, there is the risk that the debtor (or the advisors which prepare the plan together with 
the debtor), when preparing the plan, gives preference to one of the stakeholders. In particular, it 
depends on which stakeholder has more power; in most cases, the risk is that the financial 
creditors (i.e. banks and other financial institutions) are in the position to appoint some advisors 
which tend to support them. This possibility can be seen also as a threat which can damage the 
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environment even though in reality the advisors appointed is fair; as stated by Slatter et al. 
(2006), “The perception of bias in favour of a particular stakeholder group can become a 
significant obstacle to the restructuring process”. 
Another important aspect is that some stakeholders are more expert in dealing with a distress 
scenario than others. In particular, the financial institutions deal with companies in trouble very 
often, while the management itself has never dealt with such a situation before. Thus, there is the 
risk that who is more expert tries to take advantage of the “economy of experience” it has 
developed in the past. To solve this problem, the restructuring manager shall bridge the gap 
between the experience of the financial institutions and the inexperience of the managers. 
As a general rule, if there is not an insolvency situation, the probability to have conflict of 
interests between the stakeholders is low: both the creditors and the shareholders are interested in 
the continuation of the company operations. By contrast, in case of insolvency, the likelihood of a 
conflict between them is material, even though there still are some points where all the parties 
agree. Those conflicts on one side are solved by the law through the establishment of measures 
such as the par condicio creditorum and the clawback action, while on the other side shall be 
solved by the new management (i.e. temporary manager or CRO). 
 
3.3.2.1 Financial creditors 
The financial creditors class is the most critical one for a turnaround procedure, since once the 
crisis has been communicated to the public the main risk is that those agents (in particular the 
banks) block the credit lines, with the consequence of worsening dramatically the debtor cash 
position (already dangerous). This class is composed by users such as banks, bondholders and 
other lenders which have contractual monetary rights towards the debtor; in other words, those 
creditors have a precise sum of money to receive by a specified date, so under a turnaround 
process they risk giving up a part of it. Thus, to deal with them is complex, first of all because of 
the complexity of the standardised contracts they provide (contracts that the financial creditors 
know well, so there could be an information asymmetry problem), secondly because they could 
be oriented only to collect the sum under contract, damaging the whole restructuring process. 
Moreover, nowadays the financial environment is even more complex, since also the medium 
companies are starting to have a complex capital structure composed by several types of 
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syndicated loans, high-yield debt and mezzanine finance; on the other side, those types of debt, 
together with the more traditional bonds, are increasingly traded to others investors whose 
purposes are so different that it is impossible for the debtor to find their real purposes (some of 
them are simply speculators, while others could be informed traders). 
Obviously, the goal of those agents is to maximise their payoff. It is important to note that not 
necessarily their objective is to maximize the amount of cash they have the right to receive; a 
financial institution shall think also on the future contracts it may renounce in the case that the 
highest sum of money – in absolute terms – is obtained in case of a debtor bankruptcy. In other 
words, it may happen that a bank selects a solution which guarantees a lower amount of cash 
today, but in exchange gives the possibility to get more contracts with the “reborn debtor” in the 
future. 
 
The alternatives that the financial creditors have are multiple: 
• debt write-off, i.e. the elimination of all or part of the debt in return for the going concern 
of the company (which in terms of the bank means more contracts in the future); 
• stand still, i.e. an agreement where the financial institutions promise to the debtor: i) to 
suspend the request of the debt service for a period of time; ii) to stop using the covenant 
negotiated in the contract as indicator for a period of time (the so called “covenant 
holidays”); iii) to guarantee the already existent credit lines; 
• debt consolidation, i.e. the repayment of a debt through a new debt contract, usually at 
better conditions for the debtor; 
• new financing: the debtor can ask to the financial institutions not only the modification of 
the actual debt conditions, but also the possibility to improve the cash flow through a 
direct cash injection by the bank itself, in exchange for either a new debt contract or a 
participation in the company equity. This activity can be very risky for a financial creditor 
since it would give more cash without guarantees; 
• Debt-Equity swap: i.e. the transformation of the debt (or part of it) into equity 
instruments, either normal or with some limitations (as for example shares without voting 
power or limited voting). It is also possible to assign in exchange of the debt shares of an 
amount which is more than proportional than the debt written off; this possibility has been 
provided in order to improve the degree of flexibility during this problematic phase. In 
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general, the banks do not like to pass from a creditor status to a shareholder one; firstly 
because of the higher level of intrinsic riskiness, secondly because the banks should have 
to see a relationship with the debtor from a completely different perspective137. Moreover, 
on average an equity investment in a distressed company offers low returns, while in 
terms of payoffs the downside is more probable than the upside. When becoming 
shareholder of a company, the banks shall also plan a way-out, i.e. how to exit from the 
investment: the two possibilities the most feasible ones are to sell to a third party (maybe 
a fund) or to sell to the company itself; 
• Debt-Hybrid instruments swap: it consists in the conversion of the debt (or part of it) into 
hybrid financial instruments. In Italy there is a financial instrument called SFP (Strumenti 
Finanziari Partecipativi) which is used often138: it is a financial instrument which can 
contain either equity rights (for example, participation at the earnings distribution and 
right to get some cash in case of liquidation of the debtor) or administrative rights (for 
example the veto power for extraordinary decisions and the presence in the board of 
directors139). Other hybrid instruments are subordinated bonds (subordinated to the 
normal bonds in case of bankruptcy) and index-linked bonds (whose performance is 
linked to some indexes connected to the debtor performance); 
• debt extension, i.e. the expansion of the payment deadline for a debt; 
• extension of the current amount of debt offered, i.e. an increase of the debt with or without 
further guarantees. In the latter case, the financial institutions undertake further risk 
without anything in exchange; thus, to accept this condition, the bank shall be very 
confident on the probability of the debtor to recover its performance, as in the case of 
giving new financing to the debtor. 
In this sense, Rutigliano (2010) suggests a decision tree approach. Under this model, first the 
bank should decide whether to provide new finance (often without obtaining new guarantees but 
only gaining the prededucibili claim label in case of bankruptcy procedure); secondly, the 
financial institutions shall decide up to whether to convert the debt in equity or quasi-equity 
                                                 
137 Moreover, the banks must comply with the Istruzioni di Vigilanza rules. The rules say that the banks can convert 
its debt in distressed companies’ shares, but only if the operation is aimed at recovering the company performance. 
Moreover, the bank has to compare the Debt/Equity swap outcome with all the possible alternatives, such as a 
bankruptcy procedure. Thus, the only condition the law provides is that the distress of the company must not be 
irreversible. 
138 For example, they are going to be used for the Stefanel restructuring, one of the most famous Italian restructuring 
cases. 
139 However, the law provides that it is not possible to vote at the company meetings. 
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instruments; thirdly it has to deal with all the decisions about the treatment of the existent debt 
(consolidation, stand still, write off, etc.); and so on. Thus, before deciding the strategy, the 
financial institutions shall estimate the payoff (usually in terms of expected value) considering 
the different combinations. 
Inside the class, there is the possibility that some conflicts of interest occur. A conflict of interest 
arises when two parties inside the class (i.e. banks, bondholders and public administration) have 
different purposes or are damaged while the other parties are fully satisfied140. 
For example, it may happen because the new temporary manager or CRO has been appointed on 
initiative of the banks; in this case, there is the possibility that the new management undertakes a 
strategy aimed at satisfying the banks as a first objective. In particular, the plan can impose the 
payment of the bank debts before all the other ones or the creation of earnings with the sole 
purpose of paying back the banks debt. 
Similarly, if the turnaround manager has been appointed by the bondholders, it may privilege 
them, for example by using the retained earnings to repay the bonds. 
Finally, also the public administration could be preferred in a similar way to the last two cases. In 
particular, the CRO may privilege the tax debts in respect of the other ones, or it may focus on 
the creation of earnings in order to create more income taxes. 
To solve those problems, usually the financial creditors create a committee, similarly to the 
bankruptcy case. This committee – which usually includes the trade creditors as well – acts on 
behalf of all the creditors which take part of it and negotiates with the debtor in order to avoid 
any conflict of interest. 
There could be conflict of interests also between financial creditors and other types of 
stakeholders. In particular, it is important to analyse in detail the conflict between the financial 
stakeholders and the shareholders (see Box 3.1).  
 
3.3.2.2 Shareholders 
At the distress date, the equity value may be equal to zero, or very close to zero. Thus, the 
condition of the shareholders must be reintegrated either through new provisions by the existent 
                                                 
140 It may also happen that the debtor gives preference to one bank only, so there could also be a conflict of interest 
among banks. 
100 
 
ones or through the intervention of a new external player, such as a distress investor (this player 
will be discussed in detail in the next chapter). 
If, on the contrary, there is not a too low level of equity, the shareholders can negotiate with all 
the other stakeholders considering their utility function and their payoffs. In general, the 
shareholders – in particular the dominant ones – prefer the operational restructuring, i.e. the set of 
strategies aimed at improving the positioning of the company and the internal efficiency; by 
contrast, they dislike either equity-based strategies such as dividends cuts and new equity issues 
or assets sales since they “extinguish the option value attached to the assets sold” (Lai & 
Sudarsanam, 1997). 
As for the potential conflicts of interest, from an internal point of view there may be a conflict 
between the block shareholders and the minority ones. In particular, the lapse of time for the 
maximization of the earnings can be different, so that to find an agreement among all the 
shareholders can be almost impossible. Moreover, some shareholders are interested in remaining 
inside the company, while others would prefer to exit from the investment: also in this case there 
could be different payoffs. 
Potential conflicts of interest with other categories of stakeholders may happen when the 
turnaround manager has been appointed by the shareholders. In this case, the focus of the 
turnaround strategy would be on the maximisation of the earnings, strategy which can damage the 
other stakeholders. 
 
Box 3.1 Conflicts of interest between Financial creditors and Shareholders 
Particularly important is to analyse in detail the relationship between the financial creditors (in 
particular the banks) and the shareholders when negotiating the plan. Indeed, often those two 
classes of stakeholders have specular objectives; thus, it is important to manage properly the 
conflicts of interest among them. 
In particular, as noted by Lai & Sudarsanam (1997), “Lenders’ preference for cash generative 
action is in direct conflict with shareholders’ incentive to avoid such action”. For example, a 
bank may prefer that the debtor decides to sell the non-core assets to repay its debt, while the 
shareholders would prefer to avoid such measures in order to not lose the option value linked 
to the asset.  
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3.3.2.3 Trade creditors 
The trade creditors are all those creditors, in general the suppliers, which give the possibility to a 
firm to create the products and services to sell to the clients. Generally, the suppliers are 
interested in the continuation of the company operations, since the alternative is to stop being 
supplier of the (failed) company. Moreover, if a supplier is strongly dependent on the debtor, its 
interest on the survival of the distressed firm would be even higher; the extreme case is a 
monopsony situation – as happens for some big corporations’ suppliers – where in case of 
bankruptcy of the debtor also the suppliers will go bankrupt. 
From a debtor perspective, it is important to keep the key suppliers during the restructuring 
process. Their support is critical since the plan execution cannot exclude the production of the 
items or services sold to the clients. Thus, at least the key suppliers must believe that it is in their 
interest not to take aggressive actions against the debtor and to continue its supply in order to 
contribute to rescue the company. 
The most common measures that the trade creditors have to negotiate are: 
• extension of the days in payables: in order to accommodate the debtor necessity to 
improve the cash position, the suppliers may accept to be paid at a later date; 
• confirmation of the existent monetary conditions: i.e. when the supplier does not modify 
the current monetary conditions present in the supply contract, without trying to force the 
payment of the debt as soon as it discovers the distress situation; 
Moreover, a turnaround strategy based on equity injections from the shareholders is a good 
solution for the banks since the Enterprise Value (and so the probability to cash the debt 
totally) increases; on the other side, obviously, the shareholders do not like such a strategy 
since they would have to give money to the company in terms of risk capital. Finally, the 
financial creditors would like a strategy consistent in dividend cuts because of the higher 
amount of cash available for repaying their debt. 
As for the shareholders preferences, “Strategic or asset restructuring in the form of 
divestments may be favoured by shareholders provided the divestment proceeds are not used 
to pay down debt” (Ibidem). Moreover, the shareholders may prefer high-risk investments 
since in most cases they have nothing to lose; on the other side, the lenders would prefer 
conservative actions in order to preserve the company value. Finally, the shareholders would 
prefer a strategy which includes a debt restructuring (for example a debt write off); of course, 
the same is not valid for the banks. 
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• confirmation of the current supplying conditions: in this case, the trade creditor assures 
the debtor to continue delivering the raw materials or providing the services during the 
turnaround period. 
The presence of key suppliers can create situations of conflicts of interest, in the event that the 
new management tries to protect them primarily. In particular, if the privilege offered to them is 
related to huge amounts of cash, the negative effects for the other stakeholders can be relevant.  
 
3.3.2.4 Management 
The way in which the management pushes toward a certain strategy depends materially on their 
influences. A board of directors may be more banks-oriented or shareholders-oriented on the 
basis of who appointed them in the past141. Moreover, also the remuneration policy may be 
decisive; for example, a board may be inclined to avoid asset disposals if their remuneration is 
linked to the dimension of the company. Obviously, moreover, the management is against every 
type of managerial restructuring. 
Basically, the orientations that the management may have are two: shareholders-oriented or entity 
oriented (Liao, 1975). The first ones are inclined in undertaking a strategy aimed at maximising 
the earnings in order to distribute dividends to the shareholders; the latter ones are oriented in 
preferring the activities aimed at maximising the revenues, looking for the highest company size 
possible. The shareholders-oriented managers’ strategies consist of activities addressed at 
obtaining high EBITDA margins, while the entity-oriented managers’ ones are linked to the 
research of the best market positioning policy. A turnaround manager should move between those 
two extremes, in order to find the right balance among the interests of the stakeholders. 
Another important aspect about the way in which the management may act is the composition of 
the board, i.e. how many managers are insiders and how many are external. According to Lai & 
Sudarsanam (1997), the external managers have more incentives to monitor the management 
actions because they have to maintain their reputation as high-quality professionals; thus, the 
higher the incidence of the external managers in the board of directors, the higher would be the 
quality of the control on the activities performed by the managers. The direct consequence would 
                                                 
141 In particular, if the managers hold significant shares of the company they manage, their actions tend to be aligned 
with the objectives of the shareholders. 
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be the lower probability that the managers favour a single stakeholder instead of making the 
interests of the totality of them. 
 
3.3.2.5 Employees 
As well as the trade creditors, also the employees are interested in the continuation of the 
company operations, since the alternative would be a null payoff (i.e. unemployment)142. On the 
other side, from the debtor point of view, under a restructuring process the employees are seen as 
a cost. Thus, it is important to balance the need of the debtor to reduce the costs as much as 
possible and the aim of the employees (i.e. to avoid unemployment). 
However, one of the most important aspects of a turnaround is the optimization of all the 
processes, in order to increase the company efficiency; it may happen that to achieve such 
objective it is necessary to reduce the number of factories, with the consequence of a reduction of 
the workers as well. For example, a distressed company turnaround strategy may include the 
dismission of the non-core product lines; to implement this strategy, the managers shall deal with 
the unions in order to decrease the number of employees. 
Also in this case there could be some conflicts of interest. For instance, the employees can be 
privileged if the new managers have been selected by the employees. In this case, the managers 
could address the restructuring strategy towards the maintenance of the employees, with the 
possibility to apply the wrong turnaround strategy. 
 
3.3.2.6 Customers and Government 
During a distress period, it is important to reassure the customers about the recovery of the 
company performance. Indeed, without customers it is difficult to prepare a feasible plan; on one 
side, the advisors which prepare the plan shall prepare a market analysis which includes the 
                                                 
142 In reality, the alternative depends on one side on the bargaining power of each employee (for example, an expert 
employee with critical capabilities may have a high bargaining power in case of potential layoff, so he could be less 
interested in behaving in order to prevent the company turnaround strategy), while on the other side it depends on the 
degree of unionization of the workers. Moreover, for simplification purposes, the analysis does not consider the 
possibility for the unemployed to obtain an unemployment subsidy; this issue may change country by country, since 
every country has its own degree of employment protection. 
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customers trend, while on the other side the attestor which certificates the document must be sure 
that the plan is feasible (i.e. that a customer basis will exist in the future). 
A conflict of interest between the debtor and the customers may occur in case the managers are 
not oriented towards a sustainable growth (Consorte, 2017). In particular, the customers may stay 
away from the company if the distressed firm presents a bad reputation during the preparation of 
the plan, for example privileging one particular stakeholder during the negotiations. 
Finally, another stakeholder which could become important in certain cases is the government, 
which may have an interest in the turnaround process as shareholder, financier or regulator (for 
example for antitrust purposes). 
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Chapter 4: Distress investors: classifications and strategies 
 
Under a procedure aimed at continuing the company operations, there is a party which can be 
seen both as a player and as a stakeholder: the distress investor (or distress fund or again vulture 
fund in a more negative sense). Indeed, on one side this entity – which from a legal point of view 
can be seen as an asset management company – acts in order to maximise its payoff, while on the 
other side it is one of the parties which negotiate in order to approve a plan aimed at rescuing the 
company. However, not all the procedures aimed at continuing the company operations include 
the presence of this player; indeed, before starting a negotiation with the distressed company, a 
distressed investor applies a thorough screening of the whole financial market, looking for the 
perfect investment (as a vulture waits until approaching the death pray). Thus, this chapter 
includes an analysis of this player, which in some cases is the main protagonist of a turnaround 
procedure. 
 
4.1 What is a distress investor? 
Basically, a distressed investor is a fund which invests in distressed companies, looking for 
profitable opportunities as happens for every normal investment company. In particular, it may be 
assimilated to a private equity fund, with the difference that the latter invests in private 
companies which are not in a distressed status. However, the approximation makes sense if we 
think that a material part of the distressed investors is simply a division of a private equity fund. 
In practice – as will be briefly described later on – in the past there has been certain periods of 
time where the number of distressed companies was very high; thus, in those periods the need for 
the presence of individuals expert on the rescue of those firms was material. This fact has led to 
the creation of the divisions aforementioned. However, also thanks to the recent financial crisis, 
the amount of funds focused solely on the distressed companies’ segment is increasing, since the 
“size of the market niche” increased significantly. 
Generally, those funds are focused in investing in “special situations”. Inside the definition of 
“special situations” there are various particular cases: financial crisis, major client’s financial 
crisis, temporary operational crisis, industry crisis, etc.; for every case the distress fund can 
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implement a different strategy aimed at rescuing the company in order to gain a positive payoff. 
The fact that a situation is ‘special’ means also that there is the possibility to recover the company 
performance; indeed, for a distress investor it is critical that a distressed company has a positive 
fundamental value. In other words, the distressed company must have a special characteristic 
which motivates the distress fund to invest on it: for example, the special characteristic can be a 
unique resource, key relationships or an advanced R&D department linked with the productive 
process. In short, a distress investor deals with the so called “good businesses with bad balance 
sheets”. 
Historically, the first signals about the existence of someone focused on investing in distressed 
companies are located in the US during the 1929 Great Depression (Rosenberg, 2000). However, 
the boom of those funds occurred during the Eighties, when: 
• the first effects of the US Bankruptcy Code reform – which introduced the Chapter 11 
legal tool – started to take its effects; 
• the introduction of the junk bond financial instruments offered for the first time a solution 
between debt and equity, i.e. on one side are subordinated to the normal debt but on the 
other side guarantee a higher interest rate. 
The enormous success of the junk bonds led to the creation of the “good companies with bad 
balance sheets” aforementioned. In this way, the field for the rise of the distress investors was 
prepared. 
After the first boom, the growth of those agents depended – and still depends – on the economic 
cycle of the country and the industries: generally, the rise of the distress funds is inversely 
proportional with the condition of the country or industry. In particular, the higher the “supply” 
of distressed companies, the higher the distress investors’ activity. 
From the Nineties, the creation of new distress funds started to occur also in Europe, even though 
currently the greatest part of the distress investors is still located in the US. In Italy, the number 
of distress funds is still low143 but it is increasing (Gaudiosi, 2016). 
If on one side the presence of those funds can be seen as a negative aspect (i.e. they may give an 
idea of taking advantage of the fact that a company is in troubles just for own purposes), on the 
other side it may happen that without their presence the outcome would have been worse. Indeed, 
                                                 
143 As demonstrated by the acquisition of Carige (an Italian bank in financial troubles) by Apollo Management, an 
American fund. 
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a distress fund invests on companies that no one else wants to touch – because of the complexity 
of its scenario. Thus, in some cases a distress investor is critical for the survival of a distressed 
company, contributing to save jobs, to increase the probability that a creditor gets the nominal 
value of its claim and to give the possibility to the entrepreneur to continue its job. In this sense, a 
distress fund can be seen as a “player of last resort”, which gives an opportunity to a distressed 
company when no one else is available to do that. 
Moreover, the distress investors can be seen as an accelerator, in the sense that sometimes they 
solve deadlock situations. For example, a distress fund may accelerate the solution of a distress 
situation by injecting capital inside the distressed company in order to give to the latter the 
possibility to pay some critical suppliers in execution of a plan. Another situation in which a 
distress investor accelerates the procedure is when it accepts to purchase – at a discount – the 
debt of a financial institution which wants to close its position; in this way, the distress fund may 
obtain a profit by trading the security at a higher value (or maintaining the claims for negotiation 
purposes) while at the same time it has solved a problem for the financial institution. Other times 
they offer a link between the distressed company and a strategic buyer; indeed, a distressed 
company may be in a situation that it is not able to find any buyer. In order to accelerate the 
research for a potential buyer process – and in order to avoid that the distressed company reduces 
further the remaining part of its value – the distress fund can offer information about the presence 
of a potential target company in troubles. 
First of all, as a private equity fund, a distress investor must be expert in analysing the business of 
the potential target; in particular, it must master the main techniques used to understand the 
industry (i.e. Porter five forces analysis, competitors analysis and profit pools analysis), the 
market (i.e. market segmentation, customers analysis and analysis of the market trends) and the 
target company business model (i.e. internal value chain, SWOT analysis and analysis of the 
sources of competitive advantage). Linked to the expertise on the target company business is the 
ability to understand the reasons for distress; a distress fund must understand if, for example, the 
target company is in distress simply because it has overpaid a company acquisition. If this is the 
case, there could be a good probability that the fundamental value of the company is positive. In 
general, the distress investor must be sure that there is room for future growth: in order to obtain 
this certainty, it must be able to understand everything about the target company business. 
Secondly, a distress investor must be extremely expert in all the finance issues (such as valuation, 
corporate finance, capital markets and debt restructuring); also this aspect is common with the 
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private equity funds and the other financial investors. In particular, the distress fund should 
master all the main valuation techniques for assessing the Enterprise Value (multiple analysis, 
Discounted Cash Flow, liquidation value, etc.) and the securities (for example, methods such as 
the expected value and the decision tree approach). Moreover, the distress fund must be capable 
to identify the elements necessary for the restructuring, in order to determine which are the main 
drivers to change to restore a positive performance. To do that, it is important to have also strong 
accounting skills, since the financial statements must be analysed thoroughly at a financial 
statement line item level. 
In addition, a distinctive characteristic and an important prerequisite of a distress fund is the 
expertise on the insolvency law. Indeed, in most cases a distressed investor has to deal with a 
legal procedure – as the ones described in the last two chapters – when dealing with a distressed 
company. This is one of the reasons why at a certain point there are no funds or industrial 
companies willing to deal with a distressed company: the knowledge that a distress investor must 
have is very complex and pervasive, and the activity per se is very risky. However, a positive 
aspect of this complex environment is that who is able to manage all the tools required for this 
job has a strong competitive advantage in some particular cases: often a distress investor is able 
to discover a distressed company before the market recognises it, so that it has a higher 
probability to be a first-comer on a distressed company without participating a bidding war, 
respecting the “buy low and sell high” dogma. 
It is important to distinguish the distress investor from the strategic investor144. Indeed, when 
dealing with a distressed company, the purposes are completely different; on one side, the 
distress fund aims at maximising the return of the investment (that is why it is important for it to 
plan the exit from the investment from the very beginning of the procedure), while on the other 
side the strategic investor decides to purchase a distressed company only when it believes to 
create high synergies (high enough to overcome the cost of recovering the distressed company). 
For this reason, usually a strategic buyer is willing to offer a higher price, since it has a clearer 
definition of the potential synergies that the transaction can bring because of a deeper knowledge 
of the industry in which the distressed firm is operating145. Moreover, from the distressed 
company perspective, it would prefer to be acquired from a distress investor rather than a 
                                                 
144 The distinction is very similar to the one between financial investors and strategic investors. A strategic investor 
can be either a competitor of the distressed company or other industrial companies such as holdings. 
145 Moreover, since on average the strategic buyers recognize the distress status of the target on a later stage than the 
distress investor, it is more likely that the strategic buyer is involved in a competitive procedure, increasing the price 
to pay to acquire the distressed company. 
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strategic one, in order to avoid giving too much information to the latter during the due diligence 
phase; ultimately, the distressed investors are preferred because they tend to pay for the distressed 
company by cash, usually a solution that the creditors like. 
Finally – as explained before – the distress funds are expert also in the legal field, while the 
strategic investors do not have an in-house legal department specialized in M&A. Accordingly, 
commonly a distress fund is able to negotiate better with the main stakeholders of the distressed 
company, for example reducing the uncertainty about the deal obtaining a contingent payment 
form or an earnout (i.e. to condition the purchasing price to future positive performances). 
The distress investors can be classified in several ways. 
A first distinction is related to the toughness of the fund, i.e. its degree of aggression. 
Accordingly, a distress investor can be: 
• passive: a fund is passive when it simply evaluates the convenience of the purchase of a 
financial instrument. If the price of the instrument is lower than the expected value of it, 
the fund will buy the instrument. This behaviour is passive because the distress investor 
does not try to influence the decision-making process of the distressed company, since it 
selects a “wait and see” strategy; 
• activist: in this case, the fund tries to maximise its return by participating into the 
decision-making process of the distressed company, affecting the turnaround strategy. In 
practise, the distress investor negotiates with the managers and the creditors in order to 
create a “blocking position” aimed at increasing the bargaining power when deciding the 
turnaround strategy. To do that, the distress fund may prepare a concurrent plan which 
includes better conditions for the creditors; 
• aggressive: those funds try to take the majority of the company shares (or a class of 
creditors) in order to block every plan that does not satisfy fully its claims. 
Another classification deals with the financial instruments acquired in order to implement the 
strategy. Thus, a distress investor can purchase: 
• debt: a fund may acquire some debt (usually with a high seniority) in order to convert it 
with an equity or quasi-equity instrument such as the SFP described in the last chapter 
(debt/equity swap or hybrid-equity swap); 
• assets: a distressed investor may decide to purchase claims guaranteed by one or more 
assets. In this way, if the fund is able to obtain a blocking position, it can use its 
bargaining power to obtain successful conditions; 
110 
 
• equity: in this case, the fund acquires – usually at a discount – the shares of the distressed 
company in order to participate directly in the decision-making process. 
A third distinction is related to the type of the target the distress investor deals with146 (Gaudiosi, 
2016): 
• special situations: i.e. generally speaking, the companies which are in economic or 
financial troubles; 
• workout: in this case the fund deals with procedures which are totally out-of-court (i.e. the 
court is not involved at all, so the agreement is private); 
• underperformer: this type of distress investing is linked with the early stage of distress 
(see Chapter 1 of this paper). Here the company has a negative trend in performance, but 
it is not in distress yet; 
• restructuring: in this case, the fund tries to restructure the capital structure of the 
distressed company; 
• turnaround: i.e. the fund tries to restructure the operations of the distressed company; 
• stressed company: in this case, the distressed company presents serious economic and 
financial problems that can still be solved by the management; 
• distressed company: in this case, the distress is serious. Thus, there is a high probability 
that the fund enters an in-court legal procedure in order to recover the distressed company 
performance. 
 
4.2 Main strategies 
Generally, the activity of a distressed investor consists in investing in distressed firm’s 
discounted financial instruments or debt (or low-priced stocks) obtaining a positive return when 
the distressed company will not be distressed anymore (or when the value of the financial 
instrument or stock will increase). Thus, a distress fund may have: 
• a strategic behaviour, in the case where the fund looks for obtaining a positive return 
when the distressed company exits from distress or; 
• a speculative behaviour, when for example a fund takes advantage of the low price of a 
stock147 (acting like a technical trader) or of a discounted bond (selling it at a higher price 
                                                 
146 This distinction is mostly used in the US, where the distress investing is more common and has a greater tradition. 
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as soon as the distressed company starts to improve its financial performance). In this 
case, a distress fund can act as a hedge fund, adopting also short selling strategies. 
However, it is important to specify that the objectives of a distress investor are not perfectly 
aligned with the distressed company ones. If this is clearly true for a speculative behaviour, it is 
true also for a strategic one, since the aim of those funds is to maximise the return from an 
investment. Thus, a distress fund is interested in the future of the distressed company only until it 
has decided to exit from the investment obtaining a positive payoff. 
An interesting explanation of the strategy performed by the distress investors has been provided 
by the current Apollo Global Management (one of the most important distress investor of the 
world) Senior Managing Director Marc Rowan: “Rather than looking for acquisitions in the 
traditional private equity fashion during these periods of time, we employ our fixed income skill 
set. We go in and we buy the debt, bank debt, subordinated debt, of fundamentally good 
businesses that are overlevered, and we work through a process with creditors — sometimes in 
bankruptcy, sometimes out of bankruptcy — and we end up, hopefully, backing into control of a 
fundamentally good capital structure at a good price” (Rowan, 2009). 
The strategies that a distress fund can implement can be classified looking at the degree of 
pervasiveness of their presence and the type of the investment performed, as analysed by 
DePonte (2006)148: 
• distress debt trading: it involves purchasing debt at a significant discount (for example at 
the 30% of the nominal value) in order to resell it at a higher price once the distressed 
company has recovered its performance. In short, they assume that the debt instrument 
they are going to analyse is mispriced, so that it is possible to obtain a short-term capital 
gain149; 
• distressed debt: Active/Non-Control: the strategies included in this class are aimed at 
accumulating significant positions in firms that are likely to enter (or are already inside) a 
legal procedure aimed at continuing the company operations. The aim is to obtain the 
proper bargaining power to negotiate during the restructuring process, maximising the 
return. Rather than the former strategy, this one requires a longer time interval; 
                                                                                                                                                              
147 Usually, when a company is distressed, the shareholders continue to maintain the company stocks since they hope 
to avoid losing money until the end. As a consequence, they will be willing to sell the shares too late, at a very 
discounted price. That is the perfect moment where a distress investor shall purchase the equity. 
148 In most cases the funds adopt a combination of those strategies. 
149 Usually the operation involves weeks, or days. 
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• distressed debt: Control: in this case, the distress fund tries to obtain the control of the 
distressed company purchasing the fulcrum security (see later in this paragraph), either 
alone or together with other funds (syndicate). This strategy requires even more time for 
the fund, since once it has obtained control of the distressed company, it has to define the 
operative strategy; 
• restructuring or turnaround: this strategy is aimed at purchasing directly the equity of the 
distressed company, either in case of legal procedure or completely out-of-court. The final 
purpose of this strategy is to obtain the control of the distressed company in order to 
implement freely the restructuring strategy. 
However, a distress fund may decide to implement a mix of the strategies aforementioned when 
investing in a distressed company, for different purposes. For example, if the distressed company 
shares are marketable, a distress investor which wants to implement the “distressed debt: 
Active/Non-Control” strategy can hedge its investment – in case the possibility to increase the 
bargaining power during the negotiations disappears because of an unexpected strong decrease of 
the distressed company performance – by short selling the stocks (implementing also a strategy 
similar to the “distress debt trading”). The mix of strategies can also be horizontal: for instance, 
the fund may decide to protect its “distress debt trading” strategy by – again – short selling the 
stock, combining the different payoffs of the transactions as happens for an investment on futures 
or derivatives. 
Moreover, a distress investor can decide its strategy also considering the timing. In particular, a 
short-term investment is appropriate when it believes that a trigger event150 is incoming, such as 
the presentation of a certificate plan, or the demand of composition with creditors “in bianco”151; 
in this case, a short term investment is necessary in order to take advantage of the current 
mispricing or to purchase the proper financial instruments (debt or equity) before the other 
investors start to consider an investment on the same distressed company. Otherwise, a long-term 
strategy is more suitable if the distress fund has assessed the fundamental value and has 
concluded that there is room for improving the performance and eliminating the distress status 
                                                 
150 Generally, the market reacts disproportionately when a trigger event occurs; thus, the distress fund may prepare a 
short-term strategy (speculative) in order to take advantage of the mispricing. Moreover, the distress investors are 
able to assess better the potential effects of a legal trouble; in this case, the fund may also adopt a long-term/control 
strategy obtaining significant advantages. 
151 Other trigger events that a distress investor usually considers are: i) change of the legal auditor; ii) continuous 
decrease of the operative performance; iii) sale of the “crown jewels”; iv) material deviation from the content of the 
action plan; v) unexpected top managers’ resignation; vi) downgrade of the company rating; vii) abnormal trend of 
the capital structure (ex. covenant breach). 
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(the so called “growth investing”). However, the long-term investments are riskier than the short-
term ones; indeed, if the convenience of the latter are easier to assess, the former ones require a 
detailed due diligence process where the target company must be analysed properly. 
Among all the strategies aforementioned, the one which characterizes the most a distress fund 
involves the purchase of debt securities addressed to obtaining the control of the distressed 
company (loan-to-own strategy). In order to be implemented, this strategy requires the ability to 
select the correct security among the ones which represent the capital structure of the target 
company: in other words, the distress fund must find the so-called fulcrum security and buy it at a 
reasonable price. As the American literature on distress investing says, “vulture investing is all 
about leverage!” (Schultze & Lewis, 2012); in order to have this “vulture leverage” – since every 
lever has a fulcrum –, a distress investor needs a “fulcrum security” which allows it to implement 
the strategy planned. In general, the fulcrum security is the debt instrument which is more likely 
to be converted in equity during a restructuring process with a debt-equity swap procedure; in 
other words, “the fulcrum security is the last security to recover less than par value under a 
capital restructure and is the one most likely to be converted into equity” (FCS Commercial 
Finance Group). Indeed, once those instruments have been converted, the fund will have the 
possibility to vote and influence the distressed company strategy. To purchase the fulcrum 
security, the fund must analyse thoroughly the capital structure of the distressed company (in 
order to select the right instrument) and wait the right moment for the purchase itself (in order to 
avoid paying too much). In most cases, the fulcrum security corresponds to the debt instrument 
with the highest seniority, since those debtholders will be the first to be reimbursed even when 
the plan provides for an asset disposal (Gaudiosi, 2016). 
In some cases, a distress fund may purchase directly the equity of the distressed company when 
looking for obtaining the control of it; however, it may happen that the equity-holders are not 
willing to sell the shares since they hope to an increase of the distressed company performance. 
Thus, the purchase of the fulcrum security may be the only solution available for a distress 
investor which aims at controlling a distressed firm. 
In conclusion, the ideal strategy for a distress investor would be: to purchase the fulcrum security 
at a large discount and be able – thanks to the fulcrum security itself – to obtain a blocking 
position in order to be able to influence the restructuring or turnaround strategy. This is the best 
solution because the distress fund would spend a low amount of money for the security, 
decreasing the degree of risk exposition, while at the same time it can vote and exercise power. 
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Summarising, the success of the distress investor’s strategy is based on: 
• a complete understanding of the distressed company business model and financial 
statements; 
• a complete understanding of the distressed company industry and market; 
• the ability to wait for the right moment of intervention; 
• the capacity to find the fulcrum security that gives the possibility to influence the 
determination of the turnaround strategy. 
 
4.2.1 Main activities 
After having described the way in which a distress investor decides the strategy to implement, it 
is important now to describe briefly the main activities that those funds implement in order to 
achieve the goals planned. The most common activities are: 
• prededucibile debt: a distress fund may decide to lend some money to the distressed 
company, taking advantage of the fact that the loans provided by a lender in execution of 
the plan is prededucubile, i.e. with a super-seniority152. If this is the only activity 
performed by the fund, the outcome is the reimbursement of the money lent plus the 
interests. However, often a distress investor lends money to the target as an ancillary 
operation, in order to support the main strategy (such as the obtaining of the control of the 
company) and increasing the possibility of making it succeed. Moreover, since the 
distressed company is in desperate research of money, the fund may act as a “lender of 
last resort”, obtaining an agreement that includes some advantages for it (an agreement 
that the distressed company would have never accepted under normal conditions); 
• turnaround in collaboration with a performance improvement expert: sometimes – even 
though it knows how to recover the company performance from a financial and legal 
point of view – the distress fund does not have the right competences to adjust the 
operations of the distressed company. In this case, the distress investor may abandon 
every idea of investment on that distressed company. In alternative, the distress fund can 
cooperate with an advisory company expert in improving the companies’ performance 
through cost optimization, operations improvement and corporate support strategies. For 
                                                 
152 In the US the security is known as DIP (Debtor-In-Possession) financing. 
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example, the advisory company can optimize the distressed company cost structure while 
the distress fund uses its expertise in the bankruptcy law to find the right agreement aimed 
at rescuing the distressed company; 
• convertible bonds purchase: a distress fund can decide to obtain the control of the 
company through a hybrid-equity swap, purchasing or subscribing convertible bonds. 
Apart from the control purposes, the distress investor may obtain a significant payoff if 
the price of conversion of the bonds in stocks is lower than the stock value in case of 
completion of the turnaround process for the distressed company153; 
• loan-to-own: as already mentioned, the most common strategy implemented by a distress 
fund is the purchase of the fulcrum security, i.e. the most senior part of the distressed 
company debt. However, in these situations there are some particular aspects, due to the 
fact that some entities cannot (or are not willing to) maintain a financial position in a 
distressed firm, becoming forced sellers. Firstly, the mutual funds sometimes are obliged 
by the charter to exit from the investments considered too risky. Secondly, the financial 
institutions can be incentivized to dismiss a high-risk investment for balance sheet 
purposes: indeed, the banks have to register the value of the financial position basing on 
the degree of riskiness of the investment itself, thus a higher risk would imply a lower 
asset value. Accordingly, those two scenarios could be used for its own advantage by the 
distress funds, that can purchase the claims at a very discounted value; 
• deleveraging: this operation is performed often by a distress investor, in particular when 
there are also other entities (both financial and strategic investors) willing to invest and 
obtaining control into the distressed company. The deleveraging is a strategy suitable for 
dealing with overindebted distressed companies; the aim of the operation is to restructure 
the capital structure of the distressed company by exchanging the debt (or a part of it) 
with the participation in the equity of the distressed company, merged in a Newco. 
Accordingly, this operation is composed by several stages: 
a) the distress fund buys the debt of the target company from a debtholder which 
wants to exit from the investment (such as the mutual funds or the financial 
institutions aforementioned), at a significant discount; 
                                                 
153 That is why usually a convertible bond pays an interest lower than a normal bond: it gives to the subscriber the 
possibility to realize a gain when converting the bonds in shares. 
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b) the distress investor, together with other investors willing to control the target 
(including the owners of the distressed company itself), create a Newco composed 
by: i) an amount of cash equal to the nominal value of the debt purchased by the 
debtholder mentioned in the point a); ii) equity equal to the amount of cash 
provided, owned by both the distress fund and the other investors; 
c) the Newco pays the distress fund, using the cash provided by the fund itself and 
the other investors, in exchange of the claim towards the target company. In 
practise, the Newco has exchanged the cash with the credit towards the distressed 
firm (at the nominal value); 
d) the Newco exchanges the credit towards the target company with a participation 
on it equal to the amount of the claim written off; 
e) now probably the Newco has the majority of the distressed company (target), 
which in exchange of the loss of control has written off a significant part of its 
debt, so that the capital structure is healthier. Accordingly, if the turnaround 
strategy is successful, it is likely that the equity value increases, while the 
remaining amount of debt (if any) decreases because of the cash inflows provided 
by the new strategy; 
f) after some years, the distress fund exits from the investment, selling its position on 
the distressed company to a third party (or to the former owners). Since the value 
of the equity has increased, the fund obtains a positive return in terms of capital 
gain. Thus, from the deleveraging operation the distress investor gains in two 
different ways: i) the capital gain aforementioned; ii) when transferring the target 
claim (purchased from the debtholder at a discount) to the Newco (which pays the 
nominal value); 
• securitization: a distress fund can make a mistake. In this case, it may risk being forced to 
maintain the (now illiquid) security until the maturity, with a material probability that the 
terminal value of the claim will be very low (if not zero). If that security is marketable, 
the distress investor may try to apply the so called “originate-to-distribute” strategy, 
creating new financial instruments composed by the toxic claims through a SPV (Special 
Purpose Vehicle). In practise, the SPV takes the claim from the fund and divides it in 
different parties with different seniorities. Then, it sells those new financial instruments 
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(called ABS, Asset-Backed Securities) to the market. In this way, the distress fund may 
exit from the investment, since the credit risk is sustained by the SPV; 
• business unit purchase: the distress fund can decide to purchase directly only a part of the 
distressed company, i.e. a division or business unit. Usually the purchase of some assets 
only is a signal of pressure by the distressed company creditors, that are forcing the debtor 
to liquidate some assets in order to be able to pay the claims. The main advantage of a 
business unit purchase is that the fund would avoid bearing also the debt of the distressed 
firm (aspect that would happen in case of acquisition of the total company). 
 
4.3 Main procedures 
Once the main strategies that a distress fund can implement has been described, it is important to 
understand how those funds generally work, i.e. which procedures they make before deciding 
whether to invest into a distressed company and the way in which they select the proper 
investment among the available ones. Generally, the fund looks at those companies that are likely 
to enter a distress period in the short-term, in order to anticipate the behaviour of the market. 
As described before, a first preliminary activity is the analysis of the business model, industry 
and market of the distressed companies that can represent a potential target for the fund. A first 
operation is to discard all those companies which industry is out of the knowledge of the 
distressed investor. It is important for a distressed investor to be confident about what it is 
analysing; thus, it may find uncomfortable to analysing new industries and markets. An 
alternative would be a partnership with another advisory company (under a sort of syndication) 
where the two companies put together their competences. 
A second preliminary activity consists of understanding the reasons for distress of a distressed 
company. Indeed – as described in detail in Chapter 1 – the reasons why a company is in troubles 
can be internal or external, or both at the same time. Moreover, a distress can be due to 
operational problems or financial ones, or a combination of the two. Accordingly, a distress 
investor must know in detail why a company is risking being insolvent; it shall avoid any type of 
investment if it is not completely informed about it154. For example, if the main reasons for 
distress are related to a decreasing path of the performance of the industry, the distress fund has 
                                                 
154 As Warren Buffett says, “Risk comes from not knowing what you’re doing”. 
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to understand thoroughly what is happening to the industry, and which are the responsibilities of 
the distressed company management; after having performed this type of analysis, the fund can 
decide not to invest or to wait for the beginning of the industry recovery. Alternatively, if the 
main reasons for distress are linked to bad management, the fund can decide to obtain the control 
of the company and replacing the old management. Finally, a financial distress can trigger other 
types of strategies, such as the deleveraging operation described in the last paragraph155. 
Once the distress investor has a clearer idea about the potential investments available, the fund 
may enter a screening process, where the most interesting opportunities are analysed in detail. 
This activity involves for sure a financial statement analysis, in order to find the numerical 
outcomes which outline the reasons for distress found during the qualitative analysis mentioned 
above. Together with the analysis of the operative performance, the distress fund will focus its 
attention on the levered Free Cash Flow, which includes the effects of the debt service in the cash 
position of the distressed company. Moreover, the attention goes also on the operative cash flow, 
when deciding as to whether applying a turnaround strategy on the target company. Indeed, a 
distress fund is not worried of the over-indebtedness of the company, but on its capacity to 
sustain, in the medium-long term, the debt service with the operative cash flow only. 
Thus, the distress fund prepares the so called “research review note” (Schultze & Lewis, 2012), 
which includes issues such as “the nature of the investment opportunity, an overview of the 
fundamental business, and an analysis of comparable companies and of the industry” (Ibidem). 
Usually this analysis includes an accurate analysis of the distressed company-target capital 
structure and a forecast of its financial statements, together with an estimate of the expected 
internal rate of return (IRR) of the investment itself. 
After the screening process, the distress investor selects the best investment available. However, 
the decision is not definitive yet. Indeed, in this phase the fund starts a due diligence process, in 
order to be more confident when approaching the management properly and obtain more sureness 
about the feasibility of the investment in terms of positive IRR. Obviously, the higher is the time 
spent to perform the due diligence, the better is the ability of the fund to make a good deal. To 
perform the due diligence, usually the distress fund uses different sources, taking advantage of 
the relationships that it has created in the past (for example historical partners, lawyers and 
                                                 
155 Usually, the SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) have a higher risk to be financially distressed since they 
cannot solve the situation by adopting an assets disposal strategy. 
119 
 
investment banks); since the fund’s network is limited, it is likely that a fund prefers to invest in 
known industries, where the insights is easier to obtain, and the experience is higher. 
During the due diligence phase, the distress investor analyses the plan eventually proposed by the 
management. It is likely that the plan mentioned is too optimistic since it is made by the 
managers, who have the incentive to stay positive because they want to demonstrate to be able to 
solve the distress scenario. On the contrary, the plan could be considered too pessimistic if 
prepared, for example, by a creditor which has interest to start a bankruptcy procedure (for 
example an aggressive distress fund). Accordingly, whether a plan is optimistic or pessimistic 
may influence the distress fund strategy; for example, the fund can decide to improve the plan (if 
it is considered too pessimistic) in order to avoid the full satisfaction of an aggressive fund under 
a bankruptcy procedure. If instead the plan is aligned with the expectations of the fund, the 
distress investor may decide to purchase the securities at a discount, since the confidence about 
the strategy planned is improved. 
Apart from this process, usually the distress investor does not have enough time to execute a 
proper screening strategy and an exhaustive due diligence. A distress fund must act quickly, since 
a distress company can worsen in a few months (or weeks). Accordingly, Moyer (2005) lists four 
steps a distress investor must perform: 
1. to analyse the most recent financial data in order to determine the capital structure and the 
debt structure (i.e. the characteristics of the debt and its seniority); 
2. to prepare an own valuation of the distressed company and the capital structure; 
3. to analyse the EBITDA recent trends and to perform a ratio analysis, in particular related 
to the capital structure; 
4. to conclude about the convenience of the investment: if the valuation of the company is 
greater than the one provided by the market, the investment can worth it. 
 
4.4 Conflicts of interest with the other stakeholders 
The distress investors goal is to maximise its payoff. It follows that the distress fund strategy may 
enter in conflict with the objectives of the other stakeholders of the procedure. For this purpose, 
the fund shall examine properly the different parties that participate in the restructuring process. 
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Usually, inside all the restructuring procedures the distress fund finds multiple situations of 
conflict of interest, for example between creditors with different seniorities, between managers 
and owners or between shareholders and creditors (see Chapter 3). This implies that it is very 
difficult that a fund that wants to enter the procedure finds a solution which satisfies all the 
stakeholders of the restructuring process. Thus, it may happen that such distress investor selects a 
strategy which supports only one stakeholder; for example, it may decide to give preference to 
the shareholders if during the due diligence it has discovered that the distress company 
fundamental value is significantly positive. By contrast, if the distress fund retains more 
convenient the return related to the debt of the distressed company, it will support the creditors 
(or a single class of creditors) looking for creating a blocking position. Alternatively, the fund 
may decide to stay neutral supporting the going concern of the distressed company by injecting 
capital adopting one of the growth strategies mentioned above in this chapter. 
The distress fund position depends also on the composition of the debt. For example, if the 
greatest part of the debt is maintained by the financial institutions, the fund knows that it is easier 
to implement the strategy planned if it is able to obtain the support of those stakeholders. 
However, it is important to recall that the distress investor strategy can be perfectly 
complementary to the one of the financial institutions which want to exit from the investment for 
balance sheet purposes (forced sellers): in this case there would not be any problems in terms of 
conflicts of interest. A similar way of thinking is valid for those shareholders which want to exit 
from the equity participation because of a too high degree of risk aversion; those equity-holders 
can easily sell their share to the distress fund offering a significant discount for the favour. 
Another situation of conflict of interest that a distress fund must consider deals with the presence 
of other investors (both turnaround or industrial) in the turnaround procedure. If this is the case, 
the investors can decide to cooperate (investors syndicate) if they have the same purposes; this 
implies that all the funds that participate in the procedure commit to maintain the financial 
position until they decide, in concert, to sell the securities (or shares). On the contrary, they can 
have different goals; this may lead to a strong competition between the funds, with the 
consequence of increasing the purchasing price of the distressed company or the securities156. 
 
                                                 
156 That is why the Italian Legge Fallimentare wants to be sure that the sales of the distressed company assets are 
made through “competitive procedures”, since this is in the interest of the creditors. 
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4.5 Effects and returns 
As for the effects of those funds in the economy, it seems clear that on average they improve the 
profitable ratio of the distressed companies. This happens because the distressed investors are a 
unique type of funds – highly specialized in the business, finance and bankruptcy law issues – 
which combine those three main areas of expertise in order to improve the performance of the 
companies in serious troubles. Indeed, they intervene in extraordinary situations (i.e. corporate 
distress) where a normal manager is not able to recover the deteriorated performance simply 
because he does not have the proper capabilities. 
The returns of those funds tend to be volatile because of the high degree of riskiness of the 
investment. However, investing in distressed debt is an attractive opportunity to obtain significant 
returns in a very short period of time; thus, who has a consolidated expertise and strong skills in 
distress investing can make very high returns in a couple of weeks or months. Accordingly, if a 
distress fund has a positive reputation, an institutional or individual investor can decide to finance 
its activity, preferring the expected return offered by a distress investor to the lower (but safer) 
ones offered by other funds. 
The returns of a distress investor depend materially on the level of distress that a distressed 
company has reached. In particular, it is easier to obtain a significantly positive IRR when the 
investment has been made in the period which follows a default peak. For example, Edison 
Investment Research (2001) hypothesizes a “potential for a 20-30% IRR in the 12-24-month 
period following a default peak”. However, the same research assessed for the sample of distress 
funds considered an average return of -27.1% in the 2008 and of +29.8 in the 2009, underlining 
the volatility that those returns may have and the tendency to have higher returns in the year after 
the negative default peak has occurred. 
The performance of a distress fund depends also on its launch date: if the fund has been founded 
at a low point of a distress period (of the financial markets as a whole or of the distressed 
company, depending on the type of target selected by the distress investor), it is more likely that 
it obtains high returns because it purchases the securities at a deep discount. On the contrary, if a 
fund invests just before a financial crash, its performance would be negative. 
Moreover, the extent of the returns depends also on the type of transaction performed by the 
distress fund; in general, an equity investment has an unlimited upside while the purchase of a 
debt instrument has the nominal value (plus the interests) as maximum gain. On the other side, 
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the payoff downside can be very high, since both an equity investment and a debt one can be 
worth zero at the end of the day; for this reason, a distress investor must assess more the 
downside than the upside, since the investment is risky. Furthermore, it depends also on the 
strategy selected by the distress fund; in particular, Hotchkiss & Mooradian (1997) found that on 
average if the distress investor strategy is aimed at controlling the distressed company, the returns 
are higher. Finally, the returns may depend on the timing of investment; obviously, to invest 
when the value of the security is at its lowest point helps to increase the return. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
At this point, it seems clear that to be a successful distress investor is very difficult, since it is 
critical to be specialized in various fields. In particular, differently than the other funds, the 
distressed ones must add a further competence, i.e. the understanding of the legal insolvency 
framework. Their strategies vary basing on the opportunities and the purposes, and before 
selecting the right investment they have to analyse in detail the business, the reasons for distress, 
the financial statements and the convenience of the potential investments. If the distress investor 
recognizes to be not enough expert to go on with a potentially profitable operation, it may be 
obliged to abandon the project; in alternative, it may ally with another distress fund under a 
syndicate of distress funds or collaborating with a performance improver expert in the required 
sector. 
A distress investor – as all the other entities – deals with an environment. As a consequence, the 
financial, legal and cultural framework affects the probability of success of a distress fund 
strategy. In particular, the Italian business environment is composed by a strong presence of 
Small Medium Enterprises157 characterized by a high degree of personal relationships with the 
local banks; the consequence is that the capital structure of those companies is not diversified 
properly, so that they risk relying too much on the possibility to raise funds by those local banks. 
For this reason, there could be room for a distress investor to intervene as soon as the scenario of 
those firms starts to worsen. By contrast, on the other side usually those SMEs are family-owned, 
with the consequence that often it is difficult to persuade those family-owners to give up the 
control to external agents. Accordingly, apart from all the competences that the funds’ managers 
have to improve, it is important to analyse thoroughly the local environment. For example, it may 
                                                 
157 In the 2018 the 76% of the total Italian firms were SME, according to Banca IFIS (2018). 
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happen that a country-wide distress investor has to co-invest into a distressed company together 
with a local fund that is embedded properly inside the area. 
Another important issue about the way in which a distress fund manager is able to perform 
efficiently its strategy is related to the role of the information. Indeed, before starting to analyse 
the business of the potential target distressed companies, the distress investor has to know about 
the presence of the distressed company. Since in Italy the greatest part of the companies are 
SMEs, it is likely that the news about a company which is going to enter a distress period are not 
disclosed. Accordingly, it is important for a distress fund manager to create an important network 
with some main advisory companies and legal offices, in order to be able to know with the right 
timing all the necessary information about the presence of one or more companies which are 
entering the distress period. To obtain the information network aforementioned requires a lot of 
years, and that may be seen as an important entry barrier for new distress investors.  
In sum, in order to have a successful transaction, Victor (2006) lists five key elements: 
• understanding the company’s situation: it is important for a distress investor to assess 
how long the distressed company can survive as a going concern firm. In particular, when 
the distressed company is burning cash quickly because of the crisis situation immediate 
actions must be undertaken in order to guarantee the company going concern. In order to 
perform positively those operations, the distress investor must know perfectly the 
company and its environment; 
• setting expectations and communicating with all constituents: a very important 
characteristic that a distress investor must have – which sometimes is not mentioned at all 
– consists in high communication skills. Indeed, first of all to communicate to the 
entrepreneur of a SME that his company is in distress is a very complex thing which 
requires a lot of resolve and empathy. Secondly, to have good communication skills is 
useful also when negotiating with the other stakeholders of the procedure, for example 
when persuading the banks to provide a standstill agreement in order to delay the cash 
disbursement of the distressed company; 
• running the right sale process: it is important to be focused on the sale process procedure, 
for example preparing the correct teaser document of offering memorandum. Moreover, 
the proper level of due diligence must be performed in order to prepare all the basis 
necessary to obtain the best result possible from the transaction; 
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• finding the right buyer: a distress investor must act quickly and offer highly reasonable 
conditions. Thus, usually the best distress investor is the one which shows confidence 
from the very beginning of the process, knowing perfectly what to do in order to extract 
the highest value possible from the distressed company; 
• solving obstacles to get to closing: during both the negotiation process and the execution 
of the plan, it may happen that some obstacles occur. Thus, a good distress investor must 
be able to solve any potential deal-breaker factor (such as short-term liquidity problems, 
labour issues and stakeholders’ contrary reactions). Moreover, it is important that feelings 
such as ego and greed are set aside. All the stakeholders must be focused and motivated to 
complete the process. 
Moreover, the ability of a distress investor consists in dealing with some market inefficiencies, as 
explained by Edison Investment Research (2011): 
• low levels of liquidity of the distressed debt market: thus, before concluding an operation 
in distressed debt, an investor shall consider that it may be difficult to exit from the 
investment if things will go wrong in the future; 
• the fact that mistakes are extremely costly and not easily undone: a wrong investment in 
distressed debt securities or equity instruments has a material potential to lead to a null 
final value, implicating a significant capital loss; 
• the circumstance that distress debt can provide considerable upside, but the downside is 
highly probable: this aspect is strictly linked to the previous ones. Indeed, it is important 
also the exit from the investment in case things go wrong; 
• to be effective it is important to know in detail the insolvency legal framework: as precised 
before in this Chapter, without knowing properly the bankruptcy legal framework it 
would be difficult to select and implement the right strategy; 
• on average, the information coverage about the distressed company is not high: another 
problem linked with distress investing is the lack of information about the distressed 
company. As a consequence, a distress investor must be able to create the right network 
(composed mainly by courts, advisory company and legal offices) in order to be informed 
with the right timing about the presence of a distressed company. 
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Chapter 5: A comprehensive case study158 
After having investigated properly the definition of distress – considering different models aimed 
at standardizing the issue and identifying the most common reasons for distress – and describing 
the Italian bankruptcy legal framework for continuing the operations of a distressed firm – and its 
main players, with a focus on the distressed investors –, the focus of this work shifts from the 
theoretical aspects to the practical ones. Accordingly, a comprehensive case study is presented, 
with the aim of observing how a distressed company can be rescued and how the different 
stakeholders (in particular the distress funds described in the last chapter) behave in a complex 
situation like a company crisis. We will see that not in every case the solution is simple, in 
particular it may happen that various attempts are made before finding the right solution: a 
potential solution may fail because of different reasons, both economic and legal. Furthermore, 
we will see how important is to have a strong knowledge in both the legal and finance-business 
fields, differently than a classic situation of Mergers and Acquisitions under non-crisis conditions 
where the strategic component can be sufficient159. Finally, we will observe the strategy adopted 
by the distress investor, and why it has selected one particular strategy rather than another one. 
The chapter starts with the presentation of the company, in particular its main activities and the 
industry and market composition, as well as the most important historical aspects. Then, the 
reasons for distress will be presented and analysed, adopting both a descriptive and financial 
analysis of the scenario. Finally, the events which regard the post-crisis identification are 
described and examined, understanding the reasons why the main protagonists of the procedures 
have taken those particular decisions. When describing the way in which the stakeholders have 
tried to rescue the company, a focus will regard the distress fund, in order to see the reasons 
behind its strategy. 
 
 
                                                 
158 Since the distressed company is private, its name and the most important information and data are not disclosed. 
Accordingly, some details that would have been analyzed exhaustively in case of public information may not be 
described properly. 
159 It is important to recall that one of the main differences between a financial investor (as a distress fund) and a 
strategic one is that usually a financial investor has an in-house legal department specialized in legal issues (such as 
the bankruptcy law) while a strategic buyer tends to rely on external professionals for that. Accordingly, in case of 
corporate crisis, a distress investor on one side is advantaged because it has already the knowledge required for such 
operations, but on the other side to get all those competences is a very complex aspect which requires time. 
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5.1 The Distressed Company 
 
5.1.1 Overview 
The Distressed Company is an Italian medium company160 headquartered in the North-Eastern 
area of Italy. The company core activity deals with the design of various products, from footwear 
to leather goods. Basically, the company works in the fashion industry; it is composed mainly by 
designers and ancillary experts (such as engineers, marketing experts and other professionals who 
support the core activity) that provide the research, development and creation of graphic solutions 
aimed not only at designing a fashionable product (i.e. aligned with the last fashion trend) but 
also at offering the proper quality in terms of wearability and material selection. Furthermore, 
recently the Distressed Company started to offer industrial design services for completely 
different purposes such as outdoors places (i.e. parks), packaging, interior design and digital 
graphic support (i.e. creation of slideshows and digital brochures). The addition of this second set 
of activities (which can be seen as a new strategic unit) has provided a horizontal perspective to 
the company, giving the possibility to offer its experience and capabilities also to markets 
different than the fashion ones; the consequence has been the possibility to diversify the market 
risk, avoiding depending too much on the trend of one single market only161. It seems clear that 
the company aspires, at least in the long term, to be considered as a sort of “factory of design”, 
distancing gradually (or at least being less dependent) from being considered as one of the most 
skilled design company only for the fashion industry. 
Accordingly, as mentioned before, it is possible to separate two main set of activities that the 
Distressed Company offers to different clients: 
• fashion: generally, this strategic unit deals with the creation of new collections or the 
restyling of the existent ones. Moreover, in this set of activities the company may create 
special projects, such as the creation of shoes prototypes starting from zero, deciding both 
the design and the materials for the shoes itself; 
                                                 
160 The Distressed Company has a turnover lower than € 10 million in all the years considered except the 2007 
(necessary condition to be considered small company), but the number of employees is greater than 50 (a small firm 
must have less than 50 employees). Thus, according to the EU Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of the 6 
May 2003, the Distressed Company is considered medium. 
161 Indeed, during the financial crisis period, the management reports linked with the Distressed Company financial 
statements state clearly that the new business unit’s market was responding badly to the financial crisis, while the 
core business’ market was more resilient. 
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• industrial design and other activities: in this set of operations, the company takes 
advantage of the skills, the expertise and the reputation of its designers to execute other 
operations such as interior design (for example for temporary stores), digital graphic 
design, labelling, packaging and the creation (or improving) of logos. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the main activities performed by the Distressed Company. 
 
Fashion Industrial design and other activities 
- Creation of new collections, or the restyling of 
existent collections, for: 
▪ men, women and/or kids; 
▪ shoes, bags or other accessories; 
▪ different styles: luxury, casual, sport. 
 
- Market advisory: 
▪ market and sales analysis; 
▪ trend hunting; 
▪ preparation of merchandising plans; 
▪ colours selection. 
 
- Research and Development: 
▪ research of the proper materials for the 
products designed; 
▪ research for new materials, healthier designs 
and improved materials; 
▪ development of new technologies. 
 
- Special projects: 
▪ design and production of completely new 
products; 
▪ application of new technologies to the 
production process; 
▪ production engineering with the obtaining of 
patents when possible. 
- Interior design: 
▪ creation of retail concepts, for visual 
merchandising purposes; 
▪ interior design for temporary shops, shop-in-
shops and flagship stores; 
▪ design of stands for mobile expositions (ex. 
fairs). 
 
- Logo creation or improving. 
 
- Conception and development of packaging. 
 
- Conception and development of labels, for 
packaging and marketing purposes, also in digital 
form. 
 
- Creation of brochures, videos and slideshows in 
order to present the client to the public properly. 
 
- Development of a coordinate graphic which 
represents the client in every document it prepares for 
the external environment. 
 
- Creation of mood boards for summarizing a 
particular concept. 
      Table 5.1: The Distressed Company main activities divided for class of activities. Own elaboration. 
 
As for the process of the core activities performed by the Distressed Company (i.e. the creation of 
new collections, under the fashion strategic unit) – which are the most important activities in 
terms of revenues –, usually it is composed by the following phases: 
• preliminary phase: during this phase, the client provides to the company all the data and 
information necessary to understand the client itself, its style and the characteristics that 
the collection shall have. After the company has received all that information, it makes all 
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the preliminary activities necessary to perform the work properly (i.e. trend hunting, 
market research and data analysis); 
• briefing phase: once the preliminary phase has been completed, a direct communication 
process starts between the client and the company. In particular, the client indicates the 
desires and objectives of the collection and all the conditions of the project (ex. colors and 
materials). Then, the two parties discuss the project and the timeline of the work; 
• design phase: the company proposes its ideas and interpretation about the collection and 
presents the concept of the project. When presenting the project, the company has to 
explain in detail the reasons why it has selected that particular color, material and design. 
Then, the project is discussed with the client, in order to take a definitive decision as to 
whether the project can start; 
• project development phase: in this phase, the company executes the project and presents 
the prototypes created to the client. Obviously, the prototypes must be aligned with the 
guidelines provided by the client. The prototypes are discussed with the client in order to 
reach a final decision about the presentation of the final product to the market; 
• final definition phase: the final sketches of the products are sent from the company to the 
client and the client decides whether to produce it; 
• industrialization process: usually this phase is managed solely by the client, but the 
contract may include the possibility that the final product is produced by the client under 
the supervision of the company, or the possibility to co-produce the final product. 
On average, those contracts are between one and two years long, so the clients’ turnover can be 
high under high-pressure periods such as macroeconomic crises; for this reason, it would be 
important to obtain a high client fidelization, in order to guarantee stable revenues for the 
medium-long period. 
However, the service offered by the company is characterized by its flexibility to every clients’ 
request. For example, the company may create a prototype starting from zero or supporting only 
the initial or final phase of the client’s project (for example performing a market analysis or 
preparing a merchandising plan, respectively). Moreover, the procedure described above can be 
implemented with other activities, as for example the development of a coordinated graphic for 
the marketing campaign, or the creation of slideshows and videos to present properly the product 
to the market. 
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5.1.2 Historical background 
The company was founded in the second part of the Eighties by two designers who during the 
previous years have developed strong skills thanks to the presence of an industrial district in the 
area, specialized in the high-quality craftmanship of footwear. Those designers have been able to 
work in some companies inside the local industrial district area, taking advantage of the unique 
ability of those artisans and learning from their ordinary work, in particular the abilities related to 
the production of the shoe model from the very beginning.  
Once the two designers have been able to obtain enough confidence about the skills 
aforementioned, they decided to become autonomous, creating a new entrepreneurial activity 
based on the design of the footwear, oriented towards an international market. The aim was to 
produce innovative products – related both to new forms and new materials (or combination of 
materials) – and to sell them to the footwear factories through the participation to specialized 
fairs for shoes designers. 
After some years – when the first successes have been achieved – the two designers decided to 
start an “integrated center of product development”, in order to manage internally, inside the 
company, the whole process regarding the complete production of footwear prototypes. 
Moreover, thanks to this integration strategy, the two designers were able to assume the creative 
direction of whole collections, improving the “exclusivity” of the final product offered to the 
market. 
In the Nineties, the success of the company continued to increase. Indeed, in this phase the 
company started to be considered as a high-quality and reliable partner, so that it obtained 
important partnerships with some of the most important international shoes and accessories 
companies. Moreover, also in order to reach the most important potential clients, the company 
integrated its marketing channel creating an international sales network (however, they continued 
to attend fairs as well, in order to maintain the old clientele). 
In this period, the company started to increase the amount of R&D investment about new graphic 
and design solutions, in order to keep the pace of the market quickly and to enhance the strong 
creative skills of the designers (and the other employees); for example, the company completed 
some R&D projects about the weight reduction of the shoes, the comfort of the product and the 
research for new or improved raw materials. 
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In the following decade, the company continued its positive path, becoming – as the designers 
themselves said – a “worldwide creative design factory”, continuing the innovation and 
competences development process and consolidating its role at an international level. In this 
period, the company turned out to be a “factory of design”, entering new businesses such as the 
interior design, architecture and graphic design ones. In the 2007, the company reached a 
turnover level of € 10 million. For those purposes, the company integrated its personnel obtaining 
a composition of eight teams composed by specialized designers, architects, graphic designers, 
trend hunters, market analysts and other marketing experts. 
At the end of the 2011 – as at the foundation time – the company was owned completely by the 
two designers, with a slight majority (51%) for one of them. 
The financial statements of the Distressed Company are presented in Table 5.2 and Table 5.4, 
while Table 5.3 includes a breakdown of the costs. 
 
(€/000) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Sales revenues 8.845 7.353 7.611 8.038 3.846 
YoY revenues growth rate - -17% 4% 6% -52% 
EBITDA 355 184 926 1.210 (2.137) 
EBITDA margin 4% 2% 12% 15% -56% 
EBIT 235 (148) 740 1.109 (2.251) 
EBIT margin 3% -2% 10% 14% -59% 
Net income (120) (305) 78 103 (4.305) 
        Table 5.2 The Distressed Company Income Statement (2008-2012). 
 
(€/000) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
incidence Operative costs 9.376 7.572 7.469 7.282 8.374 
Raw materials 270 285 282 232 201 3,20% 
Change in raw materials 11 (24) (39) (5) 23 -0,10% 
Services 2.908 2.545 2.710 2.862 3.516 36,44% 
Leasing 1.558 1.247 974 773 758 13,16% 
Personnel 4.305 3.125 3.204 2.695 2.173 38,61% 
Depreciation and Amortization 119 332 186 101 61 2,05% 
Other provisions 0 0 0 0 53 0,13% 
Other operative costs 205 61 153 624 1.589 6,52% 
        Table 5.3 The Distressed Company cost breakdown (2008-2012). 
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(€/1000) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Current assets 4.015  4.093  4.738  5.821  2.628  
      Inventory 358  279  577  321  994  
      Account Receivables 3.235  3.464  3.873  5.188  1.322  
      Accrued revenue and prepaid expenses 421  350  287  312  313  
Current liabilities 926  1.005  1.717  2.128  3.871  
     Account Payables 542  833  933  936  1.418  
     Advanced payments 48  0  272  861  1.872  
     Other debts 325  160  504  317  570  
     Prepaid revenue and accrued expenses 11  13  9  14  11  
Trade Working Capital 3.089  3.088  3.020  3.693  (1.242) 
  Trade Working Capital/Sales 35% 42% 40% 46% (32%) 
Other current assets 761  784  940  1.601  1.221  
Other current liabilities (413)  (360)  (853)  (1.469)  (1.505)  
Net Working Capital 3.437  3.512  3.108  3.825  (1.526) 
Fixed assets 298  227  191  148  111  
Other assets and liabilities 200  163  171  33  (303) 
TFR and other provisions (294)  (455)  (209)  (146)  (162)  
TOTAL ASSETS 3.641  3.447 3.261 3.859 (1.880) 
      
Net Financial Position 2.932  2.843  2.579  3.075  1.640  
Cash and Cash equivalents (154) (159) (552) (155) (164) 
Bank debt 3.086  3.002  3.131  3.230  1.804  
   NFP/EBITDA 8,27 15,48 2,79 2,54 -0,77 
   NFP/Equity 4,14 4,71 3,78 3,92 -0,47 
Equity 709  604  682  785  (3.521) 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3.641  3.447 3.261 3.859 (1.880) 
      Table 5.4 The Distressed Company Balance Sheet (2008-2012). 
 
5.1.3 The reference market 
Since in the first decade of the new century the Distressed Company started a new set of 
activities, it has been able to diversify the clientele, reaching not only the footwear market but 
also other ones (such as the graphic design and interior design market). Indeed, as specified in the 
management reports of the company, the two different strategic units may have different trends 
and performance because the clients’ characteristics are different; for example, during the 
financial crisis the “Industrial design and other activities” clients were suffering the crisis while 
on the other side the historical clientele seemed more resilient. However, the reference market 
still remained the footwear ones because of its high incidence on the total revenues. 
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Focusing, for the reasons aforementioned, on the footwear market, the company was able to offer 
its services to different types of companies, both shoes producers and not-only-shoes producers. 
Furthermore, inside the shoes specialists the company served different niches maintaining the 
same quality of the service provided; the company might serve: 
• cheap shoes producers or luxury ones: the designers were able to adapt themselves to the 
different styles; 
• Italian, European or international clients; 
• customers which are focused in the sport, causal, fashion or comfort niches: the company 
was flexible also when adopting different perspectives when performing the same service 
to differently positioned clients. 
As for the non-shoe specialists, the company could provide specific services to both luxury and 
non-luxury clients, thanks to the strong skills of the professionals deeply established and rooted 
in the territory (i.e. the local footwear industrial district). 
The average duration of the main contracts (i.e. the ones related to the core activity of creation or 
restyling of collections) was about 20 months162 (between one and two years); thus, in order to 
maintain a stable revenue trend in the medium-long period, the company had to find the right 
marketing strategy which includes a set of operations aimed at increasing the degree of 
fidelization of the clients. 
The per-year value of those “core contracts” was about € 0,4 million163; however, inside the 
contracts analysed, there were some important long-term contracts which were important to keep 
stable the operative cash inflows. On the other side, considering the fact that the revenues usually 
were lower than € 10 million, the loss of an important client might have significant negative 
impacts on the company performance. 
One of the main advantages of the company was the geographical composition of its revenues, 
i.e. the geographical differentiation of the clients. Indeed, in the last decades the company has 
been able to obtain a balanced composition of its clients, with both a strong presence in the local 
Italian area and good relationships with some of the biggest players in the world fashion industry. 
 
                                                 
162 The average time length of those “core contracts” has been calculated observing the terms of the contracts object 
of the company rent contract between the Distressed Company and the Newco. 
163 Also in this case, the amount has been obtained by analysing the contracts mentioned in the previous Note. 
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Figure 5.1 Geographical composition of the Distressed Company revenues (avg 2008-2012). 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that only the 36% of the total revenues are related to the Italian market, an 
abnormal result for a medium company embedded in an industrial district. This diversification 
allows the company to reduce significantly the country risk.  
 
 
        Figure 5.2 Incidence of Italian and Rest of World revenues trend. 
 
Observing the trend, it seems clear that the incidence of the Italian customers on the total 
revenues is decreasing, demonstrating a higher potential of reduction of the country risk 
aforementioned. 
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5.1.4 Competitors, Industry and Competitive advantage 
As explained before, the Distressed Company was embedded in one of the most important Italian 
industrial districts – since it has been founded there. Accordingly, the main competitors of the 
Distressed Company were all the design firms located in the industrial district, and a first thing to 
do is to observe the competition among those firms. 
In this sense, it is important to notice that the Distressed Company – in the 2012 – was at least 6 
times bigger than every other designer located in the industrial district area, in terms of EBITDA; 
moreover, considering the revenues, the second bigger firm was about 3 times smaller than the 
Distressed Company. In other words, the Distressed Company had a dominant position if we 
compare its size with the other similar firms one. 
Apart from the company size, the Distressed Company had some competitive advantages that 
decrease further the degree of competition. In particular, one of the main strengths of the 
company is its degree of integration. As explained above, from the Nineties the company 
integrated the prototypes production process; this strategic decision permitted the company to cut 
some transaction costs and to coordinate the activities more efficiently. Another competitive 
advantage was represented by the network and partnerships that the company – especially thanks 
to the presence of the two designers – had obtained during the decades. As already mentioned, 
the company was collaborating with some of the most important fashion brands and shoes (and 
not only) specialists of the world. A third competitive advantage was related to all the 
investments in R&D made in the past; the Distressed Company has acquired enough know-how 
to guarantee a pervasive and high-quality service, while on the other side usually the competitors 
were specialized only in one phase of the design process or did not have enough knowledge to 
provide a competitive service. 
Inside an industry, and in particular inside an industrial district where the knowledge spill-over 
phenomenon is very common, another important aspect to observe is the entry barriers of the 
industry, which may be very low. For the Distressed Company, however, the threat was not very 
high because of its dimension and high economies of experience obtained in the last decades. 
A similar reasoning is valid for the bargaining power of the suppliers, in particular the threat of 
integrating the supply business with the designing processes. Indeed, it was very difficult for a 
supplier to begin a designing activity, because of the material differences between the two 
activities (the latter is creative while the former is more operative). Moreover, usually it is easier 
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to integrate the supply activity for a designer than integrating the design activity for a supplier, 
since the creative tasks require more years to be learned and the reputational aspect is more 
important. 
By contrast, a significant characteristic to examine is the bargaining power of the clients. Indeed, 
since the Distressed Company was dealing with important fashion companies and shoes 
producers, there was the significant risk that they decide to integrate totally the design process. 
Obviously, the consequence would have been the irreversible loss of some important clients, 
affecting negatively the revenues. 
 
5.1.5 The negative SWOT approach 
Now that the Distressed Company (and its reference market and industry) has been presented – 
and before analysing the negative path which have led the company to distress – it is important to 
see what could happen to enter a distress stage. In other words, the aim here is to understand all 
the reasons why a company may become distressed given the situation described so far. The 
managers should be attentive to the possibilities of crisis in every moment – also when everything 
is going fine – and maintain a proactive behaviour towards the possibility of a deterioration of the 
performance; broadly speaking, this is also a way to manage the company risk, which is an 
important component of every management activity. 
For those purposes, the “negative SWOT” approach presented in the first Chapter of this 
dissertation will be used. As mentioned above, the aim of this approach is to see every aspect of a 
company – both positive and negative – from a different perspective, i.e. the distress that may 
arise because of a bad treatment of each aspect. To perform this analysis, it is sufficient to 
prepare a normal SWOT analysis and to think about how every item of the scheme may lead the 
company to distress – or even to bankruptcy. 
Figure 5.3 shows the application of the model aforementioned to the specific case: it is important 
to notice that the analysis has been congealed to the 2011, i.e. before the distress started to 
become serious. 
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Strengths 
 
- Skills of the two designers and 
economies of experience (inertia) 
- Uniqueness and flexibility of the 
service offered (no improving) 
- Integration of the processes (rigidity) 
- Positive reputation (inertia) 
- Dominant position in the industrial 
district (competitors’ retaliation) 
- Easy access to new techniques because 
of the industrial district (inertia) 
- International presence and attitude (to 
forget the roots)  
- Geographical and horizontal 
subdivision of clients (too high 
differentiation) 
Weaknesses 
 
- Small dimension and low equity (bad 
capital structure) 
- High incidence of fixed costs, in 
particular leasing (rigidity) 
- Dependence on major clients (no 
fidelization policies) 
- Low contracts duration (no new 
clients) 
- Decreasing level of revenues (no 
reaction) 
- High indebtedness (bad capital 
structure) 
Opportunities 
 
- Further development of the new 
strategic unit (inertia) 
- Further expansion in other countries 
(no further marketing efforts) 
- Higher fidelization (no marketing 
effort) 
- Entrance of new partners in the equity 
(to maintain a bad capital structure) 
Threats 
 
- Process integration of the major clients 
(low marketing effort) 
- Unions between competitors (no M&A 
or alliances) 
- Financial and macroeconomic crisis 
(no hedging) 
- No payment by the clients (bad 
contracts) 
            Figure 5.3 Application of the “negative SWOT” approach. 
 
To think about the possibilities of entering a distress scenario because of a strength may seem 
paradoxical, at a first glance. However – as analyzed in the first chapter observing the main 
literature about the reasons for distress – a company might become distressed because, for 
example, of a too intensive focalization on a single production process or an inertial behavior of 
the managers. Thus, it is important to see what can go wrong starting from a consolidated 
competitive advantage, in order to avoid any type of error which can lead the company in serious 
troubles. 
In the case of the Distressed Company, the exceptional skills of the designers can create an 
inertial behavior which can corrode the gap with the other competitors, that by contrast can 
increase its investments in R&D approaching the company level of quality. Linked to this aspect 
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is the fact that the flexibility and uniqueness of the company service (that is a strength) can be 
imitated in the medium-long term by the competitors164, so the company should be able to 
continuously improve the quality and the perceived benefit of the services offered. Also the high 
reputation that the designers have towards the clients may create an inertial behavior, where no 
further innovations are created simply because they think that what they have done in the past is 
sufficient to maintain the clientele. 
Another advantage of the Distressed Company is the degree of integration of the production 
process; indeed, the company is able to follow the whole process from the preliminary research 
phase to the complete production of the prototype. However, the company may enter a distress 
scenario if it becomes too rigid, i.e. in the case that it decides to perform too much activities 
standardizing the processes. For example, the company may lose the uniqueness of its services 
because of a too high standardization of the processes. Accordingly, the managers-designers 
should maintain the right balance between flexibility and rigidity of the production process, also 
for a matter of fixed costs. 
For a competitors’ point of view, also the dominant position that the Distressed Company has can 
lead to distress if the managers do not control whether the competitors are implementing some 
strategies (such as unions or mergers) to increase its size, undermining the dominant position that 
the company has created during the last decades. 
In some cases, also the international presence can be a problem for a company. For example, 
since the Distressed Company is embedded in a highly traditional industrial district, a too high 
degree of internationalization can lead the company to abandon and forget all the traditions which 
represent a significant component of the competitive advantage of the company itself. 
Accordingly, the company should be attentive in preserving that component – that it is possible to 
call “made in Italy” – that is critical to maintain the competitive advantage created during the last 
years. 
Shifting now to the weaknesses, the link between them and the reasons for distress is more 
logical. 
Firstly, a too low level of equity can be a problem when the managers are going to decide about 
the convenience of an investment; in particular, with a too low level of equity it may not be 
                                                 
164 It is important to recall that the Distressed Company is embedded into an industrial district, where it is difficult to 
maintain secret an information. 
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possible to raise a significant amount of debt capital in order to avoid a deterioration of the 
equilibrium of the capital structure. 
Another problem is related to the high incidence of some fixed costs on the profitability of the 
company. In particular, as showed below in Figure 5.4, on average the leasing costs represent the 
16% of the total revenues. Those costs cannot be recovered (if not through a renegotiation of the 
leasing costs) in case of a decrease of the revenues. 
Furthermore, the Distressed Company relies significantly on some major clients, both for 
reputation and for revenues matters. Clearly, the loss of those clients – either because of their 
decisions (for example if they decide to integrate the design process) or for a manager’s mistake 
(for example the management does not focus the attention to a proper marketing campaign) – 
might undermine the profitability of the company. 
Another criticality is linked to the duration of the contracts. As mentioned above, the average 
duration of the “core contracts” of the company is about 20 months; thus, if the client decides to 
not repeat the partnership the company risks losing revenues. The consequence of this fact is that 
the future revenues are not stable; the company should consider this aspect in order to avoid bad 
consequences. 
Another company weakness is related to its capital structure; indeed, the company has a negative 
Debt-to-Equity ratio – as will be explained better below. An over-indebted company may have 
serious problems, in particular if the operative performance is not sufficient to cover the debt 
service. Accordingly, the managers should find a way to rebalance the capital structure. 
The Distressed Company can also take advantage of some opportunities to grow. 
For example, as precised before, recently it integrated the core activity with new ones (interior 
design, digital graphic support, architecture services, etc.); a significant opportunity would be to 
implement further strategies in order to develop the new strategic unit. Accordingly, the non-
development of the new set of activities would stop the internal growth process that have 
accompanied the company throughout the years; in this case, the company would remain too 
dependent to the old “fashion” strategic unit, avoiding any potential of revenues diversification. 
A similar reasoning is valid for a possible geographic broadening of the market; indeed, the 
company may have the possibility to enter new geographical markets. Thus, if the managers 
avoid considering other market opportunities, the competitors may take advantage of the 
situation, undermining the dominant position in the industry. 
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Another opportunity is related to an increase of the fidelization of the current clients. As stated 
before, one of the main weaknesses of the Distressed Company is the low duration of the “core 
contracts”; the managers may let the company enter a distress scenario if they do not take the 
necessary measures to increase the customer fidelization. 
Finally, an opportunity is the adjustment of the capital structure – at the time in a bad situation – 
through the entrance of a new financial partner which helps the company to grow financially. A 
mistake would be to decide a priori to remain small, avoiding any financial intervention by a 
third party. 
As for the threats, they can be seen as potentially external reasons for distress, so the company 
should seek to avoid them by maintaining a proactive behavior in order to avoid the verification 
of them in the future. 
A first threat presented in the model is the process integration of the major clients, i.e. when a 
client decides to integrate the design process. If on one side this aspect is not directly controllable 
by the company, on the other side the managers can try to eliminate the threat by implementing a 
more aggressive marketing campaign, or by performing more R&D investments in order to 
guarantee a higher level of quality. 
Secondly, in the future the competitors can decide to join themselves in order to compete better 
with the Distressed Company. To eliminate this threat, the company may employ a strategy 
which includes the conclusion of alliances or M&As with the competitors, promising a higher 
payoff (in terms of synergies) in respect of a “competitive battle”. 
Lastly, another threat is related to the possibility that a financial crisis occurs, both at country and 
world level. In this case, the company cannot protect itself completely since often the financial 
crises are sudden; however, the managers can decide to apply some hedging policies (such as 
geographic revenues diversification and stronger agreements with the clients) which can reduce 
the losses. 
 
5.1.6 Rise and fall of the Distressed Company: the reasons for distress 
As mentioned before, the first decade of the new century represented a period of important 
internal growth for the Distressed Company; for this reason, the managers decided to transform 
140 
 
the legal form of the company, from Srl (Società a Responsabilità Limitata) to Spa (Società Per 
Azioni), in order to adjust the capital structure to the new dimension of the company. 
This internal growth period led the two designers to implement a huge increase of the workplace 
dimension, since the increasing work to be performed required more factories, more machineries 
and a more sophisticated equipment. This is why the two designers decided to find a bigger 
headquarter in order to align the dimension of the building and the laboratories to the level of 
production reached. The designers-managers chose to get the new headquarter by signing some 
expensive leasing contracts165. Moreover, the company adopted the leasing instrument to get 
other assets such as furniture, vehicles (in particular a helicopter), printers, computers and a show 
room. In total, the company arrived to spend more than € 1,5 million in leasing costs, reaching a 
peak of € 1.8 million in the 2007. These costs had a significant impact on the profitability of the 
company, in particular if we think that the company had an amount of total revenues lower than € 
10 million166. Figure 5.4 shows the material impact of the leasing costs on the profitability of the 
company (the low 2011 level is due to the renegotiation of some contracts, resulting in a lower 
value of the leasing costs). However, the company needed a way to increase its facilities quickly, 
so that might be the most convenient way. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Incidence of leasing costs on total revenues. 
 
                                                 
165 Some of those contracts have been signed directly from the Distressed Company itself, while the other contracts 
have been concluded by two subsidiaries and then rent to the Distressed Company. 
166 The total revenues were slightly higher than € 10 million only in the 2007. 
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Notwithstanding the high price of the leasing, the investment was considered sustainable because 
of the positive trend of the company revenues. Indeed, in the 2007 (all the main leasing contracts 
have been signed before) the company reached level € 10 million of total revenues, perfectly in 
line with the scenario predicted when the designers decided to lease those buildings and assets. 
The amount of debt was high, but the business outlook seemed positive also for the future, from 
every perspective: the competitive advantages obtained so far appeared difficult to imitate, and 
the relationships with the most important clients were stable. Moreover, during the period 
observed, the EBITDA (which included the leasing costs) was positive in all the years, signalling 
that the profitability of the company was sufficient to sustain those costs. 
However, toward the end of the first decade of the new century the situation started to worsen. 
The first negative signals have been provided by the 2008 financial crisis; as happened for most 
companies, the market demand started to decline, including the ones served by the Distressed 
Company. In particular – as explained in the management reports in those years: 
• fashion strategic unit (footwear industry): the financial meltdown provided a material 
reduction of the investments in external designing services by the “core clients”; 
• industrial design and other activities: the financial crisis decreased significantly the 
architecture industry, so that the internal design activities have been reduced seriously, in 
particular because of the total absence of new financings on the real estate sector. 
A further consequence related to the Distress Company market due to the financial crisis has been 
the increase of the degree of integration of the design activity by the clients, including some of 
the most important ones. Indeed, in order to save costs those companies decided to be less 
dependent on external costs such as the Distressed Company services, preferring for a matter of 
convenience to hire internally some designers. This behaviour may be also due to a change of the 
strategy of the clients; however, the timing of the strategic change is perfectly aligned with the 
financial crisis, so that it is possible to argue that the world financial crisis had a significant role 
in provoking those changes. 
Moreover, from the beginning of the current century the cost and capital structure were not 
optimal; in practise, the unbalanced company structure was “covered” by the good performance 
of the revenues, so that the managers considered worthwhile to maintain this dangerous situation. 
If the incidence of the leasing costs has already been presented above (see Figure 5.4), the second 
structural problem was referred to the amount of debt. 
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     Figure 5.5 The Distressed Company Net Financial Position-to-Equity ratio (2008-2011). 
 
Figure 5.5 shows an alarming situation. Indeed, in the years considered the Net Financial 
Position-to-Equity ratio can be considered significantly high, demonstrating that the financial 
debt raised by the company is not covered enough by a proper amount of risk capital, 
undermining the solvency of the company. 
In particular, as shown in Table 5.5, the increase of the stock of debt is not due to an increase of 
the debt provided by the financial institutions167; instead, the increase of the indebtedness is due 
both to a persistent increase of the account payables and to the accumulation of debts toward tax 
agencies and social security institutions. Moreover, in those years the managers started to ask to 
the clients to be paid partially in advance (i.e. before the completion of the services); this aspect 
on one side had a positive impact on the cash flow, but on the other side implicated an increase of 
the total debts. Figure 5.5 explains well this characteristic of the Distressed Company capital 
structure; on one side it is possible to see a stable path of the bank debt, while on the other side 
the commercial debt and the tax debt increase significantly. All those trends signal a negative (or 
at least delicate) aspect for the Distressed Company; indeed: 
• the stable path of the bank debt reveals a situation where the banks were reluctant to 
increase significantly the credit lines since the company was in a difficult situation, in 
particular because of the performance of the commercial debt. However, as presented in 
Table 5.5, the long-term component of the bank debt is decreasing (because of the 
                                                 
167 A proof of that is the fact that during the observed period the Interest Coverage Ratio – which represents how 
many times the EBITDA covers the interest expenses – has a positive trend. Indeed, from the 2008 to the 2011 it 
went from 1.59x to 6.31x. 
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reimbursement of a long-term loan), while on the other side the short-term bank debt is 
increasing until the 2011. Thus, the relationship with the banks does not seem very bad. 
This aspect is important if we think that the banks were many (about 10). Inside a 
complex situation as a distress period, it may be seen as a positive aspect since in case of 
irremediable crisis scenario the financial institutions are the first entities that react, in 
order to block the credit lines as soon as possible. 
However, this level could not be sufficient if we think that the Distressed Company main 
contracts provided for highly deferred payments; thus, usually a company with such 
deferred cash inflows may need a higher bank financing, in particular revolving credit 
lines; 
• the increasing trend of the commercial debt (i.e. advanced payments from clients, 
account payables and other debts) signals a difficulty in respecting the deadlines when 
paying the suppliers and the other creditors. Indeed, according to internal sources, in 
those years the Distress Company had a tension with some suppliers; 
• the increasing trend of the tax debt shows a difficulty in paying the taxes, cumulating a 
significant amount of debt as the years went on. 
Table 5.5 shows those trends in absolute terms. 
 
(€/000) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Due to banks (short term) 2.188 2.248 2.702 2.946 1.687 
Due to banks (long term) 898 755 429 284 117 
Advanced payments 48 0 272 861 1.872 
Account Payables 542 833 933 936 1.418 
Tax debts 209 221 665 1.120 1.505 
Due to social security 209 139 188 489 395 
Other debts 325 160 504 317 625 
Total debts 4.417 4.355 5.692 6.953 7.619 
   Table 5.5 The Distressed Company debt composition (2008-2012). 
 
This aspect can be confirmed observing the trend of the current ratio (i.e. the ratio between 
current assets and current liabilities) showed in Figure 5.6. The even higher level of total debts 
decreases the possibility to cover the liabilities through the current assets. 
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Figure 5.6 The Distressed Company current ratio trend (2008-2012). 
 
After some years of stability, with a return to two years (2010 and 2011) of revenue growth, in 
the 2012 the performance fell dramatically. In particular, in this period a significant component 
of the Distressed Company clients went into troubles mainly because of the financial crisis; this 
aspect led to two consequences (apart from the higher degree of integration aforementioned): 
• the loss of a significantly high amount of credits; 
• the cancellation of a material number of orders. 
The first consequence led the company to record a huge credit loss168, which deteriorated 
dramatically the net profits. The second consequence implicated a fall of the level of revenues169, 
from about € 8 million to € 3.8 million; in practice, the cancellation of the orders halved the total 
revenues. Moreover, the EBITDA was already negative, equal to € - 2.1 million. 
This dramatic combination of extraordinary costs and decrease in revenues led to a negative net 
result of € - 4.3 million. Since the level of equity was not high, this loss represented a death 
sentence for the Distressed Company. 
                                                 
168 The 2012 amount of credit loss was higher than the one estimated adopting the accrual accounting principle 
because the company did not account for the credit loss in the last two years. Accordingly, the 2012 dramatic fall 
may have been more gradual, starting from the 2010. 
169 This fact may explain also the dismissal of some employees during the year. 
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         Figure 5.7 The Distressed Company revenues and relative growth rates (2006-2012). 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the trend of the revenues (and its per-year growth rate) for the period observed. 
It is easy to notice the direct effect on the revenues of the financial crisis, in particular a decrease 
of 12% in the 2008 and 17% in the 2009. In the 2010 and 2011 it is possible to see a slight 
recovery, i.e. a positive growth of the revenues of 4% and 6%, respectively. However, for the 
reasons aforementioned, in the 2012 the level of total turnover decreased of 52%, damaging 
seriously the EBITDA. In reality, the greatest part of the 2012 negative effect on the revenues is 
related to the abroad sales, as showed in Figure 5.8; indeed, the Italian revenues dropped only of 
12%, while the revenues of the European Union, Rest of Europe and Rest of World decreased of 
63%, 79% and 54%, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.8 The Distressed Company revenues geographically divided (2011-2012). 
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Figure 5.9 represents the EBITDA trend for the relevant period and the relative margin on the 
revenues. The trend follows roughly the revenues one, with an increase of both the EBITDA level 
and its profitability (represented by the margin on the revenues) in the 2010 and 2011. However, 
in the 2012 the material drop of the revenues led to a dramatic deterioration of both the operative 
margin level and its profitability. 
 
 
 Figure 5.9 The Distressed Company EBITDA and relative margin on revenues (2008-2012). 
 
In sum, the distress of the company has been caused by a mix of different but correlated reasons: 
• financial crisis: as the greatest part of the Italian medium companies, also the Distressed 
Company suffered because of the financial crisis; in particular, the world crisis led to a 
change of the behavior of all the economic agents, starting from the individuals. A worse 
financial situation of the end-consumers has decreased – as a consequence – the 
possibilities for the companies to sell their products or services; obviously, this situation 
has been translated also to the companies, such as the Distressed Company, that sell its 
products or services to other companies (B2B); 
• bankruptcy of some old clients: as mentioned above, some Distressed Company clients 
have not been able to pay the company anymore mainly because of the financial crisis. 
This fact has contributed significantly to the dramatic fall of the 2012 because the 
managers had to account for a huge credit loss in the Income Statement; 
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• cancellation of orders: since some clients entered a distress scenario mainly because of 
the financial crisis, the Distressed Company has not been able to conclude the contracts 
related to the related services. In particular, some clients decided to conclude unilaterally 
the contract; this event, as already described, implicated a huge decrease of the total 
revenues (- 52% from the 2011 to the 2012), contributing significantly to the 2012 
performance disaster; 
• fixed costs incidence: the negative effects of the past decision to purchase a huge amount 
of assets (buildings, vehicles, furniture and other equipment) with leasing contracts started 
to show immediately after the distress has begun. In particular, even though the managers 
have tried to decrease the leasing costs through some negotiations, the incidence of those 
costs on the total revenues remained high (20% in the 2012). Moreover, the Distressed 
Company business is labor intensive; as a consequence, the company had a significant 
component of costs composed by personnel costs and services costs (which includes the 
expensive costs related to the collaboration with external designers and professionals). On 
average, the personnel costs account for the 39% of the total revenues, while the service 
costs represented the 36% of the company turnover. Those costs are very difficult to 
decrease when the work to perform starts to decrease. Accordingly, when the distress 
started to become serious, the company could not try to absorb the negative contingency 
by employing an efficient cost cutting strategy because of those high fixed costs (i.e. 
leasing costs, personnel costs and services costs); 
• bad capital structure: from the very beginning of the period observed, the Distressed 
Company capital structure was unbalanced, with a too high level of debt (or a too low 
level of equity). In particular, on average the Net Financial Position-to-Equity ratio for the 
period 2008-2011 is equal to 4x, signaling an unsustainable incidence of financial debt if 
we combine the ratio with the amount of commercial debt. In particular, the banks were 
not willing to increase the credit lines anymore, while the Distressed Company struggled 
to respect the deadlines for the account payables and the tax debt; 
• clients’ integration strategy: a final reason which contributed to the company distress is 
related to a change of the strategy of some of the Distress Company clients, i.e. the 
decision to integrate inside the company the design process. This strategy – which can be 
partially due to the financial crisis – has decreased the potential number of orders for the 
Distressed Company, affecting negatively the revenues. 
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Once the reasons for distress have been listed, it may be useful to classify them following the 
main classifications described in the first chapter of this dissertation. 
The first classification presented in Chapter 1 regards the dichotomy internal vs external reasons 
for distress. In this practical case, the distress has been provoked by a mix of internal and external 
reasons; in particular: 
• inside the “internal reasons” class there are: 
▪ fixed costs incidence: obviously, the high incidence of the fixed costs – in 
particular the leasing ones – has its origins from a decision taken by the managers 
in the past. Thus, by definition it is an internal reason for distress; 
▪ bad capital structure: the high degree of indebtedness is due to some strategic 
decisions undertaken by the management in the past, such as the treatment of the 
commercial and tax debt; 
• inside the “external reason” class there are: 
▪ financial crisis: obviously, the global 2008 financial crisis is an event which has 
not been created by the Distressed Company. Instead, it has been the main trigger 
event which has activated all the other reasons for distress listed above; 
▪ bankruptcy of some old clients: the fact that some of the Distressed Company 
clients went bankrupt because of the financial crisis has nothing to do with the 
company internal decision-making process; 
▪ cancellation of orders: the non-completion of the orders because of the unilateral 
cancellation of them is outside the control of the Distressed Company, even 
though the latter might have included inside the contracts some protecting clauses; 
▪ clients’ integration strategy: clearly, the strategies of the clients – as the 
competitors ones – are very difficult to predict. Accordingly, this could be 
considered as an external cause. 
The second dichotomy analyzed is the operational vs strategic reason for distress. The main 
difference between the two classes is that the operational reasons are more related to the 
decisions (not) undertaken by the managers in order to maximize the internal efficiency. 
Accordingly, in general there is a connection between internal causes and operational causes (and 
external reasons and strategic reasons). In particular: 
• on one side, the fixed costs incidence and the bad capital structure are related with the 
operational reasons, since they undermine the possibility to maximize the internal 
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efficiency of the company. In particular, the two reasons limit significantly the possibility 
to adjust the cost structure as a consequence of a decrease of revenues and to get more 
financing when necessary, respectively. Accordingly, those two reasons are operating 
causes for distress since they affect the internal efficiency of the company; 
• on the other side, all the other external reasons aforementioned (financial crisis, 
bankruptcy of some old clients, cancellation of orders and clients’ integration strategies) 
affect the strategy of the Distressed Company. Indeed, all those reasons deal with a 
change of behavior of external agents (global economy, clients, end-consumers, 
competitors, etc.) which affect the company strategy. i.e. it has nothing to do with the way 
in which the company structures its production process. 
A third classification regards the second part of the “negative SWOT” approach presented in 
Chapter 1, i.e. balance sheet vs income statement reasons. The usefulness of the approach is due 
to the possibility to see clearly where the problems are located in the financial statements. In the 
Distressed Company case, some reasons for distress are a balance sheet problem, others are an 
income statement problem while other are related to the whole financial statements. In particular: 
• income statement problem: first of all, the fixed costs incidence is completely an income 
statement problem, since it affects directly the EBITDA – as mentioned above in this 
chapter. Secondly, the bankruptcy of some old clients could be seen (mainly) as an 
income statement problem, since it has provoked a huge drop of the net income170. 
Thirdly, both the cancellation of orders and the clients’ integration strategies have led to 
a material decrease of the total revenues, because of the financial crisis and an 
unforeseeable change of strategies, respectively; 
• balance sheet problem: among the reasons for distress identified, only the bad capital 
structure is related to the balance sheet only. Indeed, the problem regarded the huge 
amount of debt in respect of the low value of equity; 
• general financial statements problem: the financial crisis is a pervasive event, which 
entails both the operative performance (i.e. drop in revenues and higher extraordinary 
expenses) and the financial one (i.e. the difficulty in obtaining new financing or the 
missed payment of some credits). 
The quantitative impact of the reasons for distress in the different schemes of the financial 
statements (or in the financial statement as a whole) are summarized in Table 5.6 (Income 
                                                 
170 In reality, the credit loss affects the balance sheet as well. 
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Statement), Table 5.7 (cost structure) and Table 5.8 (Balance Sheet), which recall the Tables 5.2, 
5.3 and 5.4 respectively. 
 
(€/000) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Sales revenues 8.845 7.353 7.611 8.038 3.846 
YoY revenues growth rate - -17% 4% 6% -52% 
EBITDA 355 184 926 1.210 (2.137) 
EBITDA margin 4% 2% 12% 15% -56% 
EBIT 235 (148) 740 1.109 (2.251) 
EBIT margin 3% -2% 10% 14% -59% 
Net income (120) (305) 78 103 (4.305) 
       Table 5.6 The Distressed Company Income Statement (2008-2012). 
 
(€/000) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
incidence Operative costs 9.376 7.572 7.469 7.282 8.374 
Raw materials 270 285 282 232 201 3,20% 
Services 2.908 2.545 2.710 2.862 3.516 36,44% 
Leasing 1.558 1.247 974 773 758 13,16% 
Personnel 4.305 3.125 3.204 2.695 2.173 38,61% 
Depreciation and Amortization 119 332 186 101 61 2,05% 
Change in raw materials 11 (24) (39) (5) 23 -0,10% 
Other provisions 0 0 0 0 53 0,13% 
Other operative costs 205 61 153 624 1.589 6,52% 
        Table 5.7 Distressed Company cost structure and average incidence on total costs (2008-2012). 
 
Table 5.7 shows the structure of the costs for the Distressed Company; apart from the personnel 
costs, the highest impact on the total operative costs is provided by services costs and leasing 
costs, i.e. costs which may have a significant component of rigidity. In particular, the services 
costs are mainly related to relationships with external designers and other professional, i.e. costs 
which usually are completely fixed and expensive. Thus, it seems alarming the increasing trend 
of the services costs, since they do not reflect the sales performance. As for the personnel costs, 
during the distressed period the managers tried to cut part of the total employees because of the 
decrease of the orders from the clients; however, to dismiss the employees can be expensive and 
usually requires several months to be performed, so that those costs can be seen as fixed. 
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(€/1000) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Current assets 4.015  4.093  4.738  5.821  2.628  
      Inventory 358  279  577  321  994  
      Account Receivables 3.235  3.464  3.873  5.188  1.322  
      Accrued revenue and prepaid expenses 421  350  287  312  313  
Current liabilities 926  1.005  1.717  2.128  3.871  
     Account Payables 542  833  933  936  1.418  
     Advanced payments 48  0  272  861  1.872  
     Other debts 325  160  504  317  570  
     Prepaid revenue and accrued expenses 11  13  9  14  11  
Trade Working Capital 3.089  3.088  3.020  3.693  (1.242) 
  Trade Working Capital/Sales 35% 42% 40% 46% (32%) 
Other current assets 761  784  940  1.601  1.221  
Other current liabilities (413)  (360)  (853)  (1.469)  (1.505)  
Net Working Capital 3.437  3.512  3.108  3.825  (1.526) 
Fixed assets 298  227  191  148  111  
Other assets and liabilities 200  163  171  33  (303) 
TFR and other provisions (294) (455) (209) (146) (162) 
TOTAL ASSETS 3.641  3.447  3.261  3.859  (1.880) 
      
Net Financial Position 2.932  2.843  2.579  3.075  1.640  
Cash and Cash equivalents (154) (159) (552) (155) (164) 
Bank debt 3.086  3.002  3.131  3.230  1.804  
   NFP/EBITDA 8,27 15,48 2,79 2,54 -0,77 
   NFP/Equity 4,14 4,71 3,78 3,92 -0,47 
Equity 709  604  682  785  (3.521) 
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3.641  3.447  3.261  3.859  (1.880) 
       Table 5.8 The Distressed Company Balance Sheet (2008-2012). 
 
 
              Figure 5.10 Distressed Company Days-in-Receivables and Days-in-Payables (2008-2012). 
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Figure 5.10 shows the average time that the company need to collect the cash from its operations 
and the average time of payments of the suppliers. From the figure it is possible to see an increase 
– during the distress period – of both the Days-in-Receivables and the Days-in-Payables. 
However, the two increases have a different explanation: indeed, the increase of the Days-in-
Receivables are due to both an intrinsic characteristic of the company contracts171 and the 
financial difficulty of some clients, while the increase of the Days-in-Payables are due to a 
difficulty from the Distressed Company to respect the deadlines for the payments of some 
suppliers. 
This fact is the consequence of a very high Trade Working Capital, which signals that the 
Distressed Company had some difficulties in the management of the operative cash flow since 
the cash inflow timing was higher than the average deadline related to the payment of the 
commercial debt. 
 
Summarizing the distress period from a macro perspective, we can distinct two distress stages: 
• Stage 1: this stage corresponds to the period 2008-2011, where the first effects of the 
financial crisis started to impact the financial statements. As already analyzed, in this 
period the performance declined at the beginning but improved slightly until the 2011. 
However, a significant component of the 2012 credit losses should have been accounted 
for during this period of time, so the first signals of distress were already present in this 
stage. According to the Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) model, it is appropriate to classify this 
stage as a mix of “blinded stage” and “inaction stage”, since on one side the managers 
were not aware of the situation while on the other side they did not implement (or were 
not in a position to implement) the proper countermeasures in order to soften the impact 
of the crisis; 
• Stage 2: continuing to follow the Weitzel & Jonsson (1989) framework, the second stage 
– which corresponds to the year 2012 – represents the crisis stage, where the only 
solution available to recover from the situation was the creation of the proper turnaround 
strategy (the alternative would have been to move to the next stage, the dissolution one, 
where the possibilities to rescue the company are null). Indeed, in that year the 
combination of turnover decrease and credit loss increase led to a materially negative net 
                                                 
171 It is not a case that the Distressed Company requires a significant amount of advanced payments from the clients. 
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income, so that the value of the Distressed Company equity became negative. Thus, the 
managers had to find a successful way for continuing the company operations. 
Once having determined a “distress period”, an interesting aspect is to see the path of the distress, 
in order to see – according to the D’Aveni (1989) model if the crisis period follows a sudden, 
gradual or lingering decline. Since the trend of both the revenues and the EBITDA are similar, 
Figure 5.11 considers only the level of total revenues as benchmark for determining the trend of 
the period of distress. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 The crisis pattern (revenues trend 2006-2012). 
 
According to the model, the pattern represented in the figure is composed by a mix of gradual 
decline and sudden decline. However, the “sudden” component seems more appropriate for a 
general definition of the whole distress period. Indeed, in the 2011 the situation seems positive, 
while after one year only the scenario changed dramatically. This fact implies that it is not 
possible to match perfectly the D’Aveni (1989) model with the reality of the Distressed Company 
distress period, since the distress period provides different paths in two different stages. In 
practice, the Stage 1 can be related to a gradual decline, while the Stage 2 (i.e. the year 2012) 
represents clearly a sudden decline phase. Thus, it is preferable – as made before – to focus on 
each sub-period of the distress period instead of relying on the complete version of the model. 
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5.2 The turnaround process 
Once the Distressed Company has recognized the distress situation, it tried to find a solution in 
order to save the company operations and in particular its competitive advantage created during 
those decades. 
Accordingly, this section includes all the strategies that the Distressed Company implemented, in 
particular some attempts to restructure the financial situation of the company through a 
restructuring plan, an attempt of composition with creditors and, finally, a bankruptcy buy-out. 
 
5.2.1 The first attempt: the unsuccessful business plans 
During the 2012, as mentioned before, the Distressed Company performances collapsed. This 
aspect led to two main consequences: 
• firstly, because of the quick decrease of the performance – and the already bad capital 
structure – the banks were not willing to support financially the company anymore; 
• secondly, since the equity value became negative, the shareholders (i.e. the two designers) 
had to find a way to cover the loss. For this purpose, in the 2013 the shareholders decided 
to reduce the share capital from € 400.000 to € 10.000, transforming the legal form of the 
company from Spa (Società per Azioni) to Srl (Società a Responsabilità Limitata). 
However, during the 2012 the Distressed Company management started to try taking the first 
countermeasures in order to return to a positive performance adjusting both the operative and 
financial structure. For these purposes, at the half of the 2012 the managers asked to some 
advisory companies to collaborate in the preparation of a business plan which should serve as the 
basis for the recovery of the company performance. Accordingly, the aim of the business plans 
aforementioned was to adjust the capital structure (decreasing the over-indebtedness of the 
company) and to find a way to improve the operative performance (applying a cost cutting 
strategy and working on better relationships with the clients). 
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5.2.1.1 The first business plan 
The first attempt regarded a plan created by the management with the support of an advisory 
boutique which includes the achievement of a better capital structure thanks to: 
• the implementation of a strategy aimed at increasing the marginal profitability and the 
attractiveness of the services offered; 
• the increase of the legal capital of € 300.000 to realize in the 2012, accompanied by new 
external financing. 
In this way, on one side the legal capital increase would have offered an immediate adjustment of 
the Debt-to-Equity ratio, while on the other side the strategic change would have produced 
positive operative cash flows through which the company could reduce the stock of debt. The 
goal would have been achieved through a new set of investments (to execute in the 2012) aimed 
at improving the quality of the prototypes and standardizing the productive process (reducing 
significantly some fixed operative costs). Those investments would have been covered by new 
financings provided by some financial institutions. 
 
(€/000) 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 
Net Working Capital 3.972 3.884 3.392 3.673 3.857 
   Net Working Capital/Sales 47% 44% 38% 39% 39% 
Fixed Capital 4.549 4.500 4.343 4.175 3.997 
TFR and other operative funds (127) (95) (90) (85) (81) 
Net Invested Capital 8.394 8.289 7.645 7.763 7.773 
Net Financial Position 5.917 4.665 2.663 1.300 (264) 
   NFP/EBITDA 2.86 1.74 0.99 0.47 (0.09) 
   NFP/Equity 2.39 1.29 0.53 0.20 (0.03) 
Equity 2.477 3.625 4.982 6.462 8.038 
Total liabilities 8.394 8.290 7.645 7.762 7.774 
                 Table 5.9 The Business Plan balance sheet (2012-2016E). 
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                Figure 5.12 Business Plan NFP/Equity ratio (2012-2016E). 
 
Table 5.9 and Figure 5.12 show the main effects of the plan on the Distressed Company capital 
structure. In Table 5.9 it is possible to see both the Decrease of the Net Financial Position – due 
to the return to a positive profitability – and the increase of the Equity due both to the immediate 
capital injection established by the plan and to the maintenance of the net profits inside the 
company. The consequence of this double change of trend is represented in Figure 5.12, which 
shows the path of the Net Financial Position/Equity ratio; at the end of the forecast period, the 
ratio becomes even negative, signaling a positive financial position. 
 
(€/000) 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 
EBITDA 2.068 2.674 2.689 2.748 2.840 
Non-monetary changes (19) (33) (5) (5) (5) 
Extraordinary changes (476) (392) 0 0 0 
Taxes (509) (547) (821) (884) (941) 
Operative Cash Flow 1.064 1.702 1.863 1.859 1.894 
Δ Net Working Capital (532) 16 492 (280) (185) 
Capex (668) (180) (80) (80) (80) 
Free Cash Flow (136) 1.538 2.275 1.499 1.629 
Table 5.10 The Business Plan cash flow (2012-2016E). 
 
The cash flow analysis represented in Table 5.10 shows two main aspects. Firstly, the positive 
effect of the strategy planned on the EBITDA, and consequently on the Free Cash Flow; indeed, 
from the 2013 the increase of the performance helps to improve the balance of the capital 
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structure mentioned above. Secondly, the Table represents the investments (Capex) that the 
Distressed Company should make in the 2012 in order to support the revenues growth. 
 
(€/000) 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 
Revenues 8.424  8.800  9.002  9.307  9.811  
YoY revenues growth rate 8% 4% 2% 3% 5% 
EBITDA 2.068  2.674  2.689  2.748  2.840  
EBITDA margin 25% 30% 30% 30% 29% 
EBIT 1.856  2.445  2.452  2.500  2.582  
EBIT margin 22% 28% 27% 27% 26% 
Net Income 547  1.130  1.357  1.480  1.576  
             Table 5.11 The Business Plan Income Statement (2012-2016E). 
 
Table 5.11 represents the income effect of the business plan, considering also the assumptions 
made by the management about the revenues and the costs. In particular, on average during the 
forecast period the revenues increase of the 3.5%, assuming that the company will be able to both 
maintain the most important contracts and attract new clients (at least 4 per year). Secondly, the 
effectiveness of the cost cutting strategy can be seen observing the improvement of the EBITDA 
margin on the revenues, which in the 2013 increases by 5 percentage points. 
As analyzed above, in order to be economically feasible, the plan included some assumptions, 
such as a positive growth of the revenues, a significant increase of the EBITDA and the complete 
resetting of the Debt-to-Equity ratio by the end of the forecast period (composed by 5 years). 
However, mainly because of the too optimistic revenues forecasts, the plan was not executed by 
the managers; in particular, the plan has not been able (for timing reasons) to predict the 
cancellation of some orders by the clients occurred during the second semester of the 2012. 
Moreover, the plan did not consider the credit loss registered in the 2012 financial statements, so 
that the net profit forecasts resulted too optimistic. 
As a consequence, those negative events that occurred during the preparation of the plan 
eliminated the possibility of implementing the required capital increase. The capital increase was 
a critical aspect of the plan; thus, the non-occurrence of the capital injection avoided also the 
additional financing which should have been provided by the financial institutions. 
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A possible explanation of the failure of the plan could be that the Distressed Company managers 
decided to prepare the plan including optimistic values in order to persuade the banks to offer a 
large amount of financing. In practice, the managers aim might have been to see the extent to 
which the banks were willing to finance the company in order to avoid a more several stage of 
distress. As a consequence – after having made the proper valuations –, the bank offered an 
amount of cash that it considered correctly related to the risk of the investment. However, the 
mangers considered not sufficiently high the financing provided by the bank; thus, they decided 
to not perform the equity injection since they would have risked losing all their money (indeed, as 
precised in Chapter 3, if things go wrong, the shareholders would lose everything). 
 
5.2.1.2 The second business plan 
The second attempt to exit the distress period through a completely out-of-court agreement is 
related with a business plan produced with the support of another advisory company. This plan 
was more focused on restructuring the Distressed Company capital structure rather than 
implementing a new (or incremental) strategy. The main points of the plan were: 
• an injection of new capital by the current shareholders of € 3 million (of which € 1.7 
million as equity injection); 
• the identification of further capital requirements (in debt form) of about € 750.000. 
 
 
                Figure 5.13 The Distress Company Net Financial Position according to the plan (€/000). 
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Figure 5.13 shows the positive effect on the Net Financial Position provoked by the intervention 
of the shareholders. In particular, the capital increase adjusts the capital structure leading to a 
positive 2012 cash flow since it permits to pay totally the debt reimbursement. 
 
(€/000) 2012 2013E 2014E 
Revenues 4.974  6.060  6.060  
YoY revenues growth rate  -  22% 0% 
EBITDA (1.765) 399  829  
EBITDA margin -35% 7% 14% 
EBIT (2.135) 309  579  
EBIT margin -43% 5% 10% 
EBT (2.323) 184  454  
Net Income (2.427) 43  231  
           Table 5.12 The Distressed Company Income Statement according to the plan. 
 
Table 5.12 shows the effects on the Distressed Company performance of the plan. In particular, 
the plan forecasted a significant increase of the revenues from the 2012 to the 2013 (+ 22%) 
because of the continuation of a significant contract. Moreover, the positive effect on the 
EBITDA is due not only to the improvement of the revenues but also to the cut of some costs, 
such as the leasing costs (- € 204.000) and the personnel ones (- € 475.000). For the 2014 the plan 
provides for a further improvement of the EBITDA mainly due to a cut of some services costs (- 
€ 340.000). 
As happened in the first attempt – even though the plan has been prepared close to the end of the 
2012 – the revenues forecasts were too optimistic. For this reason, also this plan has not been 
executed and the Distressed Company management decided to not perform the capital increase 
planned since the risk of the equity investment was too high. 
 
5.2.2 The entrance of the Fund, the company rent and the composition with creditors “in bianco” 
In the 2013, a fund (hereinafter, the Fund) started to show its interest for the Distressed 
Company. The Fund found out about the Distressed Company thanks to a local advisory 
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company; in practice, the Fund did not do anything to know about the presence of the Distressed 
Company since it used its network of contacts that it has created during the past decades. 
The procedure started from the Distressed Company owners, that appointed an advisory company 
in order to find someone willing to help the company to recover the performance. Thus – 
according to a Fund insider – the local advisory company, after having known the fact that the 
company was in a distress stage, informed the Fund about the possibility to conclude a deal with 
the Distressed Company owners172. Only at that point, the Fund started an internal analysis about 
the convenience of the investment; in particular, the analysis included the difficulty that usually a 
financial investor has when negotiating with an entrepreneur – as in the Distressed Company case 
– that was used to be free to do whatever he wants with his firm. In particular, one of the most 
difficult aspects – apart of the loss of the company ownership – regards the “financial education” 
that usually a financial buyer provides to the target company. For example, because of the 
intervention of the financial buyer the entrepreneur has to change the way in which he decides to 
spend the money gained from the company operations. Accordingly, a distress investor such as 
the Fund has to be able to accompany the entrepreneur finding the right balance between 
maintaining some entrepreneur’s behaviors and implementing the “financial education” 
aforementioned; in this case, it is possible to imagine this type of preliminary discussions 
between the Fund personnel and the two designers. 
The Fund is a company which has a consolidated experience – and positive results – in the 
extraordinary finance operation field. The Fund has been created in the Eighties, and it has been 
one of the first Italian companies focused on the private equity investment niche. Currently, the 
Fund operates in the so-called special situations field, i.e. scenario characterized by a high level 
of complexity such as in-court procedures, presence of non-performing loans and equity 
investments in distressed companies; basing on the practical context, the Fund may act as a 
financial investor, provide technical competences or act as contractor (assuntore) in case of 
composition with creditors or bankruptcy buy-out. The recent Fund profitability is positive, 
signaling a good reputation173 and strong capabilities provided by both the founders and the 
employees. 
                                                 
172 It is not clear whether the local advisory company informed also other potential buyers about the presence of the 
Distressed Company. However, it is probable that the Fund has been the only one informed since no auctions about 
the Distressed Company has occurred. 
173 The Fund itself says – when presenting itself to the public – that the high reputation it has obtained with the 
courts, the official receivers, the Italian Economic Development ministry and various financial institutions is a 
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Recently, the Fund opened a subsidiary specialized in rescuing and managing distressed 
companies characterized by a strong “made in Italy” component as competitive advantage. 
Accordingly, the aim of the Fund was to purchase the healthy component of the Distressed 
Company – if convenient – in order to associate the distressed company itself to the portfolio of 
all those “high made in Italy component” companies. Thus, for the companies inside the 2made 
in Italy” portfolio, the strategy performed by the Fund may be seen as a mix of financial strategy 
and strategic strategy174. 
However, in order to assess the feasibility of the operation in terms of payoff, the Fund needed 
time in order to perform the necessary due diligence process. For this purpose, the first step 
undertaken by the Fund was the creation of a Newco, owned by the Fund itself and with the 
minority composed by the two designers. If the Fund decides to conclude the operation, the 
Newco will be the final destination of the healthy component of the Distressed Company. 
However, for the short term, the objective of the Newco was to conclude a contract of company 
rent with the Distressed Company. The contract was signed a couple of days after the registration 
of the Newco in the commercial registry (Registro delle Imprese) and concerned the part of the 
Distressed Company that were necessary to continue the operations. The aims of the company 
rent were: i) to conclude the pending orders in order to avoid expensive contract dissolutions; ii) 
to preserve the employees’ condition; iii) to avoid the impoverishment of the enterprise value of 
the Distressed Company. 
One day after the signing of the company rent contract, the Distressed Company managers 
(formally alone but in practice in concert with the Fund) decided to apply for the admission to the 
composition with creditors “in bianco” discipline, ex art. 161, sub. 6 l.f. As already described in 
Chapter 3, the law gives to the debtor (i.e. the Distressed Company) the possibility to ask for the 
admission to the procedure without presenting the plan, but only if it provides information about 
the creditors and the last three years financial statements. However, the debtor must provide the 
plan175 within a period (settled by the court) between 60 and 120 days. 
                                                                                                                                                              
competitive advantage which permits to be able to propose itself as a company that solves complex financial 
problems. 
174 Of course, since the Fund can be assimilated to an asset management company which manages money provided 
by third parties, the main component of the Fund strategy is financial. 
175 The debtor can also decide to present an “agreement for debt restructuring” plan ex art. 182 bis l.f., changing the 
legal instrument during the period settled by the court. 
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In this case, the composition with creditors “in bianco” legal tool has been chosen in order to 
give to the Fund the necessary time to perform the due diligence and to prepare a convenient and 
feasible plan. For this purpose, the Distressed Company managers asked the concession of the 
maximum number of days admitted by the law (120). The court approved the demand a couple of 
weeks after its presentation176. 
The plan presented by the company (but practically considering the directives of the Fund) 
included: 
• the full payment of the prededucibili claims; 
• the payment of the secured claims until the full amount of the assets has been reached; 
• the partial payment for the unsecured claims through new preferential financing equal to € 
1.1 million. The financing aforementioned would have been guaranteed by a surety 
(fideiussione) obtained from a main financial institution. 
Obviously, the plan was a critical step in order to create the basis for the purchase of the healthy 
component of the Distressed Company by the Fund. 
However, the plan has not been approved by the court for a complex legal dispute about the 
interpretation of two legal instruments by different courts. 
Indeed, the plan – produced on the basis of the art. 161, sub. 6 l.f. – included the necessity of 
downgrading the VAT claims. This fact was against the legal orientation of the court under which 
the procedure has been opened. In practise, in those years there was a situation where different 
courts interpreted differently the (potential) conflict of law between two articles of the Italian 
Legge Fallimentare: 
• art. 160, sub. 2 l.f.: this article was directly related to the composition with creditors legal 
tool. The second subparagraph states that the plan may indicate that the secured creditors 
are not paid in full, but only if they are fulfilled in a better way than during a company 
liquidation under a bankruptcy procedure. Moreover, the treatment given to every class of 
creditors cannot alter the par condicio creditorum rule, i.e. the creditors must be satisfied 
equally, but respecting the fact that the secured creditors have a priority in respect of the 
unsecured ones; 
• art. 182 ter l.f.: the article – that has been modified recently – disciplined the transazione 
fiscale sub-procedure. The transazione fiscale is a procedure linked to the composition 
                                                 
176 However, the period of time in which the plan had to be presented has been extended until the beginning of the 
2014. 
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with creditors one177 where the debtor can propose the payment of a certain amount 
(reduced or deferred) of the taxes. Of course, if the tax claim is secured, the par condicio 
rule must be respected. As for the procedure, the article establishes that all the relevant 
documentation must be presented to the tax creditor; then, the tax creditor has to give to 
the debtor a certification about the exact amount of the claim. That amount will be 
included into the composition with creditors plan. For the purposes of the sub-procedure, 
the total tax claim is consolidated, and the tax creditor cannot take further legal actions 
against the debtor after the certification has been sent. However, the version in force in 
the 2013 included the impossibility to reduce the amount of the VAT, while it was 
possible to defer its payment. 
The legal dispute was about the importance of the art. 182 ter l.f., in particular as to whether this 
article must be used also for the composition with creditors without transazione fiscale. Indeed, 
the debtor can select the composition with creditors without transazione fiscale, where the 
applicable rules are only the ones related to the composition with creditors – as the art. 160, sub. 
2 l.f., where the ranking of creditors must be respected. On the contrary, the debtor can choose 
the composition with creditors with transazione fiscale, where the art. 182 ter l.f. is applicable, 
i.e. the VAT claims could not be paid partially but only deferred. 
In short, the main question was: does the law permit to the debtor to decide about the destiny of 
the VAT claim simply selecting the proper legal tool? Can the tax creditors be subject to the 
debtor will? 
Nowadays the issue is solved, since the new art. 182 ter l.f. does not include the limitation for the 
VAT claims aforementioned anymore. 
However, in the 2013 the issue was considered differently by the different Italian courts, so that it 
was not clear whether the Distressed Company composition with creditors plan would have been 
approved or not. Indeed, on one side the Court of Cassation orientation were toward the adoption 
of the art. 182 ter l.f.; in particular, in the sentence 4/11/2011, no. 22932178, the Court concluded 
that: 
                                                 
177 In the sense that it can be chosen only in combination with the composition with creditors. Accordingly, it is 
possible to have a composition with creditors without transazione fiscale and a composition with creditors with 
transazione fiscale. 
178 Case Il Guercino Srl vs Agenzia delle Entrate, where the company selected the composition with creditors without 
transazione fiscale tool. The related plan included the partial write-off of the VAT claims. For this reason, after the 
Court of Appeal has rejected its complaint against the decree with which the Court approved the debtor proposal, the 
Agenzia delle Entrate appealed to the Court of Cassation. 
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• it has no sense that the legislator permits to leave to the discretion of the debtor the choice 
between paying the total VAT amount (deciding to select the composition with creditors 
with transazione fiscale ex art. 182 ter l.f.) and paying only a partial amount of the VAT 
claim (selecting the composition with creditors without transazione fiscale); 
• the nature of the art. 182 ter l.f. is not simply processual (i.e. it is not connected only to 
the transazione fiscale sub-procedure) but it is substantial, in the sense that the article 
regards the treatment of a particular class of claims which the legislator has decided to 
treat differently. In other words, the directives provided by the article about the VAT 
credit has nothing to do with the type of legal tool selected by the debtor. 
By contrast, on the other side some Courts, such as the Ascoli Piceno one179, allowed a debtor to 
avoid paying in full the VAT claim by selecting the composition with creditors without 
transazione fiscale (i.e. avoiding the application of the art. 182 ter l.f.), since the article was 
considered directly related to the transazione fiscale sub-procedure. In other words, if – and only 
if – the debtor had asked for the transazione fiscale instrument, it would have been obliged to pay 
the full amount of the VAT; otherwise it could treat the tax creditors as a normal unsecured 
one180. This position has been undertaken also by other courts (such as Varese, Perugia, Como, 
Milano and Genova), signalling that the case was not isolated, but there was a material legal 
conflict between different courts and agencies. 
As revealed before, in the Distressed Company case the court did not approve the plan. This 
happened because the court followed the Court of Cassation orientation, treating the art 182 ter 
l.f. as a substantial rule. In other words, according to the court the art. 182 ter l.f. was 
automatically applicable as soon as the Distressed Company – under a composition with creditors 
procedure framework – decided to prepare a proposal which included the partial payment of the 
VAT claims. 
This is the reason why the composition with creditors plan has not been approved; consequently, 
the debtor decided to file for bankruptcy. 
                                                 
179 Sentence 311/2014, the case is very similar to the one explained in the previous note. 
180 “In definitiva, ritiene il Collegio che la previsione del primo comma dell’art. 182 ter L.F. opera esclusivamente 
ogni qual volta l’imprenditore voglia, e soprattutto possa, avvalersi dei vantaggi dell’istituto della transazione fiscale 
(quali il cd. consolidamento del debito tributario e l’estinzione dei giudizi pendenti), avendone le risorse. In tal caso 
infatti il debitore sceglie di utilizzare i vantaggi della transazione nella piena consapevolezza della non negoziabilità 
del credito IVA e dei crediti per ritenute per i quali l’amministrazione può unicamente assentire ad un pagamento 
dilazionato” (sentence 311/2014, Ascoli Piceno court). 
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5.2.3 The “Accordo Quadro” and the bankruptcy buy-out 
In the meantime, at the end of the 2013 the Fund and the two designers signed an exclusivity 
agreement (hereinafter Accordo Quadro), under which: 
• the two designers committed to collaborate exclusively with the fund for five years181; 
• the two designers accepted to not compete with the Fund (and so with the Newco) for the 
three years which follow the completion of the collaboration between the two parties. 
In practise, the Accordo Quadro eliminated any possibilities that the two designers worked for 
other companies than the Newco for eight years. 
This agreement is very important because it signals that the Distressed Company cannot be sold 
together with the two designers. This means that if there is a third party (as for example another 
distress investor) which wants to purchase the healthy part of the Distressed Company, it will be 
obliged to prepare an offer regarding only the assets of the company, without including the skills 
and reputation of the two designers. In other words, thanks to the Accordo Quadro only the Fund 
can extract the positive value of the Distressed Company since without the presence of the two 
designers its value would be derisory. 
A couple of months later, the Distressed Company filed for bankruptcy. Indeed, after the 
composition with creditors have failed, the company was in a serious position, sufficiently 
dangerous to satisfy the condition for filing for bankruptcy according to the art. 5 l.f., since the 
company were not able to regularly fulfil its own obligations anymore. 
Once the court has approved the demand – and consequently appointed the official receiver –, the 
official receiver started to prepare the assets inventory and created the list of creditors examining 
the declarations of claims (domande di insinuazione al passivo) presented by the creditors. 
According to the law, with the last activity the official receiver divided the creditors into three 
classes: prededucibili, secured and unsecured. 
After some months – while the list of creditors prepared by the official receiver was still 
temporary – the Fund prepared a demand of bankruptcy buy-out. 
First of all, it is important to precise – at that date – that the Fund had the possibility to present a 
proposal while the Distressed Company (which has filed for bankruptcy) could not do it; indeed, 
the art. 124 l.f. establishes that the bankruptcy buy-out proposal can be presented by one or more 
creditors, a third party and the debtor if one year from the bankruptcy declaration date has passed. 
                                                 
181 This part of the agreement can be renewed. 
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Secondly, even though the list of creditors was still temporary, the Fund could present the 
demand because the scenario respected the provision of the art. 124 l.f. Indeed, according to the 
article it is possible – for a creditor or a third party – to present the demand for bankruptcy buy-
out if the accounting has been kept properly and the related information gives to the official 
receiver the possibility to prepare a temporary list of creditors182. This aspect is very powerful 
because it gives to the Fund the possibility to limit the perimeter of the stakeholders of the 
proposal; in particular, thanks to this particularity – unique in the Italian insolvency legal 
framework –, the Fund could address the proposal only to the creditors that made the admission 
to the declaration of claims up to the date where the Fund presented the proposal183. However, 
even though the list of creditors is still temporary, the proponent has the possibility to address the 
proposal to all the bankruptcy creditors, i.e. also the ones that did not present the admission to the 
declaration of claims (Norelli, 2008); in practise, it is rarely a better alternative for the 
proponent184. As a consequence, ex art. 124 l.f., the Fund addressed the proposal to: i) the 
creditors included in the temporary list of creditors; ii) the tardive creditors (i.e. the one admitted 
after the proposal that have already made the demand for declaration of claims); iii) the creditors 
that have been admitted after they made opposition against the first refusal by the official 
receiver. However, when preparing the offer, the Fund had to consider the fact that also the other 
creditors (i.e. the one which were outside the temporary list of creditors) can apply for the 
procedure at a later stage; as a consequence, when preparing the plan the Fund had to be sure that 
the proposal was convenient also in case all the creditors were admitted to the procedure. 
As for the content, the plan can be classified as “agreement with assumption” (concordato con 
asunzione) since the Fund works as a contractor (assuntore). Indeed, proposing this plan the Fund 
accepted to assume the obligation to pay the creditors according to the plan in exchange of the 
acquisition of the Distressed Company assets. In particular, the proposal included: 
• the full payment of the prededucibili claims by 30 days from the homologation date; 
                                                 
182 However, it is not very clear when the official receiver has to prepare the temporary list of creditors. According to 
Norelli (2008), the temporary list of creditors shall be made, if possible, only after the bankruptcy buy-out proposal 
has been presented; indeed, there is not any rule which obliges the official receiver to prepare such list. Moreover, 
after the official receiver has prepared such temporary list, he does not have to stop its work, since the bankruptcy 
procedure is not completed until the bankruptcy buy-out has been approved by the court; accordingly, if during the 
bankruptcy buy-out process the official receiver concludes the preparation of the “official” list of creditors, the 
definitive list substitutes the temporary one, and the proponent must integrate its proposal considering this new list. 
183 On the contrary, if the proposal is made by the debtor, it must be addressed to all the creditors, also the ones 
which do not have prepared the demand for the declaration of claims. 
184 However, even if some creditors remain out from the proposal, they still can challenge the debtor in order to fulfil 
their claims. 
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• the full payment of the secured claims by 60 days from the homologation date; 
• the payment of the 20% of the unsecured claims by 90 days from the homologation date; 
• the payment of all the tardive creditors admitted to the procedure, respecting the 
percentages above (100% if the tardive creditor is prededucibile or secured, 20% if it is 
unsecured); 
• the transfer of the cash of the bankruptcy procedure to the Fund; 
• the transfer to the Fund of the ownership of the business branch related to the healthy part 
of the Distressed Company. The business branch has been evaluated by an expert 
specialized in company valuation185; the expert gave a valuation equal to € 1.250.000, but 
only at the condition that the two designers continue to work for the Fund (the Accordo 
Quadro aforementioned confirms this possibility)186. The business branch included all the 
assets – both material and intangible – that were necessary to perform properly the 
company operations; it does not include the Distressed Company past credits and 
liabilities. For example, together with the assets related to the execution of the operations, 
the business branch included the related contracts (such as the energy ones), the 
employees, the brands and the Distresses Company website; 
• the transfer of all the bankruptcy procedure tax credits and all the other assets or 
credits/claim recognized after the homologation of the proposal to the Fund. 
In total, the original proposal offered to the creditors about € 1.3 million, provided by both the 
bankruptcy procedure cash (equal to € 867.315) and directly by the Fund itself (€ 437.535). The 
cash provided by the Fund was guaranteed by a surety provided by a main Italian financial 
institution. 
                                                 
185 In order to estimate the business branch value, the expert has considered the financial statements of the Distressed 
Company in the period 2006-2012, in order to find an average value of the financial statement line items which 
regards both the positive and the crisis period. Moreover, the expert normalized the average values found by 
applying some cost reduction related to extraordinary or useless costs (i.e. not related to the core activity of the 
Distressed Company). Finally, in order to reach a final valuation, the expert used a combination of two methods: 
• market multiple analysis: in particular, the expert used the EV/EBITDA multiple after having create a list of 
comparable companies. The average multiple was equal to about 11x, but the expert decided to reduce the 
average multiple to 4x because of the crisis status of the Distressed Company and the fact that the company 
was closely held; 
• “control method”: in order to see whether the Enterprise Value estimated with the market multiple method 
was reasonable, the expert used a secondary method. For this purpose, he checked the company rent 
contract signed in the 2014 between the Distressed Company and the Newco; he found that the parties gave 
a monthly rent related to the business branch only equal to € 16.000. According to the expert, this 
information was sufficient to give an estimate of the Enterprise Value.  
186 The expert estimated a business branch value equal to about € 80.000 without the presence of the two designers, 
as a prove that the only solution for continuing the operations was to deal with the Fund. 
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After almost one year the original proposal has been integrated because the temporary list of 
creditors has been updated considering the tardive creditors and the new prededucibili creditors 
which made opposition to the original list of creditors. As a consequence, the proposal offered to 
the creditors has been updated – and improved – to € 1.4 million; the difference than the original 
proposal consisted in the increase of the cash provided by the Fund (and consequently of the 
linked surety), from € 437.535 to € 551.542. The increase of the cash provided by the Fund has 
been counterbalanced partially from the increase of the bankruptcy procedure cash, from € 
867.315 to € 904.007187. The official receiver, when executing the plan, had to use first the cash 
provided by the bankruptcy procedure; once those money are finished, the cash provided by the 
Fund is used188. 
The cash provided by the bankruptcy procedure itself and the Fund is distributed as shown in 
Table 5.13. 
 
Creditors Amount 
% on 
total 
Total claims 
Prededucibili € 180.000,00189 12% € 180.000,00 
Secured € 1.059.487,15 73% € 1.059.487,15 
   Originals € 805.123,22 55% € 805.123,22 
   Tardive € 91.189,59 6% € 91.189,59 
   Oppositions € 163.174,34 11% € 163.174,34 
Unsecured € 216.062,25 15% 1.080.311,25 
   Originals € 195.108,39 13% € 975.541,95 
   Tardive € 9.481,47 1% € 47.407,35 
   Oppositions € 11.472,39 1% € 57.361,95 
Total € 1.455.549,40  € 2.319.798,40 
              Table 5.13 Distribution of the bankruptcy buy-out creditors according to the plan. 
 
From the table it is possible to see that the greatest part of the claims – in terms of amount – are 
secured, as represented graphically in Figure 5.14. 
                                                 
187 The amount of cash increased mainly because of the collection of the company rents. 
188 As for the surety, it decreases as the Fund money are used for executing the plan. 
189 This amount has been decided already during the preparation of the original proposal by the Fund, considering a 
maximum amount of total potential prededucibili claims. After the integration of the proposal, the increase of the 
prededucibili claims were still lower than that amount. 
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Figure 5.14 Incidence of each creditor on the total amount of cash provided by the procedure and the Fund. 
 
The high incidence of the secured claims is mainly due to some oppressive claims such as the 
ones related to the tax agency, some professionals and an employment agency; in particular, all 
those claims have been accumulated in the past years. By contrast, the unsecured claims are 
related to a similar number of creditors but with a lower credit value. 
It is important to observe that the bankruptcy buy-out plan is very similar to the one (rejected for 
the impossibility to pay only a part of the VAT claims) presented under the composition with 
creditors procedure. Thus, one may argue that also this plan can be rejected by the court for the 
same reason. 
However, the art. 182 ter l.f. related to the transazione fiscale sub-procedure was in conflict only 
with the composition with creditors procedure, since it can be used only in combination with a 
composition with creditors. In other words, there were no reasons to link the art. 182 ter l.f. with 
the bankruptcy buy-out procedure, so that once roughly the same plan has been proposed under 
this new legal framework, the VAT matter ceased to exist. 
At this point, according to the law, before homologating the plan some steps must be performed. 
First of all, the official receiver had to provide an opinion, according to the art. 125 l.f.; in 
particular, the official receiver must provide an opinion – which is not binding – about the 
convenience of the plan in respect of the bankruptcy alternative, the feasibility of it and the 
quality of the guarantees offered. In order to assess the convenience of the proposal, the official 
receiver has created the bankruptcy scenario and compared it with the one proposed by the Fund. 
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The result demonstrates that the bankruptcy buy-out alternative is more convenient; in particular, 
if on one side the prededucibili claims are paid in full in both the alternatives, on the other side 
both the secured and the unsecured claims are fulfilled at a higher percentage in respect of the 
best bankruptcy scenario (100% vs 83% and 20% vs 0%, respectively). The main reason why the 
proposal is more convenient is related to the fact that under the bankruptcy buy-out plan the Fund 
has limited the perimeter of the claims taking advantage of the art. 124 l.f. Indeed, thanks to this 
limitation remain excluded from the procedure claims for a total amount of about € 3.2 million. 
By contrast, in case of bankruptcy those claims would have been considered; that is why the total 
creditors’ fulfilment are lower in case of bankruptcy. Accordingly, the official receiver’s opinion 
was positive. 
Secondly, the proposal passed to the creditors committee, which had to vote the plan. According 
to the art. 127 l.f., only the creditors which had been admitted to the procedure could vote, i.e. the 
creditors which are listed in the temporary list of creditors prepared by the official receiver. 
Moreover, the same article establishes that all the secured creditors could not vote, unless they 
did not renounce to the guarantee. Finally, according to the art. 128, sub. 3 l.f., the variation of 
the number of creditors admitted to the procedure occurred after the voting deadline has expired 
does not affect the computation of the majority. However, in the 2016 the creditors committee 
approved the plan with a large majority. Regarding the voting procedure, it is important to precise 
that the creditors composition was fragmented, so that there were no blocking positions that could 
get a bargaining power.  
Finally, as established by the art. 129 l.f., once it has received the official receiver’s opinion and 
the vote of the creditors committee, the bankruptcy judge examined the legal legitimacy of the 
procedure, the result of the vote and homologated the proposal. 
 
5.3 The Newco performance 
After the bankruptcy buy-out has been homologated by the court, the official receiver could start 
the execution of all the dispositions presented in the proposal. Accordingly, all the effects of the 
proposal started to be effective. Thus, on one side the creditors started to be paid by the Fund (the 
execution of the proposal finished in the 2018), while on the other side the Newco entered in 
possession of the Distressed Company business branch. In particular, the transfer of the property 
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of the business branch occurred in June 2016, i.e. when the court homologated the bankruptcy 
buy-out plan. 
Accordingly, it is important to see whether the Newco performance is better than the one of the 
Distressed Company during the distress period. Obviously, one of the main errors would have 
been to continue to make the same mistakes that led the Distressed Company to distress. Thus, it 
was important to maintain a sound and flexible cost structure and to have a recovery of the sales 
performance; moreover, the capital structure did not have to be as unbalanced as during the 
distress period. 
The activity of the Newco includes the ones performed by the Distressed Company in the past; in 
other words, the vision of the company is to become an “industry of design”, performing the 
activities described in Figure 5.1. As precised before, the Newco is controlled by the Fund, but 
the two designers offer a significant role for the company performance. The detailed ownership is 
represented in Figure 5.15190. 
 
 
   Figure 5.15 The Newco ownership. 
 
 
                                                 
190 The “others” category consists of an employee already present for the Distressed Company considered important 
for the Newco operations. 
Fund
87%
Designers
10%
Others
3%
NEWCO OWNERSHIP
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(€/000) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Sales revenues 1.857 4.183 3.784 4.861 5.657 
YoY revenues growth rate - 125% -10% 28% 16% 
EBITDA 351 203 127 749 587 
EBITDA margin 19% 5% 3% 15% 10% 
EBIT 173 156 71 624 296 
EBIT margin 9% 4% 2% 13% 5% 
Net income 22 45 253 350 164 
       Table 5.14 The Newco Income Statement (2013-2017). 
 
Table 5.14 represents the summary of the results of the Newco Income Statement. 
First of all, the revenues performance is positive; indeed, even though in absolute terms the 
amount of sales revenues is lower than the one achieved during the first phase of the distress 
period, the yearly growth is promising. In particular, from the moment in which the Newco 
bought the business branch, the sales revenues grew by 28% in the 2016 and 16% in the 2017, 
with a CAGR2013-2017 equal to 32%. Moreover, the Revenue-per-Employee increases every year, 
from € 48.868 in the 2013 to € 131.550 in the 2017 (its CAGR2013-2017 is 28%). 
Secondly, it is important to observe that the EBITDA is positive from the beginning of the 
Newco activity; in particular, in the 2016 it grew almost 6 times from the previous year, 
demonstrating that the definitive acquisition of the Distressed Company business branch was a 
profitable deal. The EBITDA margin is in line with the performance of the Distressed Company 
before the 2012, as a prove that the marginality of the performance remained stable. 
However, notwithstanding the revenue growth, the 2017 EBITDA decreased in respect of the 
2016 one. The main reason is due to a significant increase of the personnel costs, showing that 
the company is hiring new employees (in the last 5 years the Newco hired 5 new employees). 
About the cost structure, it is important to precise that the incidence of the leasing costs is lower 
than the Distressed Company; a comparison is presented in Figure 5.17. As for the personnel and 
services costs, the incidence is similar to the Distressed Company one; this should not surprise 
because this type of cost structure is due to the fact that the company is labor intensive. 
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LEASING COST MARGIN ON REVENUES 
 
      Figure 5.16 The leasing cost margin: a comparison between Distressed Company and Newco. 
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(€/1000) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Current assets 1.547 1.543 2.415 4.225 3.937 
   Inventory 970 944 1.244 1.856 1.930 
   Account Receivables 406 584 1.167 2.296 1.934 
   Accrued revenues and Prepaid expenses 171 15 25 73 73 
Current liabilities 1.774 2.084 2.266 2.797 2.385 
   Account Payables 239 347 513 816 547 
   Advanced payments 901 1.450 1.479 1.806 1.670 
   Other debts 634 284 272 169 166 
   Prepaid revenues and Accrued expenses 0 3 2 6 2 
Trade Working Capital (227) (541) 150 1.427 1.552 
   Trade Working Capital/Sales (12)% (13)% 4% 29% 27% 
Other current assets 337 497 583 742 796 
Other current liabilities (320) (162) (215) (744) (729) 
Net Working Capital (210) (206) 517 1.425 1.620 
Fixed assets 110 174 286 1.039 848 
Other assets and liabilities 0 0 (40) (500) (500) 
TFR and other provisions 84 83 102 190 255 
TOTAL ASSETS (185) (114) 661  1.773  1.713  
      
Net Financial Position (216) (280) 241 1.004 779 
Cash and Cash equivalents (216) (614) (262) (6) (29) 
Bank debt 0 334 503 1.010 808 
   NFP/EBITDA (0.62) (1.38) 1.90 1.34 1.33 
   NFP/Equity (6.75) (1.69) 0.57 1.30 0.83 
Equity 32 166 420 770 934 
TOTAL LIABILITIES (185) (114) 661  1.773  1.713  
   Table 5.15 The Newco Balance Sheet (2013-2017). 
 
The Newco Balance Sheet is represented in Table 5.15. 
After a couple of years of stabilization, it is possible to observe an improvement of the Net 
Working Capital, due mainly to a higher increase of the account receivables in respect of the 
account payables; it is a positive signal for the financial stability of the company, since it means 
that the investment in fixed assets is not financed by short term sources. However, this high Net 
Working Capital level can be a threat for the liquidity of the company; thus, the managers shall 
control this aspect in order to avoid incurring in the same mistake made by the Distressed 
Company managers. 
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Secondly, in the balance sheet is evident the effect of the purchase of the Distressed Company 
business branch occurred on the 2016. Indeed, in that year it is possible to see a significant 
increase of the fixed assets (in particular due to the recording of the goodwill), together with the 
account receivables and account payables. This increase is due to the change of the property of 
the assets and liabilities part of the business branch. 
Finally, another aspect which is possible to see from Table 5.15 is represented by the adjustments 
of the capital structure. In particular, the Net Financial Position increases – signaling a growth of 
the debt obtained by the financial institutions – but at the same time the Equity value rises at a 
higher pace, because of both a capital increase of € 100.000 occurred in the 2014 and the 
conservation of the profits created during those years. The efficient balance of the capital 
structure can be represented by the Net Financial Position-to-Equity ratio, as shown in Figure 
5.17, which compares the ratio between the Distressed Company and the Newco. Indeed, apart 
from the Newco cost structure, another Distressed Company reason for distress was linked to the 
capital structure, in particular its high degree of indebtedness. Thus, it is useful to compare the 
financial performance of the Distressed Company and the Newco. Figure 5.17 compares the Net 
Financial Position-to-Equity ratio of the two companies191; it is clear that the current scenario is 
better than the Distressed Company one. Moreover, the composition of the total debt is more 
balanced, with an equilibrate presence of both bank debt and commercial debt, as it is possible to 
see in Table 5.16. 
                                                 
191 For the Distressed Company the figure includes only the years 2010 and 2011 because they are the only years 
where the company had positive earnings. For the Newco only the last two years (2016 and 2017) have been 
considered because they represent the post-business branch acquisition period. 
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                   Figure 5.17 The Net Financial Position-to-Equity ratio: a comparison between Distressed Company and Newco. 
 
(€/000) 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Total debts 2.094 2.576 3.022 5.046 4.420 
Due to banks 0 334 503 1.010 808 
Advanced payments 901 1.450 1.479 1.806 1.670 
Account Payables 239 347 513 817 547 
Tax debts 241 86 108 192 128 
Due to social security 80 77 64 104 76 
Other debts 634 283 354 1.117 1.190 
          Table 5.16 The Newco debt composition (2013-2017). 
 
Moreover, it is interesting to observe the difference among the two companies about others index. 
Table 5.17 includes a selection of other interesting ratios or measures. 
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 2010 2011 2016 2017 
NFP/EBITDA 2.79 2.54 1.34 1.33 
EBITDA Margin 12.2% 15.1% 15.4% 10.4% 
FCF/Financial expenses 8.13 2.22 9.65 11.43 
Net Income Margin 1% 1.3% 7.2% 2.9% 
Interest Coverage Ratio 6.3x 6.3x 24x 17.1x 
Current Ratio 2.02 1.96 1.51 1.65 
Quick ratio 1.44 1.38 0.82 0.82 
              Table 5.17 Distressed Company and Newco: other ratios/measures. 
 
First of all, it is important to notice that the ratio between the Net Financial Position and the 
EBITDA is lower in the Newco case, signaling a lower impact of the financial debt on the 
company operations. Similarly, the Free Cash Flow-to-Financial expenses ratio shows a better 
situation for the Newco. Moreover, as explained before, the profitability of the Newco – 
represented by the EBITDA Margin on revenues – is aligned with the one of the Distressed 
Company when the operative performance was positive. However, the Net Income Margin shows 
an improvement in respect of the same index when the Distressed Company was in its distress 
period. This difference may be explained by the fact that the Newco performance of the financial 
area is better (i.e. the interests on the debt is lower). This fact is confirmed by the Interest 
Coverage Ratio trend; indeed, the Newco EBITDA covers the interest expenses about 20 times, 
while the ratio for the Distressed Company in the years considered was about 6x. 
As precised before, a negative aspect of the Newco is its high Net Working Capital; indeed, a too 
high Net Working Capital can lead to cash problems in the long term. Those potential problems 
are represented by the Current Ratio and the Quick Ratio, which show a decrease of the index in 
respect of the Distressed Company performance during the years observed. 
In conclusion, the performance of the Newco is positive: the operative performance shows a high 
potential; in particular, the Newco is growing organically and the growth in revenues is due both 
to the maintenance of the old customers and to relationships with new clients. Moreover, the 
capital structure is well balanced. By contrast, there could be some potential problems for the 
Newco liquidity since the Net Working Capital is increasing significantly; however, the Free 
Cash Flow is tendentially positive (€ 392.000 in the 2017). 
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However, according to a fund insider, the 2018 Newco performance will increase materially, 
leading to an increase of the total revenues of about 20%. Thus, the future of the Newco seems 
prosperous: all the Distressed Company strengths has been isolated and transferred to the Newco 
in an efficient way. 
 
5.4 A focus on the Fund strategy 
At this point, it is important to review the whole timeline of the procedure considering the point 
of view of the Fund, in order to analyse in detail the strategy selected and why it has decided to 
perform that strategy instead of other ones. 
As mentioned above, the Fund started to be interested in the Distressed Company in the 2013. 
How did the Fund find out about the presence of the Distressed Company? Indeed, the Distressed 
Company was private and probably the managers did not want that the fact that the company was 
in troubles was leaked out. However, a certain level of information about the company situation 
is necessary in order to find someone willing to rescue the company. This trade-off can be solved 
by letting know to the right advisory companies or legal offices the fact that the company is 
looking for an investor that could save the company performance. This is what effectively 
happened: the Fund used its information network – composed by advisory companies, legal 
offices and other insiders – for knowing about the presence of the Distressed Company. 
Once the Fund has discovered the presence of the Distressed Company, it analysed the Distressed 
Company financial statement, its business model and its environment (i.e. clients, suppliers and 
industry), in order to be confident about the idea to have the right skills necessary to turn the 
company around. In particular, the Fund observed whether it had the right knowledge of the 
design industry and the local territory where the Distressed Company was embedded. In this 
phase, the Fund managers recognized that the investment might enter the “strategic” component 
of its business, i.e. the one which includes the acquisition of distressed companies with a high 
“made in Italy” component. 
After having decided to go on with the analysis, the Fund analysed – also talking with the 
Distressed Company management – the reasons for distress. In this phase, the Fund recognized 
that there was a “real business” behind the decreasing performance of the Distressed Company, 
signalling that it could be one of the so called “good companies with bad balance sheets”. 
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At this point, the Fund had to consider whether it had the possibility to take the right decisions 
quickly, i.e. to take the control of the company without particular problems and to see the extent 
to which it might inject capital in order to ease the recovery of the Distressed Company 
performance. In practise, in this moment the Fund combined its skills and financial resources 
with the characteristics of the Distressed Company and the opportunity available. Moreover, 
during this activity it was very important to negotiate properly with the Distressed Company 
owners and managers; indeed, for the owners (i.e. the designers) the decision was very delicate 
and might involve a loss of the company control and a change of their lifestyle because of the 
strict rules imposed by the Fund. 
As a consequence of this thorough analysis, the Fund decided to implement – in concert with the 
Distressed Company management – the first part of the strategy, performed in the 2013. It 
consisted in the implementation of four operations: 
• creation – together with the Distressed Company owners – of the Newco aimed at 
incorporating the positive part of the Distressed Company; 
• conclusion of a company rent contract between the Distressed Company and the Newco 
related to the Distressed Company business branch representing the profitable component 
of it; 
• presentation – made by the Distressed Company managers but practically in concert with 
the Fund – of the demand for admission in the composition with creditors “in bianco” 
procedure; 
• conclusion of an agreement – the “Accordo Quadro” – between the Fund and the two 
designers where the designers commit to collaborate exclusively with the Fund itself for 5 
years and to not compete with the Fund for the 3 years which follow the conclusion of the 
collaboration. 
In this way, the Fund on one side created all the bases for purchasing the profitable part of the 
Distressed Company, while on the other side it obtained a period of time (i.e. the 120 days 
granted by the court) during which it might perform a due diligence in order to create a 
reasonable and convenient plan. 
As for the selection of the legal tool, the Fund might choose a different tool, such as the 
certificate plan or the agreement for debt restructuring (see Chapter 3). However, it chose the 
composition with creditors tool for different reasons: 
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• the need of short-term liquidity: in order to pay the unsecured creditors, there was the 
necessity for the Fund to inject cash. Differently than the certificate plan, the composition 
with creditors procedure protects the financing provided to the distressed company in 
execution of the plan. In fact, the financing provided by the Fund would have had a 
prededucibile claim in case of future bankruptcy procedure (art. 182 quarter l.f.); 
• the complexity of the creditors’ composition: the Distressed Company had a complex 
diversification of its creditors. Indeed, on one side they were highly differentiated 
geographically, because of the historical international orientation of the Distressed 
Company vision; on the other side, the average “core” contract is about 20 months long, 
signalling a dynamic and variable portfolio of clients. For this reason, the Fund selected a 
structured procedure as the composition with creditors one in order to avoid being subject 
to the 60% voting rule present in the agreement for debt restructuring procedure; 
• the risk to be subject to actions addressed at diminishing the debtor assets: in that period, 
the Distressed Company was facing several legal disputes – in particular with some 
creditors, a former external designer and a leasing company – where it might both recover 
or lose money. Accordingly, the Fund might have preferred the composition with 
creditors procedure to the other ones in order to avoid being involved in other disputes. 
Indeed, it is important to precise that in the 2012 the Distressed Company dismissed 9 
employees, who might start some actions against the company itself; 
• the severity of the crisis: even though the literature does not confirm this aspect (see 
Chapter 3), the Fund might have chosen the composition with creditors legal tool because 
the stage of the Distressed Company distress was too serious for a completely out-of-court 
agreement (as demonstrated by the two failed attempts) but not so serious to justify a 
bankruptcy procedure. 
When presenting the demand for the admission to the composition with creditors “in bianco” 
procedure, the Fund was not sure that the court would have rejected it for the VAT claims issue. 
In that period, the Fund decided to select that legal tool because the Fund managers thought that 
it was the best solution available to execute the strategy planned. However – since the Fund is 
specialized in the adoption of the bankruptcy buy-out procedure – it prepared an alternative plan 
which involved the bankruptcy buy-out tool for sure, but this does not mean that in that period 
they used the composition with creditors “in bianco” simply to take more time to execute the due 
diligence. Indeed, the court could approve the composition with creditors plan following the 
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orientation which did not treat the art. 182 ter l.f. as a special rule directly applicable to the 
composition with creditors procedure. Accordingly, if the court approved the composition with 
creditors plan, the Fund would have been satisfied. 
However, the court did not approve the composition with creditors plan because it followed the 
orientation provided by the Court of Cassation where it was not possible to give to the party 
which files for the procedure the freedom to choose whether to pay the VAT claims in full or 
only partially. As a consequence, the Distressed Company managers were obliged to file for 
bankruptcy. 
After this event, the Fund decided to implement the second part of the strategy, preparing the 
demand for the bankruptcy buy-out procedure. As precised before, the plan homologated by the 
court included only a part of the total Distressed Company claims. For example, a significant part 
of the tax claims stayed out of the agreement because usually the tax authorities spend more time 
to compute the amount of the taxes that the companies must pay; thus, the tax authorities have 
not been able to enter the bankruptcy buy-out procedure in time. 
The effects of this limitation of the creditors’ perimeter are clear in Table 5.18 and Table 5.19. 
 
(€/000) Bankruptcy 
Buy-out 
Bankruptcy 
A B 
Prededucibili creditors 169.771 169.771 169.771 
Secured creditors 1.059.487 3.489.553 3.489.553 
Unsecured creditors 1.080.311 1.892.716 1.892.716 
Total liabilities 2.309.569 5.552.040 5.552.040 
            Table 5.18 The composition of the claims according to the different alternatives. 
 
(€/000) Bankruptcy 
buy-out 
Bankruptcy 
A B 
    %    %    % 
Prededucibili creditors 169.771 100% 169.771 100% 169.771 100% 
Saving in prededucibili 
claims 
10.229 100%     
Secured creditors 1.059.487 100% 2.910.841 83% 2.110.841 60% 
Unsecured creditors 216.062 20% 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 1.455.549  3.080.612  2.280.612  
       Table 5.19 The fulfilment of the Distressed Company creditors according to the different alternatives. 
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The tables summarize the analysis performed by the official receiver when preparing the opinion 
to the Fund bankruptcy buy-out proposal ex art. 125 l.f. The bankruptcy alternative includes two 
scenarios, which difference is related only to the result of a legal dispute with a leasing company. 
It is evident from the tables that the bankruptcy buy-out proposal: 
• on one side, includes a lower amount of total debts to satisfy, i.e. only the 41,6% (€ 
2.309.569 against € 5.552.040 in the bankruptcy case); 
• on the other side, includes a better fulfilment of the creditors admitted to the procedure 
claims. Indeed, if for the prededucibili creditors the outcome is the same in both the 
alternatives, for the other creditors the outcome is better in case of bankruptcy buy-out. In 
particular: 
▪ the secured creditors are paid in full under the proposal, while in the best 
bankruptcy scenario they would get the 83% of their total claims; 
▪ the unsecured creditors receive the 20% of the total claims, while in case of 
bankruptcy they would receive nothing. 
In sum, since under the bankruptcy buy-out procedure the Fund could pay only the creditors 
admitted to the procedure, it had the possibility to offer a better condition to all of them. 
However, on the other side there is a significant part of creditors which stayed out of the 
procedure, in particular the tax claimants mentioned above. In particular, the Fund paid € 551.542 
in order to execute the plan, while in case the plan would have been homologated considering the 
definitive list of creditors the Fund would have paid a significantly higher amount for sure. 
However, since the law permitted this type of behaviour by the Fund, and since the plan satisfied 
the creditors admitted to the procedure in a better way than the bankruptcy case, the official 
receiver gave a positive opinion and finally the court homologated the plan. After the plan has 
been homologated, the Fund – through the Newco – obtained the control of the Distressed 
Company business branch, definitely purchased in the 2016. 
From a structural point of view, the whole transaction can be divided in two phases (i.e. the 2013 
company rent contract and the 2016 business branch acquisition), as represented in Figure 5.18 
and 5.19. 
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Figure 5.18 The first phase of the operation: the company rent contract and the “Accordo Quadro” (2013). 
 
Figure 5.18 shows the first phase of the transaction, occurred in the 2014. As shown by the 
Figure, this phase is characterized by the conclusion of a company rent contract between the 
Distressed Company and the Newco (founded by the Fund and the designers for this reason, in 
order to continue the operations) and the conclusion of the “Accordo Quadro” aimed at 
maintaining the designers’ expertise inside the operations. Thus, in this phase there is not any 
change of ownership, since the only legal change is related to the company rent contract. 
 
184 
 
 
Figure 5.19 The second phase of the transaction: the purchase of the business branch (2016). 
 
Figure 5.19 shows the second part of the transaction, occurred in the 2016 (i.e. after the 
homologation of the bankruptcy buy-out plan by the court). In this phase, the Fund obtained 
legally the control of the Distressed Company business branch representing the company 
operations. In order to perform this operation, the Fund created a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
aimed at participating in the bankruptcy buy-out procedures as a contractor (assuntore)192. After 
having purchased the Distressed Company business branch, the SPV sold it to the Newco, 
controlled by the Fund (87%). The Figure includes also the presence of the “Made in Italy” 
subsidiary owned completely by the Fund; the subsidiary corresponds to the legal entity which 
manages all the high “made in Italy” component distressed companies purchased in those years.  
As for the profitability of the operation, if the performance of the Newco will be positive, the 
returns for the Fund can be very high, in particular if we think that it spent only € 551.542 for the 
business branch. For example, applying a multiple of 6x (quite prudential for the design industry) 
to the 2017 Newco EBITDA, and decreasing the amount obtained by the 2017 Net Financial 
Position, it is possible to observe that the Enterprise Value is about 5 times higher than the initial 
expense performed in execution of the bankruptcy buy-out plan. According to a Fund insider, if 
                                                 
192 Legally, the SPV has been created with this specific business purpose (oggetto sociale). 
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the Fund decided to sell its participation on the Newco (i.e. the 87% of the total shares) in the 
2018, its IRR would have been equal to about 35%. However, since the Newco is growing at a 
significant rate, there is a good possibility that the returns in case of divestment can be very high. 
Once the Fund strategy has been analysed, it is interesting to try to classify it according to what 
described in the literature and analysed in Chapter 4. 
In practise, thanks to the bankruptcy buy-out rules, the Fund has been able to purchase the 
Distressed Company business branch paying a low amount of money if we consider the total 
amounts of claims that the Distressed Company had. Moreover, the positive component of the 
Distressed Company – i.e. the business branch – has been sold to a Newco owned by the Fund. 
Finally, currently the capital structure is healthier, mainly because of the transaction performed 
by the Fund. 
For those reasons – if we consider the deleveraging as an operation aimed at adjusting the capital 
structure of a good company by transferring its ownership to a Newco –, it is possible to relate 
the transaction as a deleveraging operation combined with the business unit purchase. In sum, the 
strategy can be called legal deleveraging with acquisition of the business unit. Table 5.20 
combines the different stages with a classic deleveraging transaction with the one performed by 
the Fund. 
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Deleveraging 
Legal deleveraging with acquisition  
of the business unit 
Purchase by the Fund of the distressed 
company debt from a forced seller at a 
discount 
The Fund commits to pay only the claims of 
the creditors admitted to the procedure 
Creation of the newco aimed at controlling the 
distressed company 
Creation of the Newco aimed at incorporating 
the profitable part of the Distressed Company 
Payment of the claims by the Newco and 
conversion of the credit into a participation on 
the distressed company 
Payment of the claims by the Fund in 
exchange of the ownership of the business 
branch, and sale of the business branch to the 
Newco 
Partial elimination of the distressed company 
level of debt 
The level of debt of the Newco is significantly 
lower 
Positive performance of the financially 
healthier distressed company 
Positive performance of the financially 
healthier Newco (which incorporates the 
former Distressed Company) 
Table 5.20 A comparison between the classic deleveraging operation and the strategy performed by the Fund. 
 
In sum, the main common points are: 
• in both the operations a Newco is created; 
• in both the operations the fund purchases a lower amount of debt than the total value; 
• in all the cases the final outcome is a significant reduction of the debt. 
By contrast, the differences are the following: 
• in the classic deleveraging operation, the Newco is created in order to exchange the 
nominal value of the Distressed Company claims with a participation in the Distressed 
Company; on the other side, the aim of the Newco is to incorporate the business unit of 
the Distressed Company; 
• in the classic deleveraging operation, the debt is purchased at a discount after a 
negotiation with a forced seller (such as a bank) which has the incentive to sell the claim 
almost immediately; in the legal deleveraging case, the Fund pays a lower amount of debt 
because the bankruptcy buy-out rule provides for it; 
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• in the classic deleveraging case, the distressed company continues to operate under a new 
ownership, i.e. the distress investor one; in the other case, the Distressed Company is 
failed and will not exist anymore; 
• in the classic case, the distress investor can have a double return (the sale of the claims to 
the newco at its nominal value and the capital gain obtained by the future performance of 
the distressed company); in the legal deleveraging case, the return is related only to the 
future performance of the Newco. 
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
 
6.1 Summary 
Investing in distressed companies is a very difficult task, which requires a broad set of advanced 
skills and competences. As explained clearly by the D’Aveni (1989) distress stage model, the 
distress period may have different paths and a different timing; in other words, the performance 
of a distressed company can pass from a slight distress to insolvency in a very short term or in a 
large period of time. As a consequence, to have strong business, finance, legal and 
communicative skills is not sufficient; a distress investor shall also have a clear view of the 
timing of the distress period in order to know which are the strategies that it can realistically 
implement. Thus, all the technical competences mentioned in the last Chapters must be 
considered adding a further variable – i.e. the time –, since sometimes the best strategy for a 
particular distressed company cannot be available. 
Moreover, it is important to have a clear definition of distress: if on one side the quantitative 
aspect (i.e. the threshold of a ratio in order to consider it as a signal of distress) changes case by 
case, on the other side the definitions of “distress”, “crisis” and “failure” must be distinguished 
clearly, in order to have the right starting point when deciding the turnaround strategy. 
Complementary to this aspect is the perfect knowledge of the reasons for distress; in particular, it 
is important to consider the fact that the reasons that lead a company to distress can be multiple. 
Likewise, it is critical to detect the trigger event which starts the distress period, since some 
reasons for distress can be simply the consequence of one main circumstance. The analysis of the 
reasons for distress requires a strong knowledge of the business of the distressed company; in 
particular, it is important to examine the industry composition and the characteristics of the 
market. Moreover, this analysis requires also advanced accounting skills, for example in order to 
find structural problems in the cost structure or capital structure. 
Another important skill that a distress investor must have is related to the legal aspect. Indeed, 
this type of investors cannot overlook the knowledge of the legal tools that the insolvency law 
provides. In practise, every strategy a distress fund projects includes – at least potentially – the 
possibility to apply one of the legal procedures provided by the law. Accordingly, the distress 
investors must be able to use all the legal tools perfectly, in order to know how to use the law for 
maximising their own returns. 
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The case study presented in Chapter 5 examines a significant part of those themes. The 
Distressed Company was an Italian medium company located in the North-Eastern part of Italy. 
Mainly, the company provided design services for the footwear industry, supporting the clients 
throughout the whole shoes creation process, from the preliminary discussion of the market 
trends and the idea of the final product to the production of the prototypes related to the final 
product. The company was owned by two designers who had founded it during the Eighties, and 
the company was embedded into an industrial district specialized in the footwear industry. 
Recently, the designers started to offer their design services also to other sectors such as interior 
design, packaging and digital design. During the Nineties the company grew significantly, so that 
during the first decade of the new century the managers decided to move the headquarter to a 
bigger building. In that period, the company had a dominant position in the local industry and 
significant relationships with some of the most important international clients. The aim of the 
company was to become an “industry of design”, covering not only the footwear sector but other 
markets as well. 
However, at the end of the first decade of the Noughties the company started to show the first 
signals of distress; the trigger event was the 2008 global financial crisis, but the first signs were 
present also in the previous years. Table 6.1 summarizes the main reasons for distress. 
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Financial crisis 
The world financial meltdown led to 
a change of the behaviour of all the 
economic agents. As a consequence, 
the worse financial condition of the 
consumers has decreased the 
possibilities for the companies to sell 
their products or services; obviously, 
this situation has been translated also 
to the B2B companies, as the 
Distressed Company.  
Bankruptcy of 
some old clients 
During the distress period, some 
Distressed Company clients were not 
able to pay the company anymore, 
mainly because of the financial crisis. 
This fact has contributed 
significantly to the dramatic fall of 
the 2012 performance because the 
managers had to account for a huge 
credit loss.  
Cancellation of 
orders 
Since some clients entered a distress 
scenario mainly because of the 
financial crisis, the Distressed 
Company has not been able to 
conclude some of the contracts 
regarding the related services. In 
particular, some clients decided to 
conclude unilaterally the contract; 
this event implicated a huge decrease 
of the total revenues, contributing 
significantly to the 2012 performance 
disaster. 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Revenues
(383.583)
(539.968)
(1.440.26
0)
2010 2011 2012
Credit loss
€ 8.038,00
€ 3.846,00
2011 2012
Revenues
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Fixed costs 
incidence 
The negative effects of the past 
decision to purchase a huge amount 
of assets with leasing contracts 
started to show immediately after the 
distress has begun. Moreover, the 
intrinsic characteristic of the business 
(labour intensive) implied a huge 
amount of personnel and service 
costs. Accordingly, when the distress 
started to become serious, the 
company could not try to absorb the 
negative contingency by employing 
an efficient cost cutting strategy 
because of those high fixed costs. 
 
Bad capital 
structure 
The Distressed Company capital 
structure was unbalanced, with a too 
high level of financial debt, in 
particular if we combine it with the 
performance of the working capital. 
In particular, if the relationship with 
the banks could be considered stable, 
the Distressed Company was facing 
some difficulties in respecting the 
payment of the commercial and tax 
debt. 
 
Clients’ 
integration 
strategy 
It consists in the clients’ decision to 
integrate inside the company the 
design process. This strategy – 
which can be partially due to the 
financial crisis – has decreased the 
potential number of orders for the 
Distressed Company, affecting 
negatively the revenues. 
 
Table 6.1 The Distressed Company reasons for distress. 
 
33% 35% 36% 36%
91%
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49% 43%
42%
34%
57%
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180%
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4,14
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2,5
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   Net Financial Position/Equity
€ 9.119
€ 10.046
€ 8.845
€ 7.353 € 7.611
€ 8.038
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The distress period can be divided into two stages. The first stage comprehends the period 2008-
2011; in those years, the company performance declined continuously, even though the revenues 
performance was slightly positive (apart from the 2008 fall due to the financial crisis). The 
second phase corresponds to the year 2012; in that year, a combination of material decrease of the 
total revenues and the accounting for huge credit losses led the company in a serious situation. 
In order to find a solution, the Distressed Company managers tried to prepare – with the support 
of two advisory companies – two business plans, that unfortunately did not represent the real 
situation of the company. As a consequence, a distress investor (the Fund) entered in negotiation 
with the Distressed Company managers – in particular with the two designers – in order to help 
the company to exit the distress stage in exchange for the ownership on it. Indeed, the aim of the 
Fund was to integrate the Distressed Company – characterized by a strong “made in Italy” 
component – in a group of similar “made in Italy” companies already owned by the Fund itself. 
For this purpose, the Fund founded – together with the two designers – a Newco and concluded a 
company rent contract in favor to the Newco regarding the Distressed Company business branch 
related to the operative component of it. Then – in order to have the exclusivity on the positive 
part of the Distressed Company – the Fund concluded with the two designers an agreement where 
the designers committed to collaborate only with the Fund for a certain amount of years. In this 
period, the Distressed Company (in concert with the Fund) applied for the admission to the 
composition with creditors (concordato preventivo) “in bianco” procedure; however, the plan 
proposed by the managers has not been approved by the court because of the presence of a 
conflict of law regarding the treatment of the VAT claims. As a consequence – after the 
Distressed Company managers had filed for bankruptcy –, the Fund created a bankruptcy buy-out 
(concordato fallimentare) proposal with a content similar to the composition with creditors plan 
one. Because of the bankruptcy buy-out rules, the VAT claims issue was not a problem anymore 
and the Fund had the possibility to assume only a part of the claims (i.e. the ones present in the 
temporary list of creditors prepared by the official receiver). As a consequence of the bankruptcy 
buy-out plan – which has been homologated by the court –, the Fund acquired the positive 
component of the Distressed Company by incorporating it in the Newco, which currently has a 
positive performance. 
In this way, the Fund has been able to perform a sort of deleveraging operation, in this paper 
called legal deleveraging with acquisition of the business unit, where it has been able to purchase 
the positive component of the Distressed Company investing a low amount of money (€ 551.542) 
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if we consider that only the 42% of the total Distressed Company debt has been paid193. 
According to internal sources, if the Fund sold the Newco in the 2018, its IRR would have been 
about 35%: a significant rate considering a 3 years investment period. 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
The case study presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates various aspects about the way in which a 
distress investor can act and the distress investing process in general. 
 
Complexity of the distress investing requirements 
The Distressed Company case study shows clearly the level of knowledge that a distress investor 
must have in order to select the proper strategy in order to turn the company around and 
maximizing its return at the same time. In particular, generally the fund must possess advanced 
skills in the following areas: 
• business: before deciding to invest into the Distressed Company, the Fund had to perform 
a thorough and pervasive analysis of the company situation and its reasons for distress. 
Indeed, an investment in a distressed company is by definition a risky operation; thus, it is 
important to be totally confident about the fact that there is a “real business” behind the 
dangerous situation. Accordingly, for example it has been an important factor to know 
about the Distressed Company predominance in the local industry; similarly, another 
important information that the Fund may have obtained regards the composition of the 
clientele and the characteristics of the most important contracts. Moreover, the 
information related to the presence of two business units, the design process and the 
involvement of the two designers-owners provided significant insight about the 
diversification of the revenues and the importance of the presence of the two designers 
inside the company. An exhaustive knowledge about the Distressed Company and its 
environment is important also in order to detect and understand in detail the reasons for 
distress. Indeed, in the case study (and in Table 6.1) it is possible to observe the variety of 
                                                 
193 Moreover, it is important to precise that the majority of the creditors has been paid using the cash owned by the 
bankruptcy procedure itself. 
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the reason for distress; they were both internal and external and both operative and 
strategic. 
In order to perform a high-quality business analysis, a distress investor shall also have 
skills and an organization peculiar of a strategic investor; in other words, since a distress 
fund must act quickly, it should already have a certain level of specialization in the 
industry it is going to invest. In the case study, the Fund already had a project specialized 
in “made in Italy” distressed companies. Thus, it could move quicker than the other 
distress funds which are not specialized; this fact can be seen as a key competitive 
advantage since it gives the possibility for the Fund to be more flexible when preparing a 
purchasing offer; 
• accounting: in order to find the so called “good companies with bad balance sheet”, the 
distress investors have to master the financial statements analysis techniques. Indeed, it is 
as important as the business analysis to be able to recognize quickly every capital 
structure unbalance and situation of cost rigidity. In particular, a good financial statement 
analysis should show whether the reasons for distress are simply related to recoverable 
bad past decisions, suggesting that there is a “real business” behind the current state of 
difficulty. 
Strong accounting skills are necessary also when preparing the turnaround plan, since 
every line item of the plan must be prepared in detail. For example, in the specific case it 
was important to have a good knowledge of the accounting treatment of the company rent 
contract in order to estimate the effects on the performance of the Newco in the first years 
which followed the transaction. Another critical accounting point was related to the 
definitive purchase of the business branch assets, i.e. the transition from a company rent 
regime to the acquisition one; 
• finance: to have strong finance skills is important for two reasons. Firstly, in order to see 
whether the investment is reasonable, it is important to perform a correct valuation of the 
distressed company. Thus, the distress fund must know the most used valuation 
techniques. Secondly, a distress investor shall be expert in the functioning of the capital 
markets and the main financial instruments available. For example, in the case analyzed 
the Fund may have tried to adopt a debt-equity swap strategy; in order to perform such 
strategy, is would have been important to have an advanced knowledge of the securities 
the Fund was going to convert. Moreover, basically a distress investor operates as an asset 
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management company; thus, it is important to know how to balance and hedge its 
portfolio of investments; 
• legal: the most important difference between the distress funds and the other investors is 
related to the strong expertise in the bankruptcy law. Indeed, the probability that a distress 
investor enters a procedure regulated by the insolvency law is materially high. The Fund 
described in the case study is specialized in the use of the bankruptcy buy-out legal tool 
but for sure it is expert also in all the other procedures provided by the law. In the case 
study, the Fund had to understand perfectly the way in which the composition with 
creditor, the bankruptcy and the bankruptcy buy-out work. 
As a prove of the fact that to have a legal expertise is critical in the distress investing 
world, it is important to recall the use made by the Fund of the bankruptcy buy-out 
procedure. Indeed, the Fund used this procedure – and the opportunity created in that 
moment – to pay a lower amount of cash taking advantage of the art. 124 l.f., which gave 
the possibility to rely on a temporary list of creditors; 
• network of contacts and communication: finally, for a distress investor it is critical to have 
the proper network of contacts and strong communication skills. 
The network of contacts is essential in order to be informed quickly about the presence of 
a company which is in a distress stage. Indeed, this type of information is private since a 
public disclosure can alter the relationships of the distressed company with its main 
stakeholders. Accordingly, the distress fund must be able to create a reliable network of 
insiders in order to have the tip before the other funds get it. In the case study, the Fund 
obtained the information from a local advisory company, confirming the importance of 
the network aforementioned. 
Furthermore, the distress investor needs advanced communication skills in order to 
negotiate properly with all the stakeholders of the distressed company. This aspect is even 
more important when dealing with private companies owned by families or an 
entrepreneur. Indeed, often to communicate to an entrepreneur that its company is 
entering a distress scenario is a delicate aspect; moreover, usually the entrepreneur is not 
willing to give up the control of the firm he founded. Moreover, the distress investor must 
be at the same time a good negotiator and a good mediator; to find an equilibrium 
between the purposes of the stakeholders and the own ones is a very complex task. 
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Mistakes and failures 
Another important lesson that the case study provides consists in the fact that often the right 
solution is not automatic. 
Indeed, the first attempts undertaken by the Distressed Company managers consisted in the 
preparation of two business plans which were based on assumptions – provided by the managers 
– too optimistic, especially for the revenues. This fact explains well the complexity of the distress 
investing world, since often the scenario changes so rapidly that the managers are not able to 
provide a stable estimate of the main financial statement line items. Moreover, in this phase the 
distressed company managers may be incentivized to prepare optimistic plan in order to obtain 
large financings by the banks; thus, another theme is related to the reliability of the players of the 
procedure during the distress period. 
After the failure of the business plans, the Distressed Company managers selected the 
composition with creditors tool. As happened in the previous attempts, the result has been a 
failure since the court did not approve the composition with creditors plan. The reasons are 
related to legal issues, i.e. the impossibility – according to the court – to include in the 
composition with creditors plan the partial payments of the VAT claims. This event provides a 
further insight about the complexity of the issue, since sometimes the distress funds themselves 
do not know how the court will decide. 
In conclusion, the distress investing is an intricate field, where the decisions must be taken 
quickly. Accordingly, to make mistakes (or to not reach the best solution available) is a very 
common event in those cases, in particular when the availability of information is not complete, 
and the results depends strongly on the way in which the court interprets the law. 
 
The information difficulties 
As already mentioned, in the case study the Fund has been able to identify the Distressed 
Company thanks to its network of insiders that it has created during the last decades. However, in 
the same period also other funds might have been interested in the Distressed Company. This fact 
has helped the Fund to avoid a competition among distress investors which might have increased 
the acquisition cost of the Distressed Company. 
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In other cases, however, the Fund may suffer the fact that the information about other distressed 
companies is collected only by another fund. The general result is that it never happens that a 
high number of distress funds know about a particular distressed company. This fact represents a 
high information barrier which can potentially reduce significantly the probability to rescue a 
distressed company. 
However, on one side the distressed company managers would prefer to not disclose to the 
market the situation since the main stakeholders (such as the banks and the suppliers) can decide 
to stop any relationships with the company, but on the other side without a certain level of 
information nobody would seek to help the managers to save the company. How to solve this 
information trade-off? On one side, it may be possible to conclude that the distress investing is 
inefficient by definition, and its inherent complexity includes also this information gap; but on 
the other side, the distress funds should be able to contrast this difficulty by creating a proper 
network of contacts. Effectively, this last point is one of the main competitive advantages of the 
distress investors, since they deal with private information only. 
 
A new strategy: the legal deleveraging 
As explained in the last part of the previous Chapter, the strategy performed by the Fund can be 
classified as a legal deleveraging with acquisition of the business unit. The main differences with 
the normal deleveraging operation are two: 
• the payment of a lower amount of debt than the total (common to the classic deleveraging 
case) is due to the application of the bankruptcy buy-out rules instead of a negotiation 
process with a forced seller; 
• the distressed company (or a business unit of it) ownership is transferred to the Newco 
instead of having a change of the ownership directly inside the distressed company. 
The identification of this new type of distress investing operation can provide addition insight 
about the activity of the distress investors, in particular about the application of a similar strategy 
in other cases. In particular, interesting is the use of the bankruptcy buy-out procedure made by 
the Fund in this case. 
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Particularity of the bankruptcy buy-out procedure 
The strategy performed by the Fund in the case study focused the attention on the bankruptcy 
buy-out procedure. Indeed, if used appropriately, this instrument can be used in order to take 
advantage of the possibility, ex. art. 124 l.f., of creating a plan addressed only to the creditors 
which are included in the temporary list of creditors prepared by the official receiver under the 
bankruptcy procedure. In other words, this legal tool gives to the proponent of the plan the power 
to decide not to pay the creditors which are not included in the temporary list of creditors. 
However, when planning the strategy, the distress fund has to consider the totality of the 
distressed company claims, since it is ever possible that a creditor which stayed out from the 
temporary list of creditors asks to be admitted to the procedure at a later stage. In particular, in 
the Distressed Company case the tax authority lost a significant part of their claims simply 
because this type of entities employs more time to assess the real value of their claim. 
Accordingly, a good distress investor must be aware that under certain circumstances there may 
be the possibility to obtain those advantages which affect directly – and positively – its return. 
 
6.3 Insight for future research 
In addition to some conclusions, the Distressed Company case leaves some basis for future 
research. 
First of all, in Italy the distress investing is an industry which is still young, in particular if we 
consider that in the USA the distress investing was already developed in the Eighties as a 
consequence of the development of the junk bonds market. Accordingly – also considering the 
fact that the most important legal changes related to the legal procedures aimed at continuing the 
company operations are recent –, it would be important to encourage the economic agents to 
enter this niche, since the effects for the economy may be significantly positive in the long term. 
Secondly, a further analysis should be performed about the information asymmetry issue. In 
particular, it would be useful to find the main drivers which affect the right balance between the 
necessity to keep private the information in order to avoid a further decrease of the distressed 
company value and the importance to let know to the distress investors about the existence of the 
companies which are looking for help. A hypothetical possibility could be the creation of a sort of 
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protected information flow which matches companies and funds, aimed at linking the distressed 
companies’ necessity to communicate their distress status and the interest that the funds have on 
this type of information. On the other side, it is understandable that this solution may enter in 
conflict with the goals of the distress funds which are already operative, since the information 
asymmetry is one of their main competitive advantage. 
Finally, the strategies performed by the distress investors shall be reanalysed as soon as the 
Italian bankruptcy law reform will be completed194. 
In particular, it will be interesting to analyse the effect of the “alert procedure” that the Italian 
legislator is going to introduce; thanks to the alert procedure, the probability of detecting in 
advance a corporate distress status should be higher. Moreover, the alert procedure will anticipate 
further the period of protection of the distressed company assets; thus, the approach of the 
distress investors may change. 
On the other side, the reform would like to reduce significantly the number of claims that are 
possible to classify as prededucibili; this fact can have a material impact on the distress funds 
strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
194 The reform should be completed in the 2019. 
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